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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines how the US policy of detaining noncitizen families
emerged at the intersection of three processes: (1) increasing connections between
geopolitical and homeland security policies and immigration enforcement practices; (2)
expanding legal categories of detainable and deportable noncitizens; and (3) the state’s
regulation of noncitizen families. 1 Implemented in March of 2001, but expanded sixfold
in 2006, family detention’s evolution reflect wider changes in the immigration
enforcement system. Family detention provides, therefore, a discrete case study through
which to trace emerging trends in the policing of citizenship and migration status. Border
enforcement and boundary-making have been enduring foci for political geographers,
who critically analyze the role of il/licit border-crossing in the production of political
boundaries, the ways in which borders and border-crossings are contested, and the forms
of border enforcement that emerge from these framings of territorial bordering, political
membership, and national identity (Burridge and Loyd 2007; Dunn 1996, 2010; Nevins
1

A Note on Terminology: Mainstream media, advocates, and policy-makers most commonly refer to
“immigrant family detention,” but this phrase gives me pause for a few reasons. First, it erases the fact that
many people migrate to the US with no intention of establishing permanent residency or citizenship.
Referring to noncitizens as immigrants presumes that all noncitizens seek to stay in the US, which both
ignores migrants’ intent to return and emphasizes a swelling noncitizen population. Second, for families in
particular, “immigrant” obscures the fact that most families at Hutto and Berks seek protection by filing
asylum claims. US and international law differentiates between economic or labor migration (which is
supposedly “by choice”) and socio-political persecution, which isthought to be without choice. Many
question the boundary between political and economic refugee status, in order to emphasize how neoliberal
economic reforms have created life-or-death situations for migrants that do not conform to post-World War
II norms of political persecution. These distinctions are critical for how people navigate the US admissions
process, but from the perspective of exclusion, noncitizenship defines migrants’ relationship to border and
immigration enforcement agencies. Since I focus on the process of physical containment and banishment, I
use the term noncitizen. Where I discuss the asylum-process in particular, I use the term “asylum-seeker.”
In situations where I am paraphrasing others, I retain their terminology.
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2002; Nevins and Aizeki 2009; Sundberg 2008; Varsanyi 2008).

Immigration

enforcement policies cannot be explained, however, solely by examining border
enforcement policies, debates, or “boots-on-the-border” practices (Coleman 2008b).
Distinct legal and governmental arrangements authorize a series of spatial strategies:
interior policing, detention, deportation, and the discretionary decisions about noncitizens
between “apprehension” and “removal.”

Beginning with the selective detention of

families at the Berks County Family Shelter Care center in 2001, expanding to the
mandatory of detention of families in 2005, and then receding to Berks once again in
2009, noncitizen families’ shifting “detainability” provides a window onto changing
detention policies. This dissertation traces these changes in order to understand, first, the
range of laws, policies, and informal practices that led noncitizens to become the US’
fastest growing incarcerated group, and second, the spatial practices through which
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), counties, and contractors produce this
detention landscape in relation to, but irreducible to, border enforcement. 2
Family detention is not strictly a “post-9/11” development, though popular media
representations recount its history as such.

The Berks County Family Shelter Care

Center near Reading, Pennsylvania, opened in March of 2001 with 84 beds (Figure 1.1).
Prior to Berks’ opening, the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) released
family groups identified as “illegal aliens” with “Notices to Appear” before an
immigration judge. For families arriving without documents and no immediate contacts
2

Until the 2003 Homeland Security Act reorganized immigration and border agencies, Immigration and
Nationalization Services (INS) was responsible for policing immigration violations and administrating
admission. The Act delegated immigration enforcement to the new Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) while the new Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) handled admissions and
administration. Whilethe INSdetained and adjudicated unaccompanied children’s cases, the conflict of
interests between caregiving and the adversarial legal process led unaccompanied minors’ custody to be
transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (see Women’s Commission 2002). When
describing pre-2003 immigration enforcement, I refer to the INS.

2

Figure 1.1: Berks County Family Shelter Care Center.

(Source: Author, December 2008.)
in the United States, the INS could not verify their identities, making release problematic
from an immigration enforcement perspective. Housed at Berks Heim, an elderly care
home built in the 1950s, the Berks family shelter stood on a large campus of county
services and next door to an INS juvenile detention facility for unaccompanied children.
According to INS officials, the site was contracted specifically because Berks County
staff were familiar with children’s specific legal frameworks and services. Berks staff
saw family detention as an extension of juvenile detention, and subject to the same ‘nonpenal’ custodial models and operating standards applied to the detention of

3

unaccompanied children under 18 years of age (Herman 2001). As a child welfare
facility, family detention at Berks unfolded out of a set of institutional practices aimed at
attenuating the effects of detention and state custody children.
A ten-year long legal battle, fought by child advocates in California’s federal
district court (9th), Flores v. Meese was ultimately settled in the Federal Court’s Ninth
Circuit in 1997. Until this ruling, the INS was charged with holding, processing, and
either releasing or deporting unaccompanied non-citizen children found to be out of
status. The INS was in charge of age determination, which was widely found to be
inaccurate, resulting in the detention of minors in adult facilities (Women’s Commission
2002). The INS also ran juvenile detention centers, so that the same officials charged
with proving unaccompanied minors were in violation of immigration law were also
charged with their daily care, recreation, education, and discipline. Immigration and
asylum interviews were held under the same “adversarial” practices as used for adults, a
situation that required that children of all ages narrate their cases with the same
evidenciary demands as adults.

These practices disregarded the special difficulties

children have obtaining records, comprehending complex legal frameworks in a foreign
language, and most importantly, retaining legal counsel (Women’s Commission 2002).
The Flores Settlement addressed these explicit conflicts of interest within the INS by
stipulating conditions of custody, procedures for releasing children to family members,
and legal mechanisms for contesting a child’s detention. The federal court intended the
settlement to provide temporary guidance, and required the INS to develop standards and
policies for the detention of minors, the publication of which would replace Flores.
The INS never wrote or implemented these policies, however, and in 2006 when

4

the T. Don Hutto Family Residential Facility opened, Flores remained the only binding
legal framework on federal immigration custody of minors. A former adult detention
center and medium-security prison, family detention at Hutto was implemented at a
facility built for adult, male inmates and staffed by corrections officers (aka prison
guards). Transforming from a pre-trial detention center for federal prisoners, to a U.S.
Marshals’ detention center, to a family detention center in a matter of months, the facility
underwent few changes to its physical infrastructure, décor, programming, or service
provision.

While the popular press has placed much of the blame on the Corrections

Corporation of America (CCA), who owns and operates Hutto, the intergovernmental
service agreements that govern the relationship between federal and private entities
contained a single alteration: the population of detainees (US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement 2006b). Hutto is typical of the wider immigration detention system, which
relies upon surplus bedspace in the criminal justice system, decommissioned army
barracks and prisons, and speculatively-built “tent cities” (Dow 2005). The detention of
non-citizen adults occurs largely in former and existing prisons and county jails, and is
governed by the Detention Operations Manual, a non-binding set of standards and
procedures based on the Adult Corrections Manual. By ICE’s Detention and Removal
Office’s own admission, many detention centers fail to pass American Corrections
Association criteria for the criminal justice system (US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement 2003; US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b). Bearing razor
wire, prison scrubs, frequent head counts, paltry medical care, unsavory and insufficient
food, automatically closing doors, and an hour of education a day, Hutto violated nearly
every provision of Flores, and drew a lawsuit (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al.) in

5

March of 2007.
Institutionally,

Berks

and Hutto represent two common governmental

arrangements in the noncitizen detention system. Both are contract facilities, contracted
through InterGovernmental Service Agreements (IGSAs). IGSAs devolve responsibility
for detention operations from the federal government to county governments, and
counties stand to make significant incomes from these arrangements. As of September
2009, most ICE facilities were contracted through IGSAs, and of these, seven were
dedicated to detaining noncitizens. A total of 50% of the total detained population is held
in these dedicated detention facilities, and the remainder detained noncitizens in criminal
justice facilities (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b). Because they are
inter-governmental, these contracts are not awarded through the federal government’s
competitive bidding process. In Hutto’s case, Williamson County subcontracts its IGSA
responsibilities to the Corrections Corporation of America, who pays the county $6,000
per month for “monitoring” costs. In the context of an economic downturn and growing
demands on county resources, detention has become a significant source of income for
both Williamson and Berks counties. While Taylor granted CCA a property tax holiday,
CCA pays taxes into the local school system. Berks, alternately, sits on a large swath of
county land, amid a recycling center, community college, agricultural extension office, a
new elderly care facility, a juvenile criminal justice facility, a noncitizen juvenile
detention center, and a jail. Family custody is part of a larger package of county service
and income generation (Herman 2001).

6

Figure 1.2: Children at T. Don Hutto Family Detention Center.

(Source: Ben Wheeler, July 2009.)

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Family detention emerged, therefore, within a complex assemblage of legislative,
judicial, administrative, and political economic processes.

My purpose in this

dissertation is to unravel a few of these threads: immigration geopolitics, legal
subjectivity, discipline, and detention’s spatial ordering. In doing so, I hope to distill the
different spatial practices that constitute US noncitizen family detention and the legal,
political, and governmental regimes that make families detainable. I began my research
with the following questions:

7

1. What do the different spatial strategies of family detention and its legal
contestation reveal about the relationship between space and the family, the child,
and the migrant as political categories?
How are the rights of children balanced against the rights of their parents, if their
treatment is governed by different legal guidelines? What do family detention policy and
practices reveal about the status of the family in immigration and citizenship law? How
are any particular needs or rights of families and children met or violated through the
spatial strategies of family detention? How do the spatial and temporal ordering of the
Hutto and Berks facilities meet or violate the needs and/or rights of families? How do
different spatial strategies and/or legal statuses differentiate between families?

2. How do family detention policy and its public contestation reproduce and
circulate spatialized conceptions of the family and the child?
What legal, moral, racial, gender, class, or age-specific categories are used to
describe immigrant and asylum-seeking families? Are some families perceived to have
special needs over others? Has detention produced a de facto assumption of parents’
criminality or illegality? How are these differentiations established and supported? How
do proponents and critics of family detention recuperate particular notions of the family
and the child? What spaces of family life, such as the home, are used to support or
describe particular notions of the family and the child? How have various spatial
understandings of the family and the child forced changes in family detention policy?

3. What does the administration and regulation of family detention reveal about

8

new connections between spatial strategies of security and immigration enforcement
practices (i.e. “the securitization” of immigration)?
How did immigrant and asylum-seeking families come to be understood as
detainable? What kinds of problems do families present to immigration enforcement
officials? What terms and assumptions framed ICE’s understandings of family
immigration as a problem? How did detention come to be the preferred solution for the
problem? What other options were considered but rejected? How does family detention
fit into a wider range of immigration enforcement practices? How has the legal challenge
to family detention forced a reworking of immigration enforcement policies more
broadly? How does family detention compare to other examples of “securitization” given
in the secondary literature?

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
The following chapters examine specific aspects of US noncitizen family
detention policy and practice, and locate family detention in relation to border
enforcement and geopolitics, immigration and case law, and sexual citizenship. First,
however, I describe the geographic literatures from which my research questions and
methodological approach emerged (Chapter 2).

This review does not exhaust the

literatures used in the dissertation as a whole, but represent the project’s starting points.
Each chapter engages therefore with additional geographical and interdisciplinary
literatures necessary to put my analysis into conversation with a broader intellectual field.
Chapter 2 charts the intellectual terrain from which my broader theoretical and
geographical curiosity flowed: recent engagements with (and critiques of) Giorgio
9

Agamben’s theorization of the sovereign ban and topological power; spatial analyses of
detention and confinement; geographical conceptions of the family; the securitization of
immigration; and spatial ordering, calculation, and subjectification as power/knowledge
practices.
Chapter 3 describes how my methodological approach evolved to accommodate
the realities of researching a highly politicized topic in the midst of a highly charged
campaign to end family detention. I outline my research methods, what they produced,
and my analytic process. In Chapter 4, I contextualize the US’ immigration detention
system and offer a conceptual framework for understanding detention as a “bordering
practice” (Newman 2006). While most studies of immigration enforcement focus on
borderland enforcement actions, the policing of territorial boundaries, and border
crossings, Mathew Coleman has argued that these studies neglect the rising importance of
interior enforcement (Coleman 2007a). As subnational jurisdictions take responsibility
for immigration policing, and proof of citizenship is required to access an increasing
number of public institutions, the “where” of security and geopolitics is no longer
contained by “the border” (Coleman 2009). Noncitizens are held, rather, in 350 different
facilities across the US, though they remain clustered in the US Southwest. I describe not
only the legal and policy measures that enabled the rapid expansion of immigration
detention in the US, but the existing prison infrastructure that enabled the rapid
containment of noncitizens. I place these spatial strategies in relation to each other to
better understand the resonances between them. (Portions of this chapter will be
published in Engineering Earth, edited by Stan Brunn, forthcoming 2011.)
In Chapter 5, I show how detention is not a single spatial strategy, but a complex

10

process of criminalization and isolation through which detainees become deportable
subjects. I trace how detention came to seen as an integral component of US-Mexico
border security more broadly, and how ICE’s practice of family release came to be
understood as a procedural vulnerability and therefore a threat to territorial closure.
Engaging with interdisciplinary critical security studies, I seek to temper recent accounts
of deterritorialized, biopolitical border technologies, especially those that argue that risk
analysis has displaced discipline as a governmental practice. Rather, I argue that security
is a heterogenous assemblage that recombines, recalibrates, and rearticulates biopolitical
techniques. (A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Geopolitics.)
Chapter 6 focuses on Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al., the 2007 lawsuit against
family detention at Hutto to trace the legal figurations of children, parents, and families. I
show how noncitizen children are framed more as ‘child-objects’ in immigration law than
agential, liberal subjects.

Immigration law figures adults, however, as criminalized

migrant-subjects, ineligible for the due process on which liberal legal regimes are based.
I then analyze how a Federal District Court judge balanced ‘irreparable harm’ to detained
children, the ‘public interest,’ and Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s discretion to
detain noncitizens. Relying upon “geostrategic discourses” (Ó Tuathail 2003) of external
threat and internal safety, the judge argued that US detention represents a safe space
compared to families’ countries of origin. Twisting national security with the ‘best
interests of the child,’ the judge authorized a legal framework for family detention, but
with specific spatial requirements. These legal, discursive, and spatial tactics form what I
call a geopolitics of vulnerability in which ICE seeks to displace national (in)securities
onto detained families. (A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Gender, Place, and
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Culture.)
In Chapter 7, I examine the contractual relationships between Immigration and
Customs and Enforcement (ICE), Williamson County, and the Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA), and outline to what extent each party was legally and practically
responsible for detention center operations. In short, ICE contracted with Williamson
County, which in turn contracted with the Corrections Corporation of America. This
formed a chain of command in which ICE and CCA did not initially communicate
directly, but used Williamson County as mediator. Thus, when the lawsuit was filed, ICE
was sued for the conditions of detention created by CCA, while CCA could not be sued
because private prison corporations are not parties to the Flores agreement. In effect, this
contractual triangle surrounded the Hutto detention center in legal procedures while
deferring responsibility for detention conditions between federal, private, and county
agencies.
In Chapter 8, I examine how ‘the family’ emerged as an object of governance, and
a key site/category through which to challenge state power, and a site of struggle over
that power.

Proper family forms—heterosexual marriage and child-rearing in

particular—have become a condition of political membership. In short, the family is a
core political identity, refracted through a host of legal categories, and, for many, a
fundamental category of social organization and identity. In this chapter, I compare
immigrant rights advocates’ efforts to reform ICE’s custody policies, to transform
detention spaces from “prison-like” to “home-like” spaces. I trace how, on the one hand,
advocates’ critiques of family detention condensed around private space, autonomy and
freedom of movement. ICE’s architectural plans for new “family residential centers”
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focused on security, surveillance, and population control. The struggle to define “family
appropriate spaces” was, therefore, a struggle over the regulation of intimacy, privacy,
and care. More broadly, Chapter 8 highlights the state’s enduring interest in the family,
reproduction, and kinship as a condition of political membership.
In the final chapter, I synthesize the previous arguments and outline their
implications for theorizing detention in and beyond geography. I argue, in short, that
detention should be understood as “a doing,” (Gregory 2006a). In the context of the
border, security, and immigration regimes analyzed in this dissertation, detention is, more
specifically, a process of creating deportable subjects. Even as the majority of families
passed their Credible Fear Interviews (CFIs) and stayed in the United States, families felt
criminalized, isolated, and feared their impending deportation (as described in Chapter 5).
At the same time, social services are increasingly unavailable to even “legal immigrants,”
so that noncitizenship precludes forms of social and political exclusion, as well. For
Nicholas De Genova, “what makes deportability so decisive in the legal production of
migrant ‘illegality’… is that some are deported in order that most may remain (un–
deported) as workers, this particular migrant status may thus be rendered ‘illegal’” (De
Genova 2002, 39). Immigration law and enforcement policy are, therefore, “deliberate
interventions that have revised and reformulated the law,” forming “an active process of
inclusion through ‘illegalization’ ” (ibid.). Drawing on recent engagements with different
aspects of Giorgio Agamben’s work, I argue that US immigration policies tie banishment
from US territory to abandonment by state institutions. I conclude the dissertation by
considering the political ethics required to challenge current US immigration enforcement
practices like family detention. I think through the ways in which detained families are
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more “bound and constrained by power relations in a situation of forcible exposure” than
they are depoliticized, biological bare life (Butler 2003, 32). It is here, I argue, that the
second half of Foucault's modern biopolitics, “making lives and letting die,” points to
more subtle modalities of sovereign power (Foucault 2003, 241).

Copyright © Lauren Leigh Martin 2011
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

DETENTION
Governments often implement detention in an ad hoc manner, refashioning the
geographies of legal access and immigration advocacy in ways that have dramatic
impacts on detainees’ asylum and immigration claims. For example, Mountz (2004,
2010) analyzes Canada’s reaction to the arrival of 600 Chinese refugees via boat in 1999.
Seemingly overwhelmed by the arrival of such a large group, Citizenship and
Immigration Canada set up a temporary processing center in a former gymnasium.
Designated as a ‘port-of-entry’ rather than a detention center, the migrants were not
officially on Canadian soil. Rather, they passed through a ‘long tunnel’ that was not
considered Canadian territory, and therefore not technically detention. And since they
were not officially detained, advocates and attorneys were barred from contacting them.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada then established provisional detention centers and
immigration courts twelve hours by car from Vancouver, where legal experts and regular
courts are located. The results of the asylum claims heard in these courts were 5%
positive, while asylum claims by Chinese have a 58% approval rate in Vancouver’s
courts. Similarly, following a raid in which 270 beef processing plant workers were
arrested for immigration-related crimes, Immigration and Customs Enforcement set up
temporary immigration courts on fairgrounds in rural Iowa (Saulny 2008; and see
Coleman 2007a). These ad hoc detention practices, ‘long tunnels’, and remote locations
create ‘detached geographies’ through which detainees are spatially separated from the
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services that facilitate their rights claims.
In addition to these detached geographies within territorial boundaries of nationstates, governments strategically use these boundaries to exclude asylum-seekers from
the rights guaranteed by international law. In the Australian and European contexts,
Hyndman and Mountz (2008) argue that nation-states are tending toward strategies of
externalization. Australia and Britain, for example, have set up asylum and visa
processing centers on islands and in dominant sending countries (respectively) to prevent
migrants from reaching the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state. By forestalling
their physical arrival on Australian and British soil, these governments prevent asylumseekers access to the rights afforded them under international law. Rather than being
detained on arrival (at an airport or border crossing) or within the boundaries of a nationstate, governments detain people in transit. Provisional ports-of-entry, temporary courts
in rural areas, and extra-territorial detention indicate not a coherent, centralized state
strategy, but nation-states’ willingness to combine multiple detention strategies. There is
no single geography of detention, therefore, but an emerging and continually changing
assemblage of spatial tactics.
The changing character of detention directly impacts the legal geographies of
detention in two ways. First, as alluded to above, the location of detention directly
impacts detainees’ access to rights and information (Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Mountz
2004). Analyzing legal access from the perspective of legal aid and advocacy
organizations in Britain, White (2002) points out that the funding of these organizations
directly impacts the spatiality of legal counseling. Official policy may include provisions
for legal representation of asylum-seekers, for example, but the withdrawal of funding
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from critical organizations can effectively eliminate legal representation without a change
in policy or law. Law and policy domains are, therefore, situated in wider governmental
networks and state apparatuses. Second, the legality of detention spaces is critical to
understanding the geographies of detention. Because detainees are held under ambiguous
legal norms, under vastly different conditions, and for indefinite periods, analyzing the
relation between law, state power, and space has been particularly important. As
explained above, detention centers and the detainees held in them are ambiguous legal
entities. State governments often exempt detainees from due process, obstruct their
access to legal counsel and courts, and detain individuals indefinitely in remote locations
(Coleman 2007a). These remote, detached, and externalized geographies of detention
work to physically segregate, contain, and exclude people to whom the law seems not to
apply.
For many, detention and detainees represent material examples of Giorgio
Agamben’s “state of exception,” a contemporary reworking of German theorist Carl
Schmitt’s understanding of sovereignty and law (Amoore 2006; Coleman 2007a; Gregory
2004a, 2006a,b; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Minca 2005). Schmitt’s (1985, 2003)
theory of sovereignty assumes that state power flows from a single sovereign, who has
the power to decide when, where, and for whom the law is in force. Likewise, the
sovereign can call a “state of emergency,” in which the rule of law is suspended. For
Schmitt, these “spaces of exception” are concrete, bounded, territorial spaces, much like
traditional political geography theorizes the nation-state as a government with power over
a discrete, bounded territory. Agamben (1998, 2005) argues, however, that the “state of
exception” has become the norm, a fundamental ordering principle in modern politics. In

17

essence, the sovereign marks boundaries between an included national citizenry and an
excluded foreign Other, and this process of exclusion is, for Agamben, the founding
moment of political life. Thus, excluded persons are never completely excluded, but are
“included through exclusion,” and, therefore, occupy a “zone of indistinction” between
the force of law and the suspension of law (Agamben 1998, 2005). Held outside of the
law, detainees can be rendered ‘bare life’, and become nothing but biological beings open
to an unmediated expression of sovereign power. As a paradigm of power, the process of
inclusion–exclusion operates throughout political life, as a topological relationship. Thus,
inclusion–exclusion is not just bounded in discrete, territorial ‘spaces of exception’, but is
woven into everyday decisions made by “petty sovereigns” (Butler 2004) in positions
throughout state bureaucracies (Belcher et al. 2008; Coleman 2007a,b). The ‘state of
exception’ has provided, therefore, a way of understanding detention as the production of
quasi-legal spaces, as spaces in which the state has suspended the law for certain people.
Alternatively, others have asked not how the suspension of law is the exercise of
executive (sovereign) power, but how law expands executive power. Tracing out the
emergence of the Bush administration’s claims to sovereign decisionism, the United
States’s post-colonial occupation of Cuba, and the detention of migrants there in the mid1990s, Gregory (2006a) argues that Guantánamo Bay’s detention camp is not so
exceptional. As Reid-Henry (2006) has also argued, the current detention camp was
established in this specific legal and colonial context, and the status of Guantánamo Bay
as US territory has never been wholly resolved. Rather, as Belcher (2008) argues, calling
Guantánamo Bay a ‘space of exception’ masks how the suspension of domestic criminal
law for ‘enemy combatants’ has allowed that space to be ‘filled’ with military law and a
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new and separate court system for detainees. In addition to housing a new court system,
the camp has also served as a testing ground for ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’
(torture), extraordinary rendition, and indefinite detention. Thus, Guantánamo Bay has
been an important site for the development, codification, routinization, and expansion of
certain detention practices. These geographers understand law as performative, as made
through the embodied practice of legal discourses, rather than a transcendent rule system
as is often implied by Agambenian analyses (Butler 2004; Gregory 2006a). In other
words, this research asks how detention and its variants have become normalized – i.e.
governmentalized – through the reconfigurations of sovereign, governmental, and
disciplinary power.
This method of inquiry also asks how certain people become detainable in the
first place. Through changes in legal categories, media representations, and policy
discourses, different groups of people come to be seen as migrants, immigrants, asylumseekers, refugees, illegal aliens, or criminal aliens, with each term connoting raced,
classed, and gendered bodies. In turn, the legal categorizations of people and spaces are
linked to these representational practices. For example, applying the term “aggravated
felony” to migrants only and expanding the term to include a wide range of petty offenses
(e.g. shoplifting) has uniquely criminalized immigrants as a group (Coleman 2007a).
These legal categorizations are linked to broader identification practices that produce
detained persons as worthy or deserving of detention. Thus, the representational practices
that depict different groups as unwanted, foreign, or dangerous inform legal and policymaking discourses, producing these groups as justifiably excludable and detainable
(Ackleson 2005).
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The material practices within detention centers are, then, bound up with the visual
and textual representations of a nation-state’s outsiders more generally. Based on firsthand experience, Falah (2007) describes how Israeli security forces use solitary
confinement, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and repetitive questioning to
purposefully dehumanize and demoralize detained persons. Gordon (2006) and Sexton
and Lee (2006) point out that torture has long been institutionalized in US prisons, and
that the colonial legacies of slavery are bound up with the ‘colonial present’ (Gregory
2004b) of mass incarceration, immigration detention, and Guantánamo Bay. In the case
of the Abu Ghraib war prison in Iraq, torture practices rang an unfortunate resonance
with the Baathist’s use of that site for the same purpose – imprisoning and punishing
perceived enemies. Performed by US soldiers, however, these practices are also linked to
a global network of US-operated prisons, detention centers, and training camps (Gregory
2004a, 2006b) and to the knowledge practices that link them. Here, Gregory’s (2006a)
sustained engagement with both Agamben and the performances of detention
demonstrates how Guantánamo’s detainees were systematically stripped of their political
subjectivity and treated as ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). The micro-geographies of torture,
interrogation, and indefinite detention rely on interdependent representational, discursive,
and spatial practices, to routinely discipline ‘foreign’ or ‘enemy’ bodies in specific ways.
Analyzing the spatialities of detention makes (at least) five significant
contributions to understanding detention. First, the uneven topography of detention sites
– the ways in which detention spaces vary across space – reveals the malleability of
detention as a spatial practice. People are held in former jails, with prisoners in existing
prisons, in tent cities, on ships, and in makeshift cells in courthouses, airports, and ports-
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of-entry the world over. Second, this uneven topography is directly related to uneven
geographies of legal practices and boundaries. The ambiguous legal status of detainees
allows them to be held in a range of places, without oversight and without recourse to
rights (or often the legal counsel that might protect them). These legal and political
ambiguities help to create the overarching sense of indeterminacy that characterizes
detention. Third, this indeterminacy results from the exceptionality of detention as an
‘included exclusion’, as a space in which there is no distinction between law and its
suspension. Fourth, these ‘spaces of exception’ are produced through discursive practices
and are imbricated with the normal, everyday operation of government. Fifth, detention
practices have specific legal, political, and historical geographies that point toward the
continuation of a violent, colonial past, rather than a break from a more peaceful, lawabiding near past. Studying the geographies of detention offers a critical vantage point for
understanding new spatialities of state power, especially as the relationship between
nation-states and territory are reconfigured in response to global migration, trade, and
security concerns.

IMMIGRATION AND SECURITY
As a geographical phenomenon, migration and immigration have primarily been
addressed in terms of political economy (Hierbert 2006; Samers 2002, 2003), push-pull
factors (Black et al. 2006), costs and benefits to host and sending countries (Borjas 2001),
identity and citizenship (Ehrkamp 2005; Leitner 1995; Leitner and Ehrkamp 2006; Secor
2004), state-level policy analysis (Ackelson 2005; Ibrahim 2003, 2005), and boundary
formation (Ackelson 2005; Coleman 2005, 2007a, b; Gilbert 2005; Nevins 2002).
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Political economy scholars tend to address migration as a capital-labor relationship,
mediated by a capitalist state apparatus. This research frames migration as a labor market
issue and analyzes both regulation and migration in these terms (e.g., Clark and Gertler
1983; Collins 2006; Hiebert 1999; Knowles 1995; van Houtum and van der Velde 2004).
In contrast, scholars of national and transnational identity approach im/migration from
the perspective of the subject, analyzing the ways in which national and transnational
identities are reconfigured through the migration process. The scholarly work on national
identity is immense and ranges from studies of assimilation policies (Ehrkamp 2006;
Forrest and Johnston 2006) to generational integration of migrants (Christou and King
2006; Walton-Roberts and Pratt 2005), to patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Ellis 2006;
Kofman 2002; Leitner 1995, 1997; Yeoh 2006). Researching immigration and identity
from these perspectives has led scholars to question the utility of the nation-state as the
proper scale of analysis as migration becomes a more permanent fixture in the lives of
people (Ellis 2006; Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan 2003; Ley and Kobayashi 2005).
Methodologically, this scholarship ranges from ethnographic and qualitative studies of
subjective experiences of migration to quantitative, longitudinal studies of demographic
statistics.
As I explore in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, boundary formation has focused
on the role of localized border management in national identity formation (Berelowitz
2005; Browne 2006; Mahtani 2002), nation-state policy responses (Ackelson 2005;
Anderson 1999; Heyman 1999), as a contested site between globalized trade and national
security (Blatter 2004; Coleman 2005; Esparza et al. 2004; Gilbert 2005, 2007). This
work sees the border as a spatialization of the processes examined in other migration
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literatures. Current immigrant detention, including family detention, arose through a
multi-scalar, multi-sited process. In my research design, I treat immigrant detention as a
complex of multi-sited practices, or a heterogenous assemblage of spatial strategies,
embodied practices, and imagined geographies that include but exceed ‘the state.’ As
Purcell and Nevins (2005) argue, critical political economy tends to treat the state as a
medium or dependent variable of the capitalist system, even when the contested character
of the state is addressed. Thus, evaluating the relationship between immigration and the
state as a relationship between flows of labor and capital can neglect other power
relations at work.
In the case of the U.S.-Mexico border, Purcell and Nevins argue, the resulting
policies were driven more by localized concerns than national policy-makers, and
policing practices were shared between enforcement locations (Nevins 2002). Thus, both
policy and enforcement developed through uneven multiscalar negotiations. In contrast,
Coleman (2005) argues that for Washington, D.C.-based policy-makers, the border is an
abstract, empty territory, while the difficulty of borderland terrains prevents border patrol
employees from executing border security policies as mandated. The presumed (and oftcited) tension between neoliberal geo-economic demands and geo-political security
measures form too convenient a story. Mountz (2004) takes the argument further, and
uses her ethnographic analysis of immigration bureaucracy as position from which to
question the very identity of the state. Locating state power in the operation of a specific
agency, during a specific time in a specific place, everyday bureaucratic practices belie
the agency’s coherent public image.
Where and how the state actually exists is, then, called into question. Secor (2007)
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analyzes the spatiality of the state from the perspective of middle class residents of
Istanbul, and notes that it is at specific points of contact (government offices, the hospital,
arrests) that people experience state power. Thus, state employees’ banal actions produce
the effect of a menacing state apparatus. At the same time, however, rights claims can
only be made to the state. This “recoiling desire” for state protections enrolls citizens as
ambivalent subjects, as residents and the state mutually constitute each other, however
unequally (Secor 2007). For De Genova (2002), immigration enforcement practices
materialize the process of “illegalization,” a historically specific, contingent process of
defining undocumented transboundary migrants’ relationship to the state. If we take for
granted people’s free movement, rather than the state’s right to regulate transboundary
mobility, the state rather than “the undocumented migrant” defines the problem, the
analytic object, and methodological focus for studies of illegality and immigration
enforcement.
Inland immigration enforcement is ICE’s primary role in the integrated, “layered
approach” to homeland security led by DHS (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
2007a). Scholars have analyzed the implementation of new biometric surveillance
technologies (Amoore 2006; Martin 2010; Muller 2004) and expedited screening for
frequent travelers (Gilbert 2005; Sparke 2006). With this expansion of surveillance,
everyday life becomes a field of possible threat and of security intervention (Amoore
2006; Martin and Simon 2008; Bigo 2002). Scholars refer to this process of making a
group of people, a space, or an activity into objects of security practice securitization.
While some scholars privilege elite discourses in the enrollment of new security objects
(Ackelson 2005; Waever et al., 1993; Waever 1995), others look at how multiple
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institutions, operating with different goals, order material relations of power to particular
ends (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Dean 1999; Foucault 2007; Hannah 2000; Ibrahim 2005;
Muller 2004; Watts 2003). For geographers, the ordering and calculation of spatial
relationships is particularly salient in security discourses (Elden 2007; Hannah 2006;
Rose-Redwood 2006). Implemented as part of the Secure Border Initiative, but applied to
many kinds of migrants, family detention offers a discrete case from which to examine
processes of “securitization” in the post-9/1 United States. In this dissertation, I seek to
problematize the boundary-making and categorization practices that produce the
conditions of possibility for family detention. The crisis of the 9/11 attacks has provoked
a reorganization of immigration enforcement practices, including high-profile workplace
raids and the integration of local law enforcement into immigration policing (Coleman
2007). If the state itself is not an object, but gains its apparent coherence within a
patterned interaction between state actors, citizens, and immigrants, then any
reorganization of immigration enforcement also reconfigures the relationship between
these parties. Changes in immigration enforcement practices, including the expansion of
detention space, represents a significant retooling of state-society relations, and a critical
moment in which to analyze the specific techniques and technologies that are
reconfiguring those relationships.

LAW
For critical legal geographers, laws bound space and establish the boundaries of
citizenship and associated rights (Delaney 2001). Laws enforce normative socio-spatial
relationships by spatially excluding certain groups from public or national spaces
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(Blomley 2003, 2005; Mitchell 1996). In the case of immigration, the ill-defined
“aggravated felony” has allowed petty misdemeanors to be retroactively used against
undocumented migrants, thereby justifying their incarceration as “criminal aliens” (see
Coleman 2007; Dow 2005; Kanstroom 2000a, b; Miller 2004; Morawetz 2000, 2004;
Welch and Schuster 2005a, b). “The law” is not an objective rule system applied to the
material world, but a socio-spatial practice, given meaning through the embodied
performance of legal speech, testimony, consultations, and judicial decisions (Butler
1997; White 2002). Furthermore, detention centers are highly localized spaces of
enforcement, however, requiring a different conception of the scale of law (Bigo 2007).
Analyzing socio-spatial relations from the perspective of the body has focused research
on how mundane activities reproduce gender, class, and racial differences (Marston
2000). Further, taking the body as a scale of geographical analysis problematizes the
analytical value of “national,” “regional,” “local,” and “household” (Braun 1997;
Marston et al., 2005), since actual bodies move through multiple spaces on a daily basis.
This research brings the critique of scale into conversation with legal geography by
analyzing how the particular spatial orderings of detainees’ bodies within Hutto and
Berks are judged to be legal or illegal, depending on corresponding judgements of
detainees’ statuses. Thus, family detention reveals the contingency and malleability of
law in practice, contributing an analysis of the family as a legal category to legal and
political geography.
Tracing family detention through the spatial ordering of migrant bodies also
shows how definition of the family changes over space and time. Sexual citizenship
scholars have noted the legal privileges granted to heterosexual, nuclear families and
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spouses (Binnie 1997; Bell and Binnie 2000, 2006; Elman 2000; Lubheid 2002; Lubheid
and Cantú 2005; Simmons 2008), but immigration laws do not privilege all families in
the same way. While marriage and kinship relations remain a primary path to US.
citizenship, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) de-emphasized family privilege by restricting the definition of family members
(Inniss 1997-8). Thus, the “immigrant family” has been differently defined and legally
constituted over time, with dramatic effects on the material welfare of migrants (Ackers
and Stalford 1999; Dobrowlsky and Jensen 2004; Van Hook and Balisteri 2006; Willen
2007). Further, asylum and children’s rights overlap with immigration law. Most of the
plaintiffs in the ACLU’s case were asylum-seeking children, whose detention is limited
in both Flores v. Reno (1997) and U.S. asylum law. In the case of asylum-seeking
parents, however, asylum law alone limits their detention, and asylum status is decided
by Citizenship and Immigration Services asylum officers, located within the Department
of Homeland Security. In the event asylum officers do not find credible fear and reject
the claimants’ evidence of persecution, the asylum-seeker is referred to Immigration
Court (Ramji-Nogales et al., 2007). Thus, the paths of detained families into and out of
detention are largely determined by legal frameworks that differentiate between noncitizens. This dissertation interrogates how governments use the law to manage
populations through different legal definitions of the family. In the following chapter, I
examine how different legal frameworks differentiate detained parents and children from
each other and from other detainees, producing a complicated legal geography for
detained families. Thus, my research contributes a geographical account of the contextdependencies of law to existing research in legal geography. This will have wider
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implications for political geographic understandings of the spatial relationships between
nation-states and political subjects.

FEMINIST AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS
If geopolitics unfolds in the everyday (Secor 2004), then feminist geopolitics
could benefit from shifting its gaze to immigration law, policy, and enforcement practice.
As Coleman (2008a) points out, this area is under-explored in geographers’ studies of
immigration precisely because of the scalar disjuncture between individualized screening,
interview, detention, and deportation practices and the universalizing tropes of national
security, threat, and sovereignty that dominate official policy discourses (Coleman 2008a,
b). Feminist political geographers have focused their critiques of ‘mainstream’ political
geography on just this problematic (Hyndman 2007). Bringing this approach to
immigration geopolitics, Coleman (2007a) and Varsanyi (2008) show that immigration
enforcement is increasingly interior to the U.S., part of the devolution of federal
immigration powers to local law enforcement. The geopolitics of immigration unfolds,
therefore, in day-laborer centers, neighborhoods, corporate security and prison
contractors, churches, and workplaces. Critically, the surveillance of these spaces is
increasingly linked through database merging and algorithmic data analysis (Amoore
2009), employee verification requirements (e.g. E-VERIFY), and the cooperation of local
and federal police. This ‘postentry landscape’ of immigration enforcement demands,
therefore, that the relationship between immigration law and enforcement practice be
closely examined.
Feminist geopolitics, too, has neglected the role of immigration law and policy28

making, as it has focused at both finer and globalized scales of interaction. Particularly in
the case of women’s political action, understanding the ways in which politics unfolds in
living rooms, kitchens, and organizations traditionally considered “non-political” is key
to understanding how marginalized groups mount their own “counter-geopolitics” (Secor
2004).

As Hyndman (2004a) argues, focusing on the state obscures violence and

insecurity at other scales.

Where the state remains the focus for feminist political

geographers, it is by analyzing the embodied practices of statecraft, the banality of
administrating immigration law, that allows a fuller understanding of the spatialities of
state power (Mountz 2003, 2004). In fact it is often through narratives of ‘the home’ that
migrants understand and articulate the complexities of their transnational lives (Staeheli
and Nagel 2006), and migrants’ “homeliness” serves as a metric of “deserving” and
“undeserving” migrants (Gedalof 2007).
Yet immigration politics in the U.S. has long blurred the lines between “foreign”
and “domestic,” since municipal school districts and state welfare systems mediate
noncitizens’ access to services (see Coleman 2008b). The case of family detention further
problematizes the separation of “foreign” and “domestic.” That is, it is not only that
public policy issues of childcare licensing and state custody overlap with national
security and immigration, as I show in Chapter 6 and 7, but that the conversation takes
place in and through conversations about meal and bathing times, headcounts, bodily
constraint, parental discipline, and host of other topics. Analyzing the legal contestation
of family detention, focuses our attention on how immigration geopolitics unfolds in the
everyday lives of real people, and the ways in which daily life itself becomes
criminalized. It is parents feeding children, brushing teeth, taking baths, playing, going
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to school, bedtimes, etc. that becomes the site of intervention for immigration
enforcement agents.

It is precisely through the banal, everyday activities of the

household that the geopolitics of family detention unfolds.

FAMILY
In geography, feminist geographers have devoted the most attention to familyrelated issues, most likely driven by feminist theory’s emphasis on the family and
household as sites of women’s exploitation. Feminist geographic work has, therefore,
focused on the institutions that reproduce gendered and uneven power relations. Although
addressed from a number of theoretical and methodological angles, the relationship
between gender, paid work, and identity has been the focus of much of this work (Bain
and Nash 2007; Bondi 1991; Gidwani 2000). Problematizing the insularity of the
assumed private space of the home in liberal democratic theory, ‘the home’ has been the
primary vehicle for examining family-related topics. The home spatializes gendered
household labor, especially the organization of kitchens, washrooms, and leisure areas
(see special issues of Gender, Place and Culture Issue 13:2, 13:6). The home is a site of
paid labor, such as au pairs, leading scholars to argue that professional women’s hiring
out of domestic labor produces a gendered international division of labor (e.g., Cox and
Narula 2003; Pratt 2002, 2004, 2005; Silvey 2004). Linda McDowell’s work has
examined the intersections of women’s worklife, state welfare restructuring and concepts
of home and belonging (e.g., 2004, 2007), while Alison Blunt (2005) devotes her book to
analyzing the practices of domesticity and diaspora, the politics of home-making in
postcolonial India. Thus, geographic analyses of ‘the family’ have tended to side-step the
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family itself in favor of a broader vocabulary—household, home, domesticity, private
space, reproduction labor, and care.

These studies implicitly include familial

relationships, but displace “the family” as the conceptual locus.
There is significant, but scattered, geographic work that can provide entry points
to a productive examination of ‘the family.’ Geographers have shown that the family can
be a site of complex labor arrangements. In these studies, the family itself can be a site of
conflict, as external demands for labor (from village councils or off-farm employment)
demand the re- allocation of gendered household tasks (Gidwani 2000; Mutersbaugh
1998, 1999; Roberts 1996). Analyzing income or labor power at the level of the
household misses the delicate and complex negotiations of peasant agrarian economies.
The family, in these analyses, is the conduit of a complex spatio-temporal arrangement,
involving children, women, and men alike. Analyses of state restructuring have analyzed
the reinscription of the nuclear family as a site of welfare provision. This trend has
marginalized the growing number of single-parent households (Winchester 1990). Since
family law privilege the mother in custody cases, this economic and political
marginalization of female-headed households has led to a feminization of poverty (Jones
and Kodras 1990). These studies demonstrate the crucial link between the
institutionalization of the family in welfare policy and the real proliferation of nonnuclear families. Thus, the ideal nuclear family operates as a category of exclusion, often
masking the role of race in policy-making.
While these diverse approaches have yielded nuanced analyses that problematize
the family, home, and private space as bounded entities, could these critiques be
circumscribed by their unacknowledged orientation to a white, European norm of the
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nuclear family (Oyewumi 2000)? Or does the emphasis on gender signify a desire to
denaturalize and decenter the family, a preference to be more specific about the processes
that constitute families? The question becomes, then, what would studying the family do
for geographic knowledge? For Valentine (2008) and Harker (2009, 2010), intimacy and
“family practices” (respectively) frame employment, mobility, migration, and housing
decisions over the lifecycle. Placing care practices at the center of analysis, rather than
biological or marriage kin ties, provides a more flexible and, Jon Borneman argues, an
ethically inclusive methodological frame through which to understand how people make
lifeworlds together (Borneman 2001). A focus on care, intimacy, and family practices
privileges the banal energetics of shared spaces, bodies, fluids, foods, and experiences,
the “enduring ties” through which we negotiate our inherent dependency on others for
survival (Butler 2002).

SPATIAL STRATEGIES
Political economic analyses of prisons provide a rich framework for
understanding the Hutto and Berks facilities in terms of their economic value.
Geographic research on prisons has developed a nuanced account of rural prison location
(Bonds 2006; Che 2005; Gilmore 2007), criminalization of drugs and poverty (Beckett
1997; Gilmore 2007), and the commodification of space (Mitchelson 2007). As Gilmore
(2007) shows, urban disinvestment and high poverty rates coincided with the devaluation
of agricultural commodities in California, creating geographically marginalized labor
surpluses in both urban and rural areas (see also Bonds 2006; Mitchelson 2007). These
scholars analyze the ways in which the commodification of space ‘fixes’ capital flows,
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labor patterns, and political discourses (Harvey 1982). These accounts provide an
analytical model for examining the geographies of power through the circuits of capital,
the organization of space, and the relative empowerment or marginalization of different
groups.
This dissertation, however, focuses on different kinds of circulation, for example,
the physical mobility of migrants within the Hutto and Berks detention facilities, and the
mobilization of discourses of families and children and security. In Chapter 7, however, I
link the circulation of detained families between detention centers and their case files
between ICE and USCIS to the circulation of money between federal, state, county, and
private institutions. I use the concept of spatial strategies to understand how immigration
policy-making and enforcement practices normalize ICE’s authority to police
noncitizens, the federal government’s authority to make national boundaries, and
Congress’ legislative role.
Spatial strategies normalize spatial relationships, as well as create and regulate
relationships between bodies, the built environment, and mobility (De Certeau 1984).
Family detention is a spatial strategy because ICE uses detention to enclose immigrants
while they await immigration court dates or deportation. Within detention centers, staff
use additional spatial strategies (e.g., rigid schedules, headcounts, threats of family
separation) to create order within the detention center. The use of detention, in particular,
to control immigrant families emerged in the context of the “securitization” of
immigration, discussed above and explored in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. These
spatial strategies work together with political discourses with the aim of securing the
physical survival of the U.S. nation-state. Non-governmental organizations also employ
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spatial strategies, such as occupying public space and long-distance marches, to make
family detention and detained families’ rights visible to a wider public. This convergence
of different, even opposing, governmental rationalities, institutions, procedures,
knowledge practices, and spatial strategies is what Michel Foucault calls governmentality
(Foucault 1991, 2007; Rose 1996). Working through spatial strategies like family
detention, governmentality offers theoretical framework for analyzing how law,
bureaucracies, and individuals circulate and normalize social, legal, and political
categories through spatial strategies and discursive practices.
This conceptual framework provides three main analytical strengths to my
research. First, this dissertation analyzes the attempts, methods, and ways of thinking
about how to control people by controlling space in family detention centers. Second, the
conceptual framework links local micro-geographies of daily life at Hutto and Berks to
each other and to “national” geographies of immigration law and policy. I analyze,
therefore, the consistencies and contradictions between the spatial strategies and
discourses used by different actors in family detention policy. Third, this framework links
spatial strategies of family detention to the legal, political, and social discourses of the
family. Using a combination of qualitative methods, described in the next chapter, this
dissertation draw together a diversity of sources to analyze the ways in which
immigration enforcement policies—and its alternatives—use, contest, and transform the
spatial ordering of detention.

CONCLUSION
My goal in this dissertation is to explore the geographies of contemporary US
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state power, particularly how materiality of border, immigration, and legal practices reify
the process of “illegalization” (De Genova 2002).

Analyzing immigration law,

enforcement practices, and the circulating textual practices surrounding family detention
as an assemblage of spatial strategies, I take care to attend to the “chaotic bundle of
storylines” (Coleman 2005). The literatures summarized above show how these
narratives condense around a few nodal discourses: security, borders, discretion, private
space, vulnerability, family, il/legality, and rights. Detention and deportation unfold
through a series of spatial practices, such as externalization, neo-refoulment, remoteness,
invisibility, and forced repatriation. My analysis of family detention draws imagined and
material cartographies together to understand the ways in which space is ordered,
calculated, and put to work to consolidate state power over national territory—and to
thereby reproduce the relations of power that normalize that authority. Focusing on
family detention, in particular, foregrounds the ways in which intimacy, private space,
and relationships become sites of state intervention.

Taking the political ethics of

detention seriously, this dissertation works along different registers: textual and symbolic
discourses; the writing of spaces; and the relationality of intimate ties. At the heart of the
struggle to expand or end family detention lie a series of fundamental questions about the
character of executive power, its limits, and the constitution of the political.
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CHAPTER 3: ETHNOGRAPHIES OF CLOSED DOORS
If we as publicly engaged intellectuals begin not from the epistemological standpoint of
the state and its functionaries but rather from the standpoint of the elementary freedom of
movement as something like a basic human entitlement, then rather than presupposing
that there is something inherently suspect about the human beings who migrate, the real
problem comes into considerably sharper focus: that problem, clearly, is the state itself.
(Emphasis added, De Genova 2007, 425)
INTRODUCTION
While I focus on a specific federal policy, family detention, I do so in order to
problematize the regimes of authority that normalize the practice. That is, I begin from
ICE’s terms and inquire, does family detention policy succeed in its aims? Instead I ask,
what work does family detention do as a governmental technique? My goal is not,
therefore, to measure how family detention deters future family immigration, child
smuggling, and illegitimate asylum-seekers, but to analyze the ways in which this
discursive regime presumes and reproduces a range of legal categories, spatial
hierarchies, coerced mobilities, and subject-formations.

In the following chapters, I

analyze the juridical and legal processes through which families became detainable and
the spatial practices through which these detentions materialize. I explore, therefore, the
relationships between legal categorizations, geopolitical imaginings of global space, the
spatial ordering of detention centers and the ways in which discourses of familial
relatedness, private space, and authority undergird the spatial practices of family
detention.
In developing this approach, I draw on previous scholarship that has sought to
trace the complex connections between symbolic national discourses, legal categories,
and detention’s concrete materialities. Mountz’s institutional ethnography of Citizenship
and Immigration Services Canada analyzes the everyday bureaucratic response to a
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perceived immigrant crises. Focusing on the response to a specific incident, Mountz is
able to trace how state immigration officials improvise detention practices, how civil
society reacts in conflicting ways, and the mixed feelings of the bureaucrats charged with
enforcing immigration law (2003, 2004, 2010). Hall (2008) spent long hours with
detention center guards at a detention facility in the United Kingdom, and while this
prevented her from interviewing detainees, it allowed her to explore guards’ identityformation processes and to fill a gap in research on detention centers. Gill (2009, 2010)
and White (2002) performed extended interviews with a series of actors active in the UK
asylum process, which allowed them to trace detainee mobility and access to legal
services (respectively). In different but resonant ways, each of these authors connects
specific spatial practices of detention and deportation to the constitution of nationhood
and state power, and use these “micro” or “local” stories to disrupt depictions of a
smoothly operating, monolithic state actor.
Taking these arguments seriously has some important methodological
implications. First, federal employees are not the only parties producing the state.
Rather, a range of actors participate in its everyday production, by ascribing intentionality
to “the government,” by advertising state agencies’ effectiveness, and even by blaming
the state for unforeseen events or consequences. Understanding family detention’s
authorization requires looking far beyond ICE and DHS to understand the unquestioned
assumptions behind it. Second, because state actors are never of one mind (and neither
are their critics), I pay close attention to ruptures and incoherencies within texts, between
texts, and in the indirect conversations unfolding across the discursive field I analyze in
the chapters below. Interview questions and analysis focused on these disjunctures.
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Third, analyzing state power through the body can reveal relations of power obscured in
policy or legal texts (Hyndman 2004b). For example, I analyze the ordering of space,
time, and bodies in detention centers (Chapter 8) to question the legal distinction between
detention and incarceration. As a whole, the project links detainability to the spatial
ordering of detention centers, but in ways that remain sensitive to the disruptions,
improvisations, and incoherencies that characterize “everyday” state practices.
De-privileging the state as the sole producer of family detention discourses
requires a multi-method research design. I originally planned to combine semi-structured
interviews with key participants in family detention: ICE policy-makers, lawyers,
detention managers, and detainees. I had planned to collect roughly equivalent numbers
of interviews from these groups, in order to ensure their respective representation in the
study. Researching a “homeland security” issue, I quickly that discovered immigration
officers were off limits to me. For wholly different reasons, detained families were
equally difficult to access. Families released from Hutto rarely stayed in Central Texas
for long, and often lost contact with their Austin-based attorneys. Fewer attorneys work
at Berks, and these organizations were far more closed to research and media requests
than those in Texas, making it difficult to establish contacts.
In addition, I encountered a deep asymmetry in available knowledge about
families’ experiences of detention and the legal and political processes behind it. A
lawsuit (analyzed in Chapter 6) kept family detention in the news throughout 2007, so
that by 2008, when I entered the field, much was known about conditions at Hutto and
Berks. Formerly detained families appeared in documentaries, sat for interviews, and
attended film screenings to testify about their treatment.
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Far less information was

available about how these families became detainable in the first place, and what
authorized their continued detention (along with 32,000 other noncitizens). My research
methods came to focus, therefore, on a broader terrain of immigration law- and policymaking than originally conceived, and more on the contracts and institutional
arrangements that support family detention at Berks and Hutto.
The original research design did not, therefore, emphasize participant observation,
as I had not envisioned opportunities for sustained interaction. As a public campaign
against family detention waged on, my early semi-structured interviews more or less
repeated accounts found in the popular media. Potential respondents continually asked
me “what my angle was,” and it became clear to me that my research was one of many
“messaging” outlets. I found it difficult, therefore, to draw out the detailed minutia that
animate the daily practices of detention, and it was these informal, unofficial, and often
arbitrary disruptions that interested me. As I began to attend activist and advocacy
meetings, however, I found that people exchanged much “off the record” information that
evinced the banal, arbitrary and often inept actions of ICE and CCA employees. Family
detention policy has been under continual revision, critique, and development, but
because ICE retains wide discretion, as I explore in the following chapters, it was far
more difficult to obtain documentary evidence of these changes, as very often, documents
simply did not exist.
This did not significantly change my research’s direction, but did change my
methods and my positionality. I worked directly with advocates to draft Freedom of
Information Act requests, and learned much from their experience with state-level Open
Records processes. When I received responsive documents, I made copies, scanned, and
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emailed those that would be of interest to different stakeholders. For example, when I
received copies of the Williamson County Sheriff's office monitoring reports, I scanned
them in and e-mailed them to interested parties in Williamson County. I also moderated
the T. Don Hutto blog (tdonhutto.blogspot.com) from 2008 to fall of 2009, when ICE
released the last families from the facility. The blog became an archive of media and
public events and a key resource for investigative journalists and other writers. It was
important to me–and still is–to share the outcomes of my research with the public in
expedient ways, since the academic publication cycle and the process of writing this
dissertation have added years to the dissemination process. I produced texts like press
releases, opinionated editorials, and two book chapters in collaboration with these
colleagues. In 2009, we formed a visitation program, and have trained a group of
volunteers to make regular visits to Hutto. Through this visitation program (initiated 1.5
years after I began my research), I was able to gain consistent access to Hutto’s public
areas and a more embodied and detailed sense of how noncitizens’ cases proceed from
inside detention centers. While not included in the original research design, these
comings and goings have provided important ambient knowledge of detention. Without
this “participant observation,” the research in this dissertation would not be as rich, and,
personally, I would have found it difficult to weather the emotional difficulties of
researching detention practices.
The research presented in the chapters that follow emerged therefore from a
sensitivity to “on the ground” politics and a commitment to problematizing the relations
of power that make them possible. This dissertation is often times inspired by (and in
implicit) conversation with different advocates and activists, but my questions are equally
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driven by theoretical questions about sovereign power, governmentality, and space. At
different moments, these theoretical questions allowed me to contribute to new campaign
strategies.

For example, detention center’s remoteness and invisibility has become

increasingly important to those with family members inside, and challenging this politics
of invisibility has become an explicit part of a broader anti-detention campaign and a new
visitation program at Hutto. In daily meetings or calls, I tended to remain pragmatic, and
helped draft relatively more limited policy recommendations for ICE. While it has been
tempting at times, given the gravity of family and adult detention, I have resisted the
temptation to wed this dissertation to an advocacy project in a more explicit way. I
wanted to retain theoretical freedom and creativity, and the opportunity to do some “big
picture” thinking outside the pragmatic demands of a campaign or more traditional policy
analysis. My goal here is not to improve the detention system, but to interrogate its
foundations. This dissertation is a starting point, I hope, for re-imagining the juridicopolitical foundations of citizenship, sovereignty, and politics in future research.

METHODOLOGY
Because the research seeks not only to detail the imaginative and embodied
spatial practices of family detention, but to push on political geographical theories of
power and space from the perspective of this case, I draw heavily from Michael
Burawoy’s (1998) call to not just critique existing theories of power, but to reconstruct
them.

Proposing a “reflective science paradigm” in place of positivist sociological

methodologies, Burawoy foregrounds the researcher’s movement through the sociospatial world, the ways in which researchers change “the field” they study, and the
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productivity of those collisions, conflicts, and negotiations. Rather than bracketing the
researcher, or subordinating her to contextual background noise relative to the object of
study, reflexive science “starts out from dialogue, virtual or real, between observer and
participants, embeds such dialogue within a second dialogue between local processes and
extralocal forces that in turn can only be comprehended through a third, expanding
dialogue of theory with itself” (Burawoy 1998, 5). As I moved physically between my
field sites and home(s), and finally came to call one field site home, this back-and-forth
movement between research, field, and theory captures the periods of furious collection,
reflection, and engagement through which this project emerged. Throughout the research
process, I “pushed back” not just on existing theories of governmentality, abandonment,
and law but on the policy-makers, local government officials, and congresspeople with
stakes in the warehousing of noncitizen families.
Research Methods
Document Collection: The documents analyzed in this dissertation came from four
primary sources: freedom of information act requests, online and print media, litigation,
and archival research (see Figure 3.1). Because interviews with government officials
never materialized, I became more creative with, in particular, how I requested
documents from the federal and county agencies. Having few initial resources besides
media reports to go on, I first submitted broad information requests and from them culled
references to other documents. Through these inter-textual citations, and rolling
information requests, I was able to build my own archive of documentary material on
family detention. Because the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests are subject to
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Table 3.1: Data Collection Methods and Data Gathered for Current Study
Collection
Method
Interviews

Data Gathered

Quantity

Documents

Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. litigation Documents.
Emails between County, CCA, and ICE officials.
Audits of Berks and Hutto; DHS Corrective Plans.
Request for Proposal documents.
Press Releases, Fact Sheets, Public Testimonies.
Government Reports.
Non-Governmental Reports.
County Budget Records from Berks County, PA, and
Williamson County, TX.
Contracts, IGSA’s, including Renewals and Amendments
News articles

Semi-structured and informal interviews with attorneys, 30
advocates, and activists.
Interviews with formerly detained families gathered from 7
other sources.

Participant Meetings with advocacy organizations.
Observation
Conference Calls.
Public Events.
Visits to Hutto.
Visit to Berks (outside only).

1000 pp.
200 pp.
1760 pp
200 pp.
20 reports
20 reports
40 reports
10 documents

30
15
15
5
1

a range of exemptions, responding agencies excluded many documents for security
concerns. My requests went to Williamson County, Texas; Berks County, Pennsylvania;
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In response, I received: contracts; service
agreements; purchase orders; e-mails between detention center operator, ICE, and county
officials; monitoring reports; communications between attorneys and ICE; detention
conditions corrective action plans; and design standards for family residential facilities.
Additional documents were collected from government websites, and these included
requests for proposals for new detention centers, ICE public hearings, press releases, fact
sheets, and the family residential standards.
43

These documents were supplemented by trips to Williamson County and Berks
County archives, where I searched through newspapers and other sources in order to trace
the history of the two detention centers I focus on in this dissertation. The state of the
archives in Williamson and Berks Counties were very different. Berks County's archive is
prolific. I found, for example, deeds dating back to William Penn for the land on which
the Berks County Family Care Shelter now stands. The Berks County Historical Society
retains a sophisticated archive, replete with folios documenting the development and
change of the county's public institutions. Located at the heart of the progressive
movement, this former industrial center took a great deal of pride in its workhouses,
asylums, poorhouses, sanitariums, hospitals, and in prisons, and had myriad documents
tracing their development. At the Williamson County archives, in contrast, I found
general descriptions of the area's history and scattered newspaper archives. Thus the
collection, organization, and public availability of these historical sources varied greatly
between the two sites. These sources form, however, general background material rather
than the bulk of the empirical study presented below. It was important to me to gain a
sense of where these two family detention centers fit in the political economy and
historical geography of their local places.

Interviews: Interviews consisted of semi-structured conversations focused on the aspects
of family detention policy and practice about which respondents were most familiar. For
each respondent, I developed a questionnaire that focused on their realm of expertise, and
also collected general information about family detention policy and practice. Through
this method I was able to collect both detailed and corroborating information. As

44

reflected in my research questions, one of my goals is to understand how families and
children come to be understood through a wider set of concepts, such as the home, the
domestic, childhood, development, and immigration law. One of my most interesting
findings emerged from my difficulty in eliciting responses on how families and children
were detected and understood as families. What families and children are was so intuitive
or obvious that my questions about them raised eyebrows, but were evidently
uninteresting and yielded little.
Interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes, and took place in locations of the
respondents choosing. Despite my assurances that names and identities would be
confidential, the interviews rarely strayed beyond the discursive patterns those same
actors put forth in the news media. What I found was that, for most, there is no great
difference between academic research and investigative reporting, so that signing an
informed consent form did not arrest their apprehensions about being quoted. This
difficulty reveals, I believe, one of the pitfalls of studying a high-profile government
practice. Interviewees were often quite used to giving interviews to the media and did not
greatly shift their responses or attitudes for me. My respondents had, for the most part,
come to a series of decisions about their disposition towards family detention, so the
interviews were not the opportunities for exploration, experimentation, or discovery that I
hoped they would be. These interviews were, however, incredibly important for gaining
a sense of the policy-making terrain during early fieldwork.
ICE never turned me down for an interview, but neither did they grant me one. I
found a rather impenetrable state apparatus, but it was a bureaucracy obscured more by
the convoluted delegation of responsibilities than by any discernable design. For
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example, one request proceeded as follows:
December 17, 2008: Conversation with Director of Berks: I asked about manuals,
training manuals, etc. and he said that would have to be run through ICE. All of
that is included in their compliance reports. I asked if, based on his experience, I
should add that to my current request, and he said yes, so there is less going back
and forth. I should definitely add it to my current request so I can see those
materials when I visit the facility. He said from a county level, he was fine with it,
but in the last 2 years they have been careful about what information they put out
there.

December 18, 2008: My packet has been sent to Patricia Pepe, who originally
received my request… everything seems to go in a circle. … Interestingly, [the
Berks Director] maintained that “from a county level” or “perspective” he didn’t
have a problem with me seeing stuff, but ICE has their own stuff… It always got
vague. My guess is that they are trying to do a better job of managing the PR…

Jan. 12, 2008: Called Assistant Field Office Director Patricia Pepe Reiser at the
phone number Ramella gave me to follow up on my request. Seemed to be
confusion about how to reach her, was connected to Mr. Gonzalez “with
immigration” and he took a message.
12:55pm CST. Received message from Trish Reiser at 2:03- request still pending
at headquarters.
From there my request languished, and efforts to restart the request were ignored. These
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passive rebukes occurred against a backdrop of more antagonistic rebukes. For example,
CCA denied the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights access to Hutto,
and other well-established advocacy organizations faced considerable obstacles gaining
access to facilities or detainees. Their visits were highly constrained and monitored.
Attorneys, while facing considerable hostility within detention centers, were the only
group to have consistent access, were bound by attorney-client privilege, and therefore
could not facilitate my entry.
Since the release of families from Hutto, however, I have helped initiate a
visitation program for women. So while it was not a planned component of my research, I
have been able to gain access to Hutto as a visitor. Women's detention issues are not the
focus of this dissertation, but Hutto’s physical plant has not been significantly altered
since families were released, allowing me to gain a embodied sense of daily negotiations
with guards and ICE officers. Knowledge gained through the visitation project builds on
the present research, and will form the basis of future work.
I had also initially planned to interview parents detained at Hutto. Unfortunately,
families released from Hutto did not long remain in the Central Texas area, as most of
them moved closer to family and other parts of the country. I did not contemplate
including interviews with current detainees, because of the ethical implications of
interviewing people in state custody. It became difficult, therefore, to locate the
population I had set out to interview. I initially sought to contact formerly detained
families through attorneys working at the facility, but they did not maintain contacts with
their clients after their cases were resolved. Furthermore, one attorney described how she
consciously distanced herself from her clients, because their post-asylum needs were
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significant but beyond her capacity as a lawyer (Fieldnotes May 2008). A few families
were vocal critics of family detention, and were quickly enrolled in a series of public
events around family detention. Because so few families are willing to step forward and
recount their detention experiences, those that did grew weary of recounting their trauma
before audiences that were unable or ill-equipped to assist them in the challenges of
settling in the United States. It became difficult for me to justify interviewing those same
families for my own purposes, once again, when they had recounted their stories
repeatedly in the public realm. Because I was not permanently located in Austin at the
time, I could not develop the necessary relationships with local counselors, psychologists,
or social workers in the event that the interview triggered post-traumatic stress from
either the family's detention, their experiences of migration, or pre-migration violence
that led them to claim asylum in the United States.
To circumvent this problem, I partnered with an Austin-based organization and
social work faculty at the University of Texas to develop a survey that we would
distribute to regional attorneys in the hopes of gathering systematic information about
families released from Hutto. This project was developed during the fall of 2008 in spring
of 2009, but faltered when the faculty partner was unable to make a long-term
commitment. Because this kind of survey required long-term, sporadic bursts of contacts
and interviews, it did not cohere with my fieldwork schedule well enough for me to
sustain the project myself. I was concerned, however, to include families’ voices in the
research, because without them I risked erasing their narratives from my analysis of the
spatiality of family detention. I have relied therefore on existing testimonies found in the
litigation, public events where families presented their stories, and interviews collected
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for two films on family detention to begin to address the perspective of detainees. My
hope is that through these materials I can begin to address the perspective of detainees.

Participant Observation: My original research design did not incorporate significant
participant observation, since I had not planned to base the study in ethnographic
methods. As described above, it became immediately clear that I was dependent on
advocates, organizers, and attorneys for the richest documents in the most detailed firsthand information of immigration detention. Furthermore, these actors were engaged in
phone calls, off the record meetings, and legal meetings with immigration officials. They
have a sense, in other words, of the everyday antagonisms in negotiations at work in
immigration enforcement practice, yet these details were often neglected in my semistructured interviews in favor of chosen storylines and messages. I learned much more
about how immigration enforcement practices unfolded in everyday life from the offhand
comments, chuckles, and sarcasm of those who interacted with them on a daily basis then
from many of the official outlets. In addition, in contesting state detention practices,
advocacy, legal, and organizing work pushed on the same state practices, and also
produced “the government” as an acting, coherent, intentional entity. Approaching
immigration enforcement practices from a postructuralist perspective, I was attuned to the
ways in which various actors produced “the effect of the state” that they intended to
change. Participant observation was, therefore, critical to my formulation of sufficient
background knowledge, and it was in weekly meetings, conference calls, and strategy
sessions that I refined my broader questions about the space of family detention, the
production of various subject formations, and the securitization of immigration. It was in
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this context that I was able to communicate early findings and contribute my own
expertise to conversations about family detention.
While I worked closely with many advocates and activists contesting family
detention, this dissertation should not be taken for a study of a social or political
movement. First, I did not design the study to focus on the organizational elements of the
immigrant rights movement, and my research questions were not aimed at tracing these
dynamics.

This is not to say that a study of immigrant rights and anti-detention

organizing is not worthwhile; in fact, these kinds of studies are underway (e.g., Jimenez
2009). Rather, because I came to the research with different questions, I represented
myself in terms of these interests from the beginning. It was clear to me that I could not
truly pursue a study of detention through document collection alone, because many of the
most interesting moments occurred “off the record” and in conversations closed to media
or press outlets. These moments were recorded in fieldnotes, and revealed the ways in
which detention policies and practices were continually revised and the banal
antagonisms between advocates and government officials.

Analysis: While Burawoy’s reflexive science paradigm framed my relationship to family
detention policy and practice, Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis served as a
method through which to capture the resonances and fractures among various actors. For
Fairclough, discourse is one aspect of social practice, bundled inseparably with activities,
relations between subjects, instruments, objects, time and place, forms of consciousness,
and values (2006, 205). Discourse structures “the way a thing is thought, and the way we
act on the basis of that thinking” (Rose 2001, 36). Meaning is not established through an
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objective language system, but is temporarily anchored in discursive practices, through
the embodiment of discourse and the relations produced through it (Waitt 2005). The
other elements of social practice are organized by discourse, even if their corporeality
exceeds their discursive purpose (Butler 1990). As such, the researcher is in a uniquely
privileged position as analyst and producer of discursive formations, and this places
special responsibilities upon the researcher, the method, and the communication of results
(Rose 2001). Thus, critical discourse analysis provided a means through which to
understand how people connect words, statements, rationalities to each other and what is
produced from those connections.
To analyze the data described above, I relied upon established methods of
qualitative data analysis, specifically critical discourse analysis. I first developed
systematic codes for each research question and combed through the data. From this first
pass I drew out "in vivo" codes: words, phrases, or tropes that framed how family
detention was enacted, imagine, and performed (Cope 2005). Using in vivo and thematic
codes, I processed the qualitative data a second time, revised initial hypotheses, and
refined my research questions. For example, I found that threat, security, and criminality
were far less pervasive than I had assumed they would be. Instead, my coding lists
contained terminology from child welfare and social services, indicating, I think that
while counterterrorism and security may have framed Department of Homeland Security
press statements, they did not dominate facility-level policies. The coding process itself
revealed, therefore, the ways in which detention practices were formulated under a broad
banner of Homeland security in counterterrorism, but were implemented through specific
relationships with a range of other less spectacular public policy regimes. Using my
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qualitative data analysis software’s quantitative tools, I then identified the most
commonly used codes. To ensure that these statistics were not skewed by synonymous
codes, I double checked these preliminary rankings against a code map, in which I
grouped similar terms. Visualizing the relationship between these codes allowed me to
identify key axes around or along which discursive formations seemed to coalesce. From
here I returned to my research questions, interpreted these data in response to them, and
developed new questions for further inquiry.

CONCLUSION
Fieldwork necessarily includes a mix of improvisation, problem-solving, rerouting, and making do. The following chapters are indebted to the generosity and
camaraderie of my fellow organizers, and culminate three years of thinking, strategizing
and theorizing about family detention. My aim has been to write relevant and responsible
analysis that addresses organizers’ knowledge gaps about immigration and administrative
law, the distribution of authority, and the spatialities of exclusion, while engaging with
current debates about power, space, and law in our current biopolitical moment. The
mixed-methods approach described above allows me to move between these different
spheres, and my role in advocacy implicates me in the circulation of documents and the
production of detention-related public discourse. In the end, this dissertation represents a
sustained critical engagement with the legal and political context of family detention, and
the methods “we” have employed to challenge it.
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CHAPTER 4: BORDER ASSEMBLAGES/TECHNOLOGIES OF BANISHMENT
ALONG THE US-MEXICO BORDER

INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines border and immigration policy-making in the Southwest
United States to place the detention system’s recent expansion in broader historical
geographical context of colonial, racial, and ethnic politics. I connect border wall
contruction to detention center expansion to show how these “bordering practices”
(Newman 2006) produce an infrastructure that is “ready at hand” (Graham and Thrift
2007). I argue that the assemblage of symbolic, concrete, and legal practices produce an
infrastructure of exclusion. In this bordering assemblage, the topographies of
infrastructure interlace with topologies of banishment, suturing a series of spatial
strategies and creating momentum for future border and immigration enforcement
expansions. Situating detention in relation to a material border infrastructure, Chapter 5
will show how family detention, in particular, emerged through the securitization of
immigration enforcement, and Chapters 6 and 7 examine the legal techniques authorizing
noncitizens detention and deportation.
As of October 23, 2008, the United States has built just over 370 miles of fencing
along its 1,952 mile boundary with Mexico (US Department of Homeland Security
2008b). Mandated by Congress in the 2006 Secure Fence Act, this phase represents just
over half of the 700 miles of new fencing to be completed by December 2008. A
combination of 10- to 18-foot mesh fencing, 3- to 5-foot vehicle barriers, moveable
fencing, and patrol roads, “the border wall” winds through flood zones, protected
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ecosystems, habitats of endangered animals, properties of U.S. citizens, national parks,
and urban areas. As some Texas residents continue to fight fence construction, and the
Organization of American States (OAS) evaluates the wall’s human rights implications,
constructing this series of fences has been more than an engineering challenge
(Organization of American States Interamerican Committee on Human Rights 2008).
Rather, the current build-up of border enforcement infrastructure represents a concerted
effort to “re-border” the US-Mexico boundary and to secure “American” territory from
unauthorized trans-boundary flows.
Security studies scholars have pointed out how the “social sorting” function of
borders now operates through databanking technologies, allowing airlines and security
personnel to exclude individuals based on their risk categorization (Amoore and de
Goede 2008; Bigo 2002, 2007; Coleman 2007a; Lyon 2003; Salter 2006; Walters 2006).
As Louise Amoore has shown, biometric databanking allows federal, state, and local law
enforcement to check immigration status more easily than in the past, which has allowed
the exclusionary aspects of the border to operate far from the international boundary itself
(Amoore 2006; and see Bigo 2002, 2007; Coleman 2007a; Walters 2006). Transboundary travelers and migrants are now evaluated prior to leaving their country of
origin, on the basis of more intense surveillance than has been possible in the past.
Combined with sweeping changes in the jurisdiction of executive agencies, these changes
in immigration and border strategy have reconfigured the spatiality of the border, locating
it in a complex system of risks, vulnerabilities, and security practices. This is part of
ICE’s strategy to “expand the border outward” and intensify expulsions from inside the
U.S., leading some to argue that the border is both everywhere and nowhere (Belcher et
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al. 2008; Coleman 2007a).
But if the border is portable, and is never fully “located” at the boundary itself,
what role does fencing construction, surveillance, and policing along the boundary play?
Fencing was initially intended to create a material disincentive for migrants attempting to
cross into the U.S., and while border crossings do tend to decrease in areas with fencing,
they displace crossings to more remote areas, ironically increasing criminal activity on
the border by making migrants more reliant on coyotes to cross in remote areas (Nevins
2007; Nuñez-Neto and Kim 2008). Acknowledging this tendency, Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP) and ICE, combine fencing with ground sensors, floodlighting, patrolling,
guard towers, and video surveillance to slow border crossers and channel them into
heavily surveilled and patrolled areas (Hostelge 2008). The construction of bordering
fencing, surveillance technologies, and patrolling have gone hand in hand with the
construction of new detention centers, and the emergence of entire transportation
networks operated solely for the confinement, management, and expulsion of
unauthorized border crossers. Border construction is linked, therefore, to a series of
examinations, interviews, and hearings that code unauthorized border crossers through
administrative, legal, and medical discourses.
As the most visible and highly publicized component of homeland security and
border enforcement efforts, fencing strategies also symbolize the federal government’s
proficiency (or, to critics, lack thereof) at securing the American public from harm
(Andreas 1999). For Newman (2006), the reproduction of symbolic borders between
groups of people and material practices of border policing can be analyzed as
interdependent bordering processes. The manipulation of the physical landscape to install
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fencing and surveillance technologies works to order the Mexico-US boundary region as
a site of territorial exclusion. The installation of fencing and different surveillance
equipment projects along the boundary, along with the containment and forced movement
of noncitizens, should be seen as distinct spatial strategies, each aimed at fixing the
territorial boundary through the physical exclusion of non-citizens in different ways. As
such, fencing and detention materialize categorical bordering practices by ordering the
movement of people and things in space in particular ways. Thus, the spatial ordering of
border enforcement and detention in part work to contain bodies for processing and
removal. Yet these spatial strategies are localized in the backyards of border residents and
in ecologically fragile areas, creating a scalar disjuncture between border policy-making
decisions and the sites of implementation (Coleman 2005).
This chapter describes some of the historical and legal context in which family
detention emerged and US boundary and detention infrastructures’ concrete landscapes. I
first provide a very brief historical review of creation of the Mexico-US border. The
second section analyzes the legislative and policy changes through which state resources
were authorized and mobilized for border enforcement. The third section describes
materials and technologies used to “build up” the border and the estimated costs of these
projects. I close the chapter by arguing that border walls, detention, and forced mobility
should be understood as a border assemblage, a linked but heterogeneous network of
different spatial strategies, knowledge practices, networks, and mobilities.

‘THE BORDER CROSSED US’: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MEXICO-US
BORDER
The area through which the U.S.-Mexico boundary passes has a long and rich
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history, and for most of this time, the area has been unfenced, unpatrolled, and
unregulated. The historical geography of this region is beyond the scope of this chapter,
but a few points are necessary to contextualize current struggles over fencing and
surveillance technologies. Following Texas’ secession from Mexico in 1836 and the USMexican War ending in 1848, over half of Mexico’s territory—1.5 million square
kilometers—was ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Encompassing roughly the same land area as Western Europe, the treaty granted the US
parts of Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming and Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada,
Utah, and California in their entirety (Figure 4.1).

100,000 Mexicans and 200,000

indigenous people were absorbed with this massive land transfer. In the 1853 Gadsden
Purchase, the US purchased more land from Mexico south of the Gila River, establishing
today’s Arizona and New Mexico boundaries. Neither Mexican nor Anglo residents took
American integration and settlement lightly, and Mexican and indigenous residents
contested the white ascendancy that accompanied the new boundary well into the
twentieth century. Using both legal and illegal coercive strategies, Anglo-Americans
divested Mexican-Americans of the landholdings, usually consolidating them into
massive livestock ranches. In 1859 and again in 1915, Texas Mexicans led violent raids
against Anglo residents in response to these legal manipulations and the massive loss of
property (Dunn 1996, 7-9). In retaliation, the Texas Rangers engaged in violent
repression against Mexican Americans, and the first deployment of active-duty National
Guard and Army troops was deployed to establish order. By 1900, the violent retaliation
had largely pacified Mexican-Americans in the southwestern US. Thus, the initial
‘pacification’ of the border region entailed the violent, quasi-militarized dispossession of
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racially defined groups, establishing the “American” boundary as a symbolic boundary
between white and non-white territorial boundary.
Yet while Mexican and indigenous people struggled against Anglo-American
racial discrimination, they also moved rather freely throughout the border region until
recently. Fostering cultural and economic ties, this mundane cross-border traffic has
defied attempts to characterize either side of the political boundary as truly “Mexican” or
“American.” When the Immigration Act of 1924 established the first Border Patrol,
Mexico-US boundary operations were oriented towards the exclusion of Asian migrants
and controlling illicit alcohol smuggling, not the prevention of border crossings from
Mexico. During the Great Depression, for example, they performed massive deportations,
only to bring thousands to supplement the war-time economy with the Bracero Program
in 1942. In combination with Jim Crow laws that prevented Mexicans from buying
property in white-dominated towns, this “revolving door” immigration policy prevented
Mexican Americans and Mexican migrants from gaining economic and political capital
in the Southwest. From its inception, therefore, US border enforcement policies have
been intimately tied to the management of the labor supply through immigration
limitations, the use of militaristic tactics to police Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in
the US, and the disenfranchisement of non-white Americans in the Southwest (Dunn
1996; Nevins 2002).
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Figure 4.1: Phases of US Land Acquisition

(Map by Richard Gilbreath)

Beginning in 1978, border policy shifted from limited physical presence on the
territory boundary and a pattern of labor recruitment and deportation to a territorial
emphasis on the criminality of border crossers policy and their implicit threat to white
America. The current combination of militaristic surveillance and policing can be traced
to anxieties over a brown-skinned, Spanish-speaking “American Quebec,” spurred in part
by a vocal Chicana/o civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent
increased visibility of Mexican-Americans in the southwestern US. A recession, rising
unemployment, and the highly publicized arrival of 125,000 Cuban and 40,000 Haitians
in 1980 destabilized the dominant “imagined community” of white, Anglo America and
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created a perceived crisis of nation-statehood. In 1986, the Immigration and Reform
Control Act (IRCA) responded to this perceived demographic crisis by mandating a
closed border and the end of the underground migrant economy (Pub. L. 99-603). In
addition to a program that legalized migrants living the US, IRCA increasied funding for
detention facilities, surveillance technologies, fencing, roads, and border policing.
Executed through cooperative agreements between Departments of Defense, Justice, and
the Treasury, IRCA quietly undermined posse comitatus, the statute limiting the role of
the military in domestic policing (Coleman 2005; Dunn 1996). In 1990, the Immigration
Act increased funding for Border Patrol agents, expanded categories of “excludable
aliens,” limited migrants’ judicial appeals, and awarded arrest power to the INS—at the
same time as it promoted family reunification and employment-based migration (Pub.
L.101-649). And in 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IIRIRA)
codified the INS’ Southwest Border Strategy, described below (Pub. L.104-208). IIRIRA
greatly expanded the categories of excludable persons, granted INS officers authority to
order removals, and streamlined the removal process, effectively removing judicial
oversight from the immigration enforcement process. Thus, immigration legislation in
the 1980s and 1990s framed immigration and border enforcement as intertwined issues of
criminality and national security, necessitating enforcement-led strategies. By increasing
funding and resources for border policing, the CBP and INS became a significant
material presence in the borderlands
After IIRIRA added resources to immigration and border enforcement, the field
was relatively unchanged until the 2003 Department of Homeland Security Act, which
reorganized enforcement operations and codified border security as a homeland security
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priority. In 2005, however, two major legislative changes occurred changing the face of
border security. First, the REAL ID Act expanded the Secretary of Homeland Security’s
waiver authority to “all legal requirements necessary to ensure expeditious construction”
of security barriers (Pub. L. 109-13; Nuñez-Neto and Kim 2008, 7). Second, the Secure
Fence Act amended IIRIRA and mandated the construction of 850 miles of fencing, later
amended to “not less than 700 miles of fencing.” The Act mandated the 370 miles be
built in priority areas by December 2008 (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Existing and Future Fence Projects

(Map by Richard Gilbreath)

Thus, beginning in 2005, the U.S.-Mexico boundary saw an unprecedented influx of
funding.
The cursory overview provided above is meant to show, first, that the border has
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long been contested by the people living in the region, and that “the border” has never
been a settled, established entity (House 1982). In part, it is the continual flux and
indeterminacy of the border region that has provided justification for an increasingly
rigidified boundary; in order for the border to be in force, it must be continually
reproduced through policing and exclusion practices.

Infrastructure is a nominally

durable enforcement strategy, built to stand in for the physical presence of border patrol
officers and to ensure the border’s reproduction in the future. Providing what CBP calls
“persistent impedence,” border barriers serve three purposes. First, they represent the
range of policing, surveillance, detention, and deportation practices aimed at
unauthorized border-crossers and in doing so they, second, aim to deter migrants from
crossing into the US and, third, legitimize the federal government as the purveyor of
“security.” The visuality and stark physicality of fencing, in particular, fuses the
exclusionary symbolism of the border to the physicality of forcible exclusion. As
Andreas argues: “Border enforcement is about deterrence, but it is also about propping up
state claims to territorial authority and symbolically reaffirming the traditional political
boundaries of an ‘imagined community’” (Andreas 2000, 143). In the context of post9/11 border enforcement, counter-terrorism, national security, and the protection of “us”
from “them” offered a new sense of urgency and nearly unassailable justifications for the
expansion of coercive power at the US-Mexico border (Grundy-War and Schofield
2005).

BORDER CONSTRUCTION
A series of immigration and border enforcement bills augmented investments in
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border infrastructure and fostered new levels of cooperation between the Department of
Defense and border enforcement agencies. Culminating in IIRIRA in 1996, INS border
enforcement strategy focused on “prevention through deterrence” (US Immigration and
Nturalization Services 1996; and see Sundberg and Kaserman 2007). Beginning in 1978,
seven miles of 10-foot chain link fencing was installed in El Paso, San Diego, Yuma, and
Tuscon sectors. These were eventually upgraded to 10-foot corrugated steel walls, and in
1991 to welded panels of surplus steel and military landing mats left over from the Gulf
War (Dunn 1996, 66; Fernandes 2007). As today, early fencing projects were
accompanied by helicopter and small aircraft surveillance, footfall ground sensors, and
the expansion of detention centers for apprehended migrants. Between 1978 and 1988,
the INS added twenty helicopters, 278 night vision scopes, in addition to night vision
goggles, infrared scopes, and remote imaging technologies.

Ground sensors were

expanded and upgraded, as was low-light-level television surveillance.

Other

communications and surveillance projects were developed with the U.S. Army, Air
Force, and Federal Aviation Administration (Dunn 1996, 44). Twenty-two border patrol
stations were built, and INS’s budget allocations grew dramatically, comparable only to
post-9/11 increases in border enforcement. In 1989, the Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) was
formed at El Paso’s Fort Bliss, and armed forces were enrolled in a permanent
cooperative relationship with the INS. Aimed at drug trafficking, the majority of support
entailed “operational” missions, largely ground reconnaissance missions used as much to
detect unauthorized border crossings as to locate illicit drugs. While new building
projects were the most visible evidence of this cooperation, engineering and construction
constituted only 10% of the JTF-6 missions (Dunn 2001, 70). This signaled an
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unprecedented role for the armed forces in the policing of U.S. territory. Extending the
paramilitary legacy of border pacification, the Mexico-US boundary has, therefore, long
been a site where geopolitical, military, and domestic policies intersect.
In the 1990s, border patrol operations were integrated across the borderlands, as
enforcement strategies were bundled and implemented throughout the region. This
“Southwest Border Strategy” entailed four phases of Border Patrol staffing, technology,
and infrastructure increases in all 9 southwest sectors, the northern border, and coastal
borders. Beginning with El Paso’s Operation Hold-the-Line in 1993, the Border Patrol
deployed law enforcement and surveillance resources at popular points of entry,
displaying a “show of force” intended to dampen unauthorized border crossings (Andreas
2000, 92). From 1994 to 1998, fencing increased from 19 miles to more than 45 miles,
including a 20-foot cement and metal wall topped with razor wire in Nogales, Arizona
(Fernandes 2007). As the JTF-6 assisted with previous construction efforts, the Armed
Forces and National Guard assisted the INS with construction projects in 1990s, as well
(Andreas 2000). The strategy successfully reduced attempted border crossings in El Paso,
and the effort was expanded to the San Diego sector with Operation Gatekeeper in 1994
(see Nevins 2002 for a detailed account). In 1995, Operation Safeguard began in Nogales,
Arizona (expanded to Douglas and Naco in 1999), and in 1997 Operation Rio Grande
was implemented in Brownsville, Texas (see Figure 4.2).
This succession of “operations” was enabled by the resources granted in the 1996
IIRIRA, which specifically mandated the construction of 14 miles of triple-layered
fencing in the San Diego sector. The Sandia National Laboratory had recommended
additional layers of fencing, patrol roads and floodlights to detect and delay crossers long
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enough for Border Patrol officials to apprehend them (Nevins 2002; Nuñez-Neto and
Kim 2008). This triple fencing was to stretch from the Pacific Ocean westward, but the
California Coastal Commission halted construction at Smuggler’s Gulch, arguing that the
Border Patrol’s plans to fill in the canyon with 2 million cubic yards of dirt was
environmentally unsound (see California Coastal Commission 2003). As of 2000, USBO
and its armed service counterparts had constructed a total of 73 miles of fencing, and the
implementation of the Border Strategy has stalled in its second phase (US Government
Accountability Office 2001). Border enforcement had seen steady increases in funding,
and decreased border crossings in targeted areas, but each decrease was followed by an
almost immediate increase in crossings in a neighboring sector. The short-term, localized
effectiveness of fencing provided some justification for its expansion, the assumption
being that with enough fencing, border crossers will be sufficiently deterred.
Under the Department of Homeland Security, the Southwest Border Strategy’s
“prevention through deterrence” doctrine was infused with unprecedented funding levels,
allowing DHS to coordinate border, drug, and immigration enforcement with more
federal agencies and armed service support that in the past. Called the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI), this multi-agency strategy to “secure America’s borders and reduce
illegal immigration” increased detention and deportation rates, particularly of Central and
South Americans (US Department of Homeland Security 2008a). Previously, INS/ICE
released Central and South Americans because they claimed asylum (and asylees were
eligible for release) or they could not immediately deported. In addition, SBI included
interior immigration enforcement and the implementation of the Boeing Corporation’s
SBInet, a complex of surveillance technologies used to detect foot and vehicle traffic
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along the border (US Government Accountability Office 2008). While not departing
significantly from pre-9/11 border policy discourses and enforcement practices, SBI
signalled three major changes to border enforcement.

First, the initiative began

unprecedented cooperation between federal agencies who had been previously
antagonistic: federal, state and local law enforcement (see Coleman 2007). Second, DHS
made wide use of contracts with private security and technology firms, where it had
previously relied upon the military for construction and technology implementation. This
shift dramatically increased the cost of security, since surplus materials, JTF-6 and other
military labor was not charged to USBP, but used for training exercises or otherwise
included in Department of Defense funding (Neto and Nuñez 2008). Third, Secretary of
Homeland Security Chertoff used his waiver authority to suspend 37 local and federal
regulations to build the more than 700 miles of fencing mandated by Congress in the
Secure Fence Act (See Figure 4.3, 4.4). Current border construction projects signal,
therefore, a larger reconfiguration of relationship between domestic law, homeland
security priorities, and United States territory, leaving large areas of the United States
without recourse to the protections traditionally offered by judicial and legislative
oversight of the executive branch.
New sections of the border wall significantly impact the land and people of the
borderlands. The costs of recent border infrastructure projects demonstrate something of
the scale of these changes. From 2005 to 2008, Congress allocated over $2.7 billion for
SBI projects, $950 million of which was directed towards “tactical infrastructure.” By
comparison, tactical infrastructure was allocated $20 million from 1996 to 1999 (NuñezNeto and Kim 2008, 21). Border patrol staff increased from 9,902 to over 17,000 between

66

2002 and 2008. Pedestrian fencing (Figure 4.5) is estimated to cost $4 million per mile
Figure 4.3: Border Areas Affected by the REAL ID Act

(Map by Richard Gilbreath)
build and $600,000 per year to maintain, while vehicle fencing (Figure 4.6) is estimated
to cost $2 million per mile and $300,000 to maintain and cost upwards of $9 million per
mile. In each case, the effects of the wall are felt, reported, and redressed at the local
level, but these effects rarely reached national news sources and receiving scant mention
in Congressional and Government Accountability Office reporting. Thus, while DHS and
CBP argue that the benefits of wall construction accrue to the nation as a whole, border
construction’s negative consequences remain localized.
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Figure 4.4: Laws Waived under REAL ID Act
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Figure 4.5: Pedestrian Fencing, Arizona

(Source: Jay Johnson-Castro)
Figure 4.6: Border Fence, Lighting, and Patrol Roads

(Source: Jay Johnson-Castro)
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DETENTION INFRASTRUCTURES
Where the PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts expanded DHS’ authority to build
border fencing, to appropriate land from borderland property owners, and to waive
environmental regulations, immigration legislation has long granted the INS/ICE and the
Attorney General wide authority to detain noncitizens.

The 1952 Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA) authorized administrative detention for immigration enforcement
purposes for the first time, and through a IRCA, IIRIRA, and the HSA, has given the
INS/ICE the unilateral discretion to detain noncitizens seeking admission, prior to their
entrance into US territory (explored in more detail in Chapter 7). Until the 1980s,
however, there was no “detention system” to speak of because immigration officials,
judges, and the Supreme Court exercised their discretion not to detain noncitizens in the
vast majority of cases. IRCA introduced the first criminal penalties for immigration
violations, particularly for employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. The
1996 IIRIRA created, however, large classes of excludable residents, and mandated
detention for “criminal aliens.” Broadening deportability and mandating detention,
IIRIRA began the expansion of the detention system as we now know it. In 1994, the
INS detained an average of 6785 migrants per day; in 2001, the daily detained population
settled at around 19,500, where it stayed until 2006. Between 1999 and 2009, the INS
and ICE detained noncitizens in 1,528 different facilities. From 2006 to 2010, the daily
detention population spiked again, settling at the current capacity of approximately
32,000 (Haddal and Siskin 2010; See Figure 4.7). All detention and removal programs
have garnered at least 28% funding increases, while the total budget increased 69%
between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.7: Budget Appropriations for Immigration Enforcement Programs 20052010 (in $1000)
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Figure 4.8: Average Daily Detained Population, 1994-2010
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The Secure Border Initiative included an expansion of the expedited removal
program (ER) from ports of entry to land and sea areas between checkpoints, and to
noncitizens apprehended within 100 miles of a border within 14 days of arrival.
Expanding ER expanded the detention system’s capacity exponentially, as then Interim
Director of Detention and Removal John Torres stated,
Before we implemented expedited removal across the Southwest border, the
Southwest border, the average amount of time that a person spent in detention
was about 90 days. Once we implemented expedited removal in South Texas last
summer, we saw that timeframe drop to about 30 days. Our goal is to get to 15
days. ... Our current time right now is eighteen-and-a-half days. Why do I
mention this? It is because it's simple math. If I have one bed, I can hold four
people in that bed over the course of a year at a 90-day detention rate. As we
break that down to about eighteen-and-a-half days, I can use that same bed for 20
people without getting any additional resources….So in effect, we're looking to
increase by over 100 percent the amount of people we can detain and remove with
just the addition of 6,700 beds.

(emphasis added, Department of Homeland

Security 2006b, 6)
This “speeding up” of deportation allowed ICE to detain and deport noncitizens without
immigration court appearances, increasing the number of people ICE could hold with the
same number of beds (See Figure 4.9).
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Figure 4.9: Total Number of Noncitizens Detained, 2006-2009
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(Source: US Department of Homeland Security 2008b, 4; US Department of Homeland
Security Office of Immigration Statistics 2008c, 3; US Department of Homeland Security
Office of Immigration Statistics 2009, 3; US Department of Homeland Security Office of
Immigration Statistics 2010, 3.)
Detention infrastructure includes not only detention capacity, but a web of legal
and transportation networks that allow ICE to move noncitizens through deportation
proceedings “more efficiently.” In 2009, ICE detained 369,000 noncitizens in two types
of temporary facilities (“holding areas” and “staging locations”) and two types of
detention facilities (those housing noncitizens more or less than 72 hours). “Holding
areas” contain noncitizens for up to 12 hours, after which time they must be transferred to
a short- or long-term detention facility. “Staging locations” may hold noncitizens for up
to 16 hours. (It should be noted that the 12 and 16 hour limits do not prevent DHS from
holding noncitizens overnight, as detainees can be detained in the evening and transferred
in the morning.) Neither type of temporary facility has sleeping or shower capabilities.
Together, holding areas and staging locations hold 3% of the daily detained population,
but represent 84% of all “book-ins,” or initial apprehension interviews (US Immigration
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and Customs Enforcement 2009b, 9). Because these facilities do not have to be licensed
for long-term care, they are virtually unregulated. They may include locked sections of
ICE offices or unmarked subfield offices in unmarked office and industrial parks
(Stevens 2009). In 2009, ICE operated 186 of these temporary facilities, which are
excluded from published lists of detention centers. These lists contain only the 300+
short- and long-term detention centers, or those that hold noncitizens less than and more
than three days, respectively.
ICE owns seven “service processing centers, but operations are subcontracted to
the private sector. Private corrections corporations own and operate seven more “contract
detention facilities,” such as Hutto, while counties own and operate seven jails via
Intergovernmental Service Agreements, such as Berks. These 21 dedicated detention
centers hold around 50% of the detained population, while the remaining 50% is scattered
throughout “mixed population” county jails and state prisons (US Immigration and
Customs Enforcement 2009b, 9-10). These statistics do not include the growing numbers
of noncitizens detained by local law enforcement agencies under the Secure Communities
or 287(g) programs. Local law enforcement agencies participating in SComm report
persons of questionable immigration status or violent offenders to ICE, and may hold
them for up to 48 hours awaiting transfer to ICE custody (Guttin 2009; Shahani and
Greene 2010).

Thus, the detention system coexists with and within the criminal

incarceration system.
A sophisticated transportation network connects these 300 jails, prisons, army
barracks, and temporary facilities, and this network has seen a 71% increase in funding
since 2005, the highest increase across removal-related budget lines (Figure 4.8).
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ICE

transfers most detainees at least once, and 24% of detainees endure two or more transfers.
So where ICE detained over 369,000 noncitizens in FY2009, it also performed as many
inter-facility transfers (Transactions Records Access Clearinghouse 2009).

Because

detention capacity is concentrated in the SW border region, those apprehended in the
Northeast, for example, find themselves in Texas detention centers. Not only are they far
from their communities of support, but the borderlands lack sufficient legal
representation and immigration judges (Human Rights Watch 2009). In addition, federal
district courts rule different on various aspects of immigration law, such as habeas corpus
claims, and scholars and advocates have shown that ICE strategically transfers
noncitizens from more to less immigration-friendly districts (Human Rights Watch 2009;
Morawetz 2004). Detention and transportation infrastructure work to physically locate
detainees in regions where ICE can achieve its desired ends: increased deportation. To
speed deportation, and thereby increase the number of noncitizens per bed per year, ICE
contracts commercial airlines to fly noncitizens to their countries of origin. “ICE AIR”
deported over 367,000 migrants from 22 airports, flying through hubs in Texas, Arizona,
and Louisiana at a cost of $680 per noncitizen per flight (Harris and Soichet 2008; Olivio
2009). In short, this topography of legal and transportation infrastructure means that
noncitizens in the Northeast, Midwest, and Northwestern US are transferred south in
order to be deported.
ICE has leveled its detention capacity and funding for construction in recent
years, but has shifted its emphasis to information sharing and collaborations with local
law enforcement. While Figure 4.9 shows a 28% increase in “institutional removal”
funding, ICE has added new budget lines for Secure Communities, a program which
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allows county jails to check the immigration status of people coming through its cells.
Aimed at identifying “criminal aliens,” the program tends to funnel misdemeanants into
ICE custody, rather than violent offenders (Guttin 2009).

So while border wall

construction has worked to push migrants into increasingly dangerous areas, noncitizen
residents (with or without documents) navigate an interior, post-entry landscape with
more points of contact between ICE and noncitizen communities. As desert bordercrossings and criminal aliens dominate popular migration imaginaries, border wall
construction is integrated into a broader network of apprehension, containment, forced
mobility, banishment.

The policing, inspection, and detention tactics associated with

territorial borders and ports of entry are now distributed—albeit unevenly—across the
US, creating a thicker network of institutions that police citizenship. These spatial
strategies are linked, institutionally, and deployed, strategically, to create a generalized
sense of unease, insecurity, and inevitable exclusion for noncitizens (Coleman 2009).

CONCLUSION
Rather than sealing US territory from illegal incursions, concrete and steel
infrastructures seem to proliferate zones of extra-legality, where some US residents find
themselves without access to information, grievance procedures, and more or less
stripped of the rights afforded to citizens who do not live near the boundary (Hyndman
and Mountz 2008). From DHS’ perspective, the REAL ID waivers apply to particular
stretches of territory—not citizens—and are necessary to ensure the sovereignty of the
US. These waivers do not, in theory, prevent residents from exercising their rights, but
they do appear to negate any specific, place-based or territorial rights residents may
76

claim. The construction of the border wall appears, therefore, to have dramatically
reconfigured the relationship between law, the federal government, and citizens; the
‘uniquely American freedoms’ supposedly secured by border enforcement are actually
diminished in the process of securing them. Just as enforcement escalations in the 1980s
and 1990s led to increased illegal activity throughout the borderlands, it appears that
building the border wall diminished citizens’ access to a host of legal procedures. Thus,
homeland security practices may create the conditions of insecurity they are engineered
to prevent (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007).
What does detention mean when detainees must be housed with “regular” prison
populations, in repurposed prisons, or in tents? To proponents of stiffer penalties, “illegal
immigration” is perceived as a threat to “every facet of our society—security, education,
social services, and health care” (Pryce in Coleman 2008, 5). That is, the problem of
immigration is represented as an on assault the state’s ability to ensure survival of US
citizens. Yet, the border wall impacts the mobility, property, and livelihoods of people on
living near the border in myriad ways. As such, the localized and individualized effects of
border enforcement infrastructural are borne disproportionately by communities in the
borderlands, while the Department of Homeland Security announces the completion of
each section of fencing as a victory for the United States as a whole.

Border

infrastructure remains, as Andreas (2000) argued, an important “stage” for the
performance of state power. But as Coleman (2005), the borderlands operate in this way
precisely because policy-makers imagine it as an open terrain and develop policies
without consideration of its social, economic, political, or geomorphological particularity.
Taken together, border and detention infrastructures combine spatial strategies of
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deterrence and containment, an ironic internalization of Cold War anti-proliferation
tactics. The re-use of military landing mats, army barracks, surplus prison space shows,
furthermore, how the infrastructures of successive military interventions interlace with
wars on terror, drugs, and crime. Wall building concretizes the US’ symbolic mastery of
the US Southwest, and appears to sediment US claims to national space. Yet, these
projects occurred alongside long-standing efforts to “push the border outward,” such as
US consulates’ administration of new immigrant applications abroad, ICE operations
abroad, and DHS inspections of international ports. Interior policing, detention, mobility
between centers, and deportation rely upon a complex logistical infrastructure, as well,
translated from the world’s largest criminal justice system.

While these material

landscapes naturalize and normalize exclusion, they must be seen as instruments, “ready
at hand” (Graham and Thrift 2007) to be repurposed and re-deployed.

As spatial

strategies, they spatialize power relations in different ways, but in combination, they form
a complex assemblage of bordering practices. Enclosing national territory from
unauthorized entries and criminalizing populations, this assemblage of bordering
practices weaves topographical with topological relations of banishment.

Copyright © Lauren Leigh Martin 2011
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CHAPTER 5: DETENTION, DISCIPLINE, AND DETERRENCE IN US
NONCITIZEN FAMILY DETENTION PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION
As the previous chapter described, US immigration officials more than doubled
the yearly detention of noncitizens from 146,760 to 369,483 between 1999 and 2009
(TRAC 2009). Moving this volume of noncitizens through its 33,000 bed system, ICE
now manages the fastest growing incarcerated population and the largest prison system in
the United States (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b). Considering that
the US incarcerates over 2 million people, the world’s largest national prison population,
the size and scope of the US’s detention of noncitizens is locally and internationally
significant. Implementing a “catch and remove” approach to immigration enforcement,
the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) both ramped up policing activities and eliminated
“loopholes” that prevented the older Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from
detaining noncitizens suspected of violating immigration law. The expanded use of
detention reflected a more general sense among federal immigration authorities that
something more was needed – beyond regular border patrol, interior investigations, and
port of entry inspection operations – to deter undocumented migration to the US (US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003). As a result, a whole range of individuals
who previously would not have been detained in order to effect deportation – including
arriving asylum-seekers, Central Americans who could not be quickly deported, and
“vulnerable” populations, such as families – were caught up in a growing immigration
prison complex.
Immigration scholars often treat detention as a function of deportability. Indeed,
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the specific legal, institutional, and infrastructural conditions of detention are rarely
addressed as strategic components of immigration enforcement. A small but growing
detention literature has tracked, however, how confining noncitizens and transferring
them to isolated centers is a crucial aspect of state strategy vis-à-vis the regulation of
immigration. This research not only links detention to a “deportation turn” in the
wealthiest states across the globe (Collyer forthcoming), but shows how detention
includes a series of surveillance practices that migrants internalize before, during, and
after their encounters with immigration authorities (e.g., Bigo 2007, Coutin 2010, Martin
and Mitchelson 2008, Mountz 2004, Schuster 2005a, b). Moreover, this previous research
outlines how the location and conditions of detention allow states to engineer detainees’
access to legal protections, representation, and resources (Gill 2009, Hyndman and
Mountz 2008, White 2002). In the US, detention falls to the administrative side of
immigration policy-making, and administrative discretion to detain noncitizens is thereby
protected from federal court oversight beyond immigration law, itself notorious for its
deference to lawmakers over courts (Neuman 2005). Policing, detention, and deportation
have reverberating effects, however, and interrupt household incomes, force migrants to
give up possessions and savings, and fragment the relations of care that sustain
transnational migrant networks. As I show below, the effects of detention-as-deterrence
policies exceed those policies’ stated aims. Detained families’ accounts of isolation,
family separation, bodily ordering, and criminalization reveal heterogeneous, but
resonant, impacts on transboundary migrants.
This chapter has two primary goals. First, I want to show that noncitizen detention
has become a key strategy—specifically a spatial strategy—in the US Department of
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Homeland Security’s approach to border and immigration enforcement.

Most

importantly, I show how DHS agencies have come to understand transboundary
migration as a territorial vulnerability, and how confinement in prison facilities became a
central US immigration enforcement tactic, and then a key counter-terrorism strategy. I
trace shifts in detention policy and practice through the case of family detention because
the difficulties in detaining parents and children together illuminate the improvisational
character of enforcement policy-making.

Second, I argue that conceptualizing

detention’s increasingly central role in risk-based, biopolitical security regimes requires a
new lens on disciplinarity. ICE’s apprehension and detention policies seek to deter future
migrants as much as ensure deportation, yet detained families’ understood their detention
in terms of its effects on their relationships to each other and to broader support networks.
Their narratives reveal how ICE’s detention policies impact noncitizens’ decisionmaking, but more importantly, the ways in which these interactions exceed ICE’s aims.
Detention’s disciplinarity is not defined by institutional efforts to remake individuals, but
oriented towards the behavior of entire populations of future, potential migrants,
disciplinary tactics--spectacular enforcement practices and subjectification. As risk and
security have become dominant themes in for scholars of international relations and
geopolitics, it is critical to attend to the ways in which disciplinary modalities of power
are reconfigured—and re-incorporated—into the risk-based security practices (and
ontologies).
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DETENTION, RISK, AND DISCIPLINE
The scale of US noncitizen detention may be novel, but detention and
confinement have become common policies in major receiving countries and,
increasingly, in transit countries, as well (Collyer 2007, Coleman 2007, Hyndman and
Mountz 2008). Liza Schuster locates detention in a European states’ efforts to control
transboundary migration: the deportation of out-of-status migrants, the detention of those
suspected of being out-of-status, and the dispersal of settled refugees away from
communities of support (Schuster 2005a, b). From the perspective of migrants’ journeys,
however, status changes with a series of arrivals, departures, and everyday mobilities, so
that “status mobility” and “geographical mobility” are more complexly linked than the
geopolitical marking of territorial boundaries would allow. This range of state and selfmanagement practices lead Schuster to conceptualize exclusion in a way that captures not
just territorial removal, but forms of legal (documentation regimes, education, healthcare)
and social (racism, xenophobia and prejudice) exclusion. In the UK, Nicholas Gill has
shown how a range of middle-men impact migrants’ mobilities within detention system,
in addition to asylees’ pathways into and out of detention center (Gill 2009). Similar
criminalization, presumed guilt, and “bogus asylum seekers” discourses frame
government responses to migration, a pattern that Alison Mountz has documented in
Canada, as well (Mountz 2010). Though couched in specific jurido-political milieux,
speedy deportation, frequent inter-center transfers, isolation from legal representation,
and strategic invisibilization characterize detention practices in the EU, US, Canada, and
Australia. For Bigo, the agglomeration of waiting zones, centers, and malleable status
place migrants on a “long march,” “where circulating is tolerated, but stopping to rest or
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settle is not allowed…It is the time of endless circulation, of constant rotation” (Bigo
2007, 30). Detention is not the final point or a limit case of “mobility management,” but
a space in which exclusion and banishment congeal (ibid., Foucault 2007, 107-110). 3
Quite apart from these ethnographies of detention, critical border and security
studies scholars have analyzed how newly implemented technologies of border
inspection, identification, and surveillance follow transboundary travelers before, during,
and after their passage through a port of entry. Identity profiling, databanking, and risk
analysis techniques work together with x-ray scans, pat-downs, “behavior observation,”
and “passenger imaging” allow security professionals to calculate a transnational
migrant’s probability of committing a crime (Adey 2009, Amoore 2009, Amoore and de
Goede 2008, Amoore and Hall 2009, Martin 2010). While these inspections are more
visible in places like airports and government buildings, security agencies have linked a
number of previously distinct databases and access to credit card transactions and phone
records, allowing them to continually evaluate risk. Surveillance studies scholars have
long argued that these risk-based “social sorting” (Lyon 2003, 2006) mechanisms remain
diffuse and disconnected, forming a fragmented “surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty and
Ericson 2000) rather than a coherent, “Big Brother” surveillance apparatus. The social
sorting that differentiated between more and less dangerous subjects has been redeployed
to evaluate risk to the “population and the way of life,” so that everyday security
practices aim to pluck “the hidden terrorist” from the everyday comings and goings
required for capitalist circulation (Martin and Simon 2008).
3

Focused on risk

Stuart Elden offers a similar argument regarding Foucauldian discipline. He argues that Foucault
understands disparate disciplinarity modalities of army barracks, schools, hospitals and asylums to meet in
Bentham’s Panopticon, rather than emanate from the prison, as many scholars have argued. S. Elden, 2001.
Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of Spatial History. London: Continuum, pp.
120-150.
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management’s knowledge practices, and ways in which state security institutions
integrate the techniques, this strain of research has emphasized the respatialization of the
border, as borders are pushed both outward and inward and exist “everywhere and
nowhere” (Coleman 2009, Belcher et al., 2008).
For Michael Dillon, infusing national security decision-making with risk-based
evaluation represents a fundamental shift in political ontology, and therefore at security
professionals’ concept of the human (Dillon 2007, 2008). Where liberal law and
disciplinary regimes revolved around various notions of a whole human, defined by
labor, language, or signification, Dillon argues that risk-based power/knowledge regimes
model the biopolitical governance as a transactional space. In this transactional space,
neither the biological species being nor the moral individual are the primary objects of
intervention. Instead, risk modeling defines this transactional space in terms of networks,
associations, and patterns between digitized pieces of information. Represented by credit
card transactions, travel patterns, and criminal records, life in this transactional space
unfolds through the circulation of commodified goods, the connections between people
and things, and the spontaneous emergence of disruptions. More a digital aggregate than
an individual, a “person” exists only insofar as s/he is related to the circulation of goods
and services. The connections and associations produced by this circulatory existence
map, therefore, a terrain of continually shifting possibilities (see also Amoore 2009).
Seeking to calculate and control risk, homeland security has become, Dillon argues, a
science of contingency, through which security professionals deploy ever-more
sophisticated algorithms at a shifting terrain of possibilities. As security agencies link
nationality, religion, language, and dress to risk profiles, people become threatening in
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and through their connections to suspicious places, people, and things. Weaving risk
analysis into immigration and border enforcement, these risk-based modeling practices
produce a political ontology of connection, circulation and contingency, and a subject
that is more a risk-pooled cohort than a whole moral individual or liberal subject.
For penologists, however, risk management does not represent a leaving behind of
imprisonment or disciplinary technologies, but reconfigures the prison’s transformative
function.

Actuarial approaches to crime control produced a shift—if a halting,

incomplete, and discordant one—from rehabilitative approaches to imprisonment towards
to the segregation of risky populations from safe ones. The purpose of imprisonment is
no longer to return reformed individuals to society, but to contain risky populations for
the sake of public safety (Feeley and Simon 1992, Garland 2001). Furthermore, criminal
history determines access to citizenship benefits, and adjudication has been replaced by
an administrative criminal justice system with wide discretionary authority. As states
respond to the pressures to protect their citizens from the negative effects of neoliberal
globalization and state security agencies scrutinize transnational mobility, policy-makers
have framed immigration both as an issue of social order/crime control and national
security. In this context, a person’s guilt, innocence, or political identity is secondary to
state security agencies’ efforts to segregate, contain, and control risky populations. In
addition, administrative boards decide sentencing and parole, so that punishment’s
distribution has become largely an administrative matter, separate from the adjudication
processes that (nominally) guarantee due process. Placing authority with administrative
rather than judicial bodies, the criminal justice system has come to resemble the
immigration system. While it has become commonplace in the US to refer to the
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“criminalization of immigration,” the concurrent “immigrationization of crime” and
“criminalization of immigration” indicate, Miller argues, the emergence of “a new system
of social control that draws from immigration and criminal justice, but is purely neither”
(Miller 2002-3, 618). What we may be witnessing is not just a blurring of domestic and
foreign policy (Coleman 2008b), a threshold or a mobius strip folding inside into outside
(Bigo 2001), but the generalization of confinement as a spatial practice of neoliberal
biopolitical governmentality (Peck 2004, 392).
What do we make, then, of detention’s strategy of bodily confinement alongside
digitized risk analysis technologies, like biometric data collection, identity management,
digital imaging, and databanking? How do we square detention’s blunt instruments with
these diffuse, less invasive surveillance technologies? And conceptually, how does
detention’s disciplinary legacy diverge from or cohere with the aforementioned
biopolitical technologies? Dillon’s analysis distinguishes between disciplinary, legal, and
risk-based subjects, yet securitized spaces continue to require legible subjects (Martin
2010). Studies of risk-based national security practices have, for the most part, avoided
questions of disciplinarity, choosing instead to focus on emerging biopolitical
assemblages. Without reducing detention centers to disciplinary institutions, detention
scholars have noted, however, how key aspects of Foucauldian discipline remain
important to border and immigration enforcement.
For Mountz (2010), detention belongs to a spectrum of containment practices:
categorization, physical enclosure of detention centers, performances of strong state
responses to migration, and strategic in/visibilities. She details, further, the ways in which
“feeling watched” defines migrants’ lives and border-crossings experiences, even when
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they obtain legalized status. For Mountz, this spectrum of containment practices work to
produce migrant identities even where state immigration authorities are not present.
Coutin, similarly, illuminates how US immigration enforcement practices confine
noncitizens’ movements before, during, and after their detention and deportation (2010).
Faced with stigmatization in the US and in the countries to which they are deported,
migrants internalize judgment, criminalization, and restricted mobility of the detention
center. They, in turn, stay close to home, restricting their own mobility. Post-entry
deportability also works as a form of social control for noncitizens. As Coleman (2008a)
has shown, noncitizens can be excluded after they have been admitted, judged by both
actions (e.g., criminal charges) and characteristics (e.g., homosexuality). That is, the
border inspection haunts the post-entry landscape of noncitizen residency. De Genova
(2002) argues that deportability’s (and detainability’s) indeterminacy is far more
conducive to producing a docile labor force than the 100% deportation DRO envisions.
Thus, as a site of surveillance’s performance and internalization, the detention’s
disciplinary power works through a double movement of spectacle and subjectification
that reverberate far beyond the detention center itself (c.f. Elden 2001; Foucault 2007, pp.
107-110).
Modulating imprisonment with risk management has not, therefore, made the
prison nor disciplinarity less important, nor have they been superceded by biopolitical
security practices.

Rather, as I hope to show below, disciplinary techniques—

categorization, spatial partitioning, hierarchical ordering—have long been remodulated to
provide the spatial ordering, visibility, and models of correct behavior necessary for a
society “governed through freedom” (Rose 1999). Releasing the prison from its reform
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imperatives (Garland 2001), physical confinement is portable social risk mitigation
strategy; prisons are recombinant institutions and confinement a versatile risk
management practice. Aimed at inherently mobile, transnational, and connected
populations, this “geopolitics of mobility” combines nominally domestic public policy,
immigration law, and exceptional executive powers to secure particular territorial orders.
Interdiction, dispersal, transfers between detention centers, voluntary return, forced
repatriation, and off-shore detention locate detention in a different relation to receiving
countries’ sovereign territory. Foreigners’ detention is, as Bigo (2007) argues, the price
of security, as illiberal border zones are essential to the liberal governance. Linked to an
assemblage of surveillance, policing, profiling, and forced mobility practices, detention is
a key spatial strategy in the US’ mapping of national and global space.

CRIMINALIZATION, SECURITIZATION, AND TERRITORIAL
VULNERABILITY
As various immigrants have been understood as the primary source of “internal
enemies” and threats to national security, tying noncitizen detention to US geopolitical
positioning. In the case of Chinese exclusion at the turn of the 19th century and Japanese
internment during World War II, detention and deportation policies were explicitly racial
and ethnic. Immigrants—as opposed to non-permanent residents—have been variously
understood as racial, religious, linguistic, and ideological threats that cannot be distinctly
separated from efforts to establish particular territorial and geopolitical orders (Nagel
2002; Tesfahuney 1998). Following a series of large refugee influxes (such as the 1980
migration of 125,000 Cubans to Florida) and a growing public perception of the southern
border as “out of control,” the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
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instituted the first criminal penalties for immigration–related crimes into immigration law
(Pub.L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359). In the decade following, immigration law became more
punitive, and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) institutionalized mandatory detention for a broad range of documented and
undocumented migrants (Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546). In particular, the
bill broadened the category of “aggravated felony” and created the Expedited Removal
(ER) program. In particular, IIRIRA broadened the category of “aggravated felony” to
include a range of petty crimes and worked retroactively. This ever-expanding list of
“aggravated felonies” funneled noncitizens with criminal records—both recent and long
past—into mandatory detention.

Further, the Expedited Removal (ER) program

deputized INS (and now ICE) officers to issue deportation orders to undocumented
migrants apprehended at ports of entry with limited court oversight. Migrants in ER
processing became subject to mandatory detention. Noncitizens in the US face, as a
result, expanded spaces of policing and shrinking judicial oversight since the mid-1980s
(Coleman 2007). Even while administrative detention is not technically considered
punishment for immigration-related infractions, mandatory detention both practically and
symbolically linked immigration status to criminality.
Detaining Children
Migration-related detention took an exclusively penal form in the US, which
created specific problems for detaining families. Old army barracks, former prisons,
existing prisons and jails, and a range of impromptu holding areas produce a highly
uneven landscape of detention (Dow 2005, Welch 2002). Unaccompanied children were
often detained in these facilities, languishing for long periods without legal representation
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or the ability to navigate the adversarial legal system on their own (Women’s Refugee
Commission 2002). In 1997, Flores v. Meese required the INS to stop holding minors in
restrictive facilities, and to release them to family members or sponsors (Flores v. Meese
Settlement 1997). The lawsuit also stipulated access to education, counseling, medical
and dental care, recreation, and state child welfare institutions, effectively creating a
separate INS custody system for children. In the 1990s, the INS routinely released
families with “Notices to Appear” (NTA) before an immigration judge, but, as I show
below, releasing “vulnerable populations” came to be understood as a “procedural
vulnerability” in the immigration enforcement system. In cases where parents had
criminal convictions or fell into mandatory detention categories, the INS often detained
parents and children separately (Women’s Refugee Commission 2007). The problem of
family of where to detain families arose, therefore, from contradictions between
mandatory detention of parents and INS’ inability to detain children in penal facilities.
The Detention and Removal Office’s Endgame strategy specifically laments the
lack of Flores-compliant, child-appropriate facilities, and notes that the lack of “soft
facilities” for low-risk detainees impedes DRO’s 100% removal target (US Immigration
and Customs Enforcement 2003). In similar statements, Secretary of Homeland Security
Michael Chertoff observed:
There are certain housing needs that are required when you have children. We're
working … to find a way to solve those housing needs so that when family groups
come across, we have the ability to detain them as well, until we can remove
them. And, we don't release them into the community where, more likely than
not, they're going to abscond. (Department of Homeland Security 2006b).
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As with smuggling and border “illegalities” more broadly, DHS and ICE couched family
release as a (potential) vector of illegality: “by expanding Expedited Removal to cover
illegal alien families, DHS is closing down a loophole that has been exploited by human
smugglers and helping stop future illegal immigration” (US Department of Homeland
Security 2006). Migrating families represented not only an opportunity for terrorists, but
were framed as uniformly illegal. Families’ exceptional status came to be viewed as an
entry point for potential terrorists. Perceived as vulnerabilities, ICE’s previous policies
and procedures became categorical pathways into and out of the US, and legal status and
smuggling logistics became vectors of threat in the same complex system. For DHS, the
problem of detaining “low-risk” noncitizens was a matter of infrastructural suitability,
rather than a conflict between legal precedent, humanitarian need, and “catch and
remove.”
INS responded to these difficulties by detaining families in a variety of ad hoc
facilities, such as guarded hotel rooms, and Berks opened as the first dedicated family
detention center in March 2001. Housing only 84 beds, Berks did not accommodate all
families apprehended by ICE, and as of 2001, ICE had not developed overarching family
detention or release policies to guide its field offices. Families’ treatment varied widely,
therefore, between border checkpoints, ports of entry, and INS field offices, and the
agency continued to release most families encountered at the US-Mexico border with
NTAs. When Berks opened, the INS announced plans to open Berks-like facilities across
the US, to accommodate the larger number of families seeking asylum (Schmitt 2001,
Rosin 2001).
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Detention and the War on Terror
During the flurry of security policy-making after 11 September, 2001,
immigration law’s wide administrative authority to detain and deport quickly became a
strategic legal component in US domestic counter-terrorism operations (explored in more
detail in Chapter 7). Attorney General John Ashcroft expanded INS detention rules in
lieu of obtaining real authority to preemptively detain terrorist suspects. Immigration and
Naturalization Services, and the then-new Department of Homeland Security after it,
targeted noncitizens, Arabs and Muslims for increased surveillance and self-reporting,
and many were detained and eventually deported through these “voluntary reporting
programs” (Aldana 2004, Nguyen 2005). ICE detained others under the pretenses of
immigration investigations, allowing counter-terrorism officials more time to investigate
potential criminal charges. ICE detained others under the pretenses of immigration
investigations, allowing counter-terrorism officials more time to investigate potential
criminal charges. Ashcroft also stiffened asylum’s evidenciary requirements, which made
it more difficult for political refugees to seek protection in the United States. In other
cases, the INS and ICE enforced long-ignored clauses in immigration law, such as an
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) clause requiring noncitizens to report address
changes within 10 days of a move. ICE (and the INS before it) did not have the resources
or procedures to keep track of the address change forms it demanded, so that bureaucratic
mismanagement landed many authorized residents in detention (Miller 2002-3). Without
reconfiguring immigration law’s admission and exclusion principles, executive branch
agencies exploited immigration officers’ administrative authority to make enforcement
policy, especially their discretionary powers to detain noncitizens without court
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oversight, charges, or evidence.

These policy recalibrations embedded immigration

enforcement in an emerging security-driven institutional context.

Administrative

immigration detention became, therefore, a key spatial strategy in the domestic War on
Terror, though it operated with considerably less public visibility than the military’s
administrative detentions.
Against this backdrop of expanded administrative detention, DHS reframed
border and immigration enforcement to become synonymous and interchangeable with
counter-terrorism. The border-crossers and drug traffickers of 2000 became potential
conduits for terrorist operations:
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the primary focus of the Border Patrol was on
illegal aliens, alien smuggling, and narcotics interdictions.… After 9/11, it was
apparent that smugglers’ methods, routes, and modes of transportation are
potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorists and result in terrorist
weapons illegally entering the United States… [T]he potential exists for a single
individual or small group to cross the border undetected with biological or
chemical weapons, weapons of mass effect, or other implements of terrorism.
(Emphasis added, US Customs and Border Protection 2004, 4)
Emphasizing smugglers’ strategic invisibility, transportation infrastructure, and pathways
across the border and back, CBP’s border became not a line, secured through a series of
barriers, but a complex of networks, material assets, and wealth. Incorporating networks
into CBP’s concept of the border, undocumented labor migration became a condition of
possibility for terrorist attacks and constituted, in the context of the War on Terror, a
significant territorial vulnerability. ICE’s investigative sub-agencies focused on tracking
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and freezing trafficking assets, which included detaining and criminally charging
smugglers. ICE’s investigative sub-agencies focused on tracking and freezing trafficking
assets, which included detaining and criminally charging smugglers. As “illegal
migration” came to be understood as a conduit, transboundary mobility itself came to be
understood as a pre-condition for terrorist activity, and border and immigration
enforcement as preempting certain conditions of possibility for another attack.
“Catch and Remove”
Learning from its 1994 “Prevention through Deterrence” Southwest Border
Strategy, CBP asserted that “the proper mix of assets increases the ‘certainty of
apprehension’ of those intending to illegally cross our borders,” which “has established a
deterrent effect in targeted locations” (Customs and Border Protection 2004, pp.8, 9).
These “mission alignment” efforts linked border security to interior immigration
enforcement and prosecution efforts in new ways.

ICE’s Office of Detention and

Removal Operations, as mentioned in this paper’s opening, sought to “deport all
deportable aliens” and to “support DHS efforts to deter illegal migration” (US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003, p. ii). Integrating these then-new agency
missions into SBI, DHS rolled out a bundle of border surveillance technologies (SBInet),
increased border patrols, and expanded Expedited Removal’s time, space, and
applicability. DHS expanded ER from ports of entry to zones within 100 miles of the
southern or coastal borders, and to all transboundary migrants caught within 14 days of
arrival. “Ending catch and release policy,” DHS targeted “Other Than Mexicans”
(OTMs), especially Central American migrants who could not be immediately deported
and for whom the INS and then DRO did not have sufficient detention space (Department
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of Homeland Security 2006b). As more migrants became detainable, and then detained,
confinement came to occupy an increasingly important role in DHS’ attempts to manage
“illegal pathways” and flows. Expanding detainability and bedspace required a series of
legal, administrative, and infrastructural changes and concretized detention’s increasingly
important institutional location in immigration and border enforcement.
By creating new detainable populations nearly over night, “catch and remove”
produced an immediate detention bed shortage. To address this shortfall, DHS opened a
number of new, primarily private detention centers in the southwest United States,
contracted with county jails through Inter-Governmental Services Agreements (IGSAs),
and added beds to existing ICE facilities. While the 596 family beds represented a small
percentage of this total, family detention’s story reveals three key elements of these
changes. First, DHS addressed the SBI-produced family detention space shortage by
opening the T. Don Hutto Family Residential Facility (Hutto hereafter), a 512-bed
medium security prison, owned and operated by the Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) in Taylor, Texas. As of September 2009, ICE owned six detention centers; of the
remaining 250+ detention centers, 14 are private, dedicated detention facilities, and the
remaining 240 hold noncitizens in mixed facilities that hold both convicted prisoners and
civil immigration detainees, as described in Chapter 4. Second, Hutto operates under an
Inter-Governmental Service Agreement (IGSA) between ICE and Williamson County,
Texas’ Commissioners’ Court, who in turn contracted with CCA to operate Hutto. Both
privatized and devolved to local government, Hutto’s contractual relationships are typical
of the complex of jurisdictional delegations and deferred liabilities that dominate the
detention sector.

Third, almost two-thirds of Hutto’s families came from Central
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America, and fell into DHS’ new categories of detainability (Coutin 2010). Mexican
families represented 3% of the total between May 1, 2006 and June 23, 2009, while
Salvadoran families were 29%, Honduran families 25%, and Guatemalan families 20%
(Figure 5.1, 5.2). Family detention succeeded then, in drawing new populations into the
detention system, even if these groups do represent a large percentage of border crossers
annually.
Figure 5.1: Number of Adults and Minors Detained from May 1, 2006 to June 23,
2009 at the T. Don Hutto Family Residential Facility, by Country of Citizenship.
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Responsive Materials to American
Civil Liberties Union Freedom of Information Act Request. On file with author.)
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of Total Families Detained at T. Don Hutto from May 1,
2006 to June 23, 2009, by Country of Origin
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Responsive Materials to American
Civil Liberties Union Freedom of Information Act Request. On file with author.)
While Hutto was not exceptional in the juridical and political-economic landscape
described above, DHS focused on the facility’s “success” in detaining families, and used
the policy to represent the efficacy of the “catch and remove” policy as a whole:
The practice of “catch and release” for non-Mexican aliens existed for years and
was one of the greatest impediments to border control. DHS and ICE reengineered the detention and removal process to end this practice along the
border, an accomplishment considered impossible in FY05 when only 34 percent
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of non-Mexican aliens apprehended along the border were being detained. In
May, ICE opened a new 500-bed facility in Williamson County, Texas that is
specially equipped to meet family needs. In August 2006, only 28 family units
were released, compared with 820 in the month before the facility opened; a 97
percent decline in family releases on the southern border. (US Immigration and
Customs Enforcement 2008d)
These statistics mask the fact that many of Hutto’s families were not apprehended at the
border, but elsewhere within the United States. For example, one mother was detained
with her child when she arrived to pick her/him up from the Division of Unaccompanied
Children’s Services, a Department of Justice agency charged with noncitizen children’s
custody (Interview 2008). Further, a majority of detained families file for asylum and are
granted political asylum in the United States (America’s Family Prison interviews 2007,
Interview 2008). They are not, therefore, deportable, but their detention comes to stand in
for and imply mass deportation, and as Coutin argues, is “designed to convince migrants
that they are on their way out” (Coutin 2010, 5). The excerpt implies, further, that Hutto’s
500 beds remain filled, when the San Antonio Field Office Director admitted that far
fewer families appeared at the southern border than expected, and adult women filled half
the facility from 2007 onwards (In re: Hutto Detention Center, Deposition of Marc
Moore).
As a spectacular and strategic representation of “success,” family detention served
as a metonymic performance of the detention system as a whole. Using the relatively
small and more easily apprehended group to represent non-Mexican migration as a
whole, family detention performed DHS’ hardened sensitivity to humanitarian
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migrations. Beyond these performances of strong state power, however, detention works
on noncitizen populations in a number of ways that cannot be reduced to deportation or
disciplinary norms of imprisonment.

Detention combines a range of geographical

imaginings, as I described above, and spatial practices that mediate detainees’
relationships to themselves, each other, and to networks “on the outside.” Rather than
opposing detention’s geopolitical role to its application, i.e. policy to practice, detention
works through an heterogenous and often contradictory combination of spatial practices.
Hoping to “catch and remove” existing undocumented migrants and to deter
future migrations, detention is as much a spectacle of state power as it is an enforcement
tactic (Andreas 2000). ICE’s attempts to create a purely “lawful” national territory are,
therefore, bound up with ICE’s attempts to discipline potential migrants. Ironically,
intensifying border and immigration enforcement often encourages smuggling operations,
as those seeking to cross the border increasingly require assistance to cross highly
patrolled and remote areas (Cornelius 2001, Hing 2001, Nevins and Aizeki 2009). As
others have argued, border and immigration enforcement practices often produce the socalled problem of illegality they ostensibly intended to solve (Massumi 2005,
Bialasciewicz et al., 2007, Martin and Simon 2008). Working to secure national
populations by changing the behavior of an abstract, global population of potential
migrants, detention intertwines the disciplining of individuals and populations with
geopolitical mappings of global space.
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DETENTION’S DISCIPLINARITY: ISOLATION, ORDERING, AND
CRIMINALIZATION
ICE’s legal authority and institutional position does not, however, capture
detention’s full effect on detained families, nor facility-specific policies and practices. It
is the quotidian ordering of bodies, space, and time within detention centers that
constitutes the practice as a spatial strategy. While I described how ICE links detention
to border and counter-terrorism policing above, daily life in detention is, for most
detainees, managed by non-federal actors and unfolds through a host of other practices.
At Hutto, for example, CCA coordinates visitation, head count, telephone, recreation,
education and detainee work policies. They stock and set prices for commissary items,
including phone cards. The embodied practice of detention unfolds through a diverse set
of material practices that cannot be collapsed with the geopolitical imaginings that
comprise ICE’s “catch and remove” policies. Yet for detained noncitizens—families, in
this case—it is the daily spatio-temporal ordering that dominates their experience. As I
show below, detention’s disciplinarity works through location, isolation, criminalization,
and forced mobility, a combination of spatial practices that both perform state power and
changed the ways in which detained parents and children understood themselves.
Location
In choosing between two sites to house the second family detention center, an
internal report mentioned Hutto’s proximity to a strong immigrant advocacy community:
“Austin, which is 25 miles from Hutto, has a broader NGO and CBO base that have
typically been very strong advocates for immigrants. The Political Asylum Project of
Austin also known as PAPA is a pro bono agency actively involved in advocacy for
immigrants” (Emphasis in original, Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Anonymous
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Memorandum). (PAPA, now known as American Gateways, is one of the few entirely
pro bono legal organizations in Austin and does not engage in lobbying or political
advocacy.) Hutto, however, was selected, indicating a degree of both conflict and
improvisation among ICE decision-makers. What these internal evaluations reveal is that
ICE is acutely aware of detainees’ relationships to surrounding communities. Valuing
isolation/connectedness to surrounding communities and supporting institutions as a
negative geographical characteristic implies a concerted effort to remove detainees’ rights
“by geographical design” (Mountz 2010).

Hutto’s proximity to Austin does not

overcome the fact, however, that the facility is functionally separate from Taylor,
serviced by a single asphalt road, and hidden from town by a large railroad depot.
Bordered by softball fields, a state highway, and agricultural land, the former prison is
virtually invisible to most of Taylor. Thus, detaining noncitizens in remote detention
centers serves to both manage noncitizen flows and to enclose “illegal” populations from
“legal” ones, a practice that attempts to create territorial orders based on legal status and
im/mobility.
Length of Confinement
For migrants seeking to stay in the US, detention is a long series of medical
exams, intake interviews, mental health check-ups (more available at Hutto than any
other detention center), and court appearances interspersed with indefinite waiting
periods. Showers, meals, headcounts, and recreation time pace the days of waiting for
decisions, appeals, and release dates. While ICE opened Hutto to receive families in
Expedited Removal, most of Hutto’s families applied for asylum, which removed them
from the average 30-day ER processing, and placed them in a much longer series of
101

interviews and hearings. Further, fewer families arrived than expected, and ICE detained
non-ER families at Hutto, as well.

Immigration and asylum case management is

distributed among 2 DHS agencies (ICE, Citizenship and Immigration Services) and the
Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). So while
asylum-seeking families became eligible for release after passing their credible fear
interviews, immigration judges set bond and field office directors set parole. Many
families arrived with few resources to pay the $1-7,000 bond and parole costs, and asked
for these amounts to be reduced. Their files travelled, therefore, from CBP (for those
detained at the border), to ICE, to an immigration judge, to CIS, and back to ICE and an
immigration judge. Each court appearance, request, and decision in the release process,
which runs separately from their asylum decision process, took weeks, so that even the
most fortunate of families spent months in detention (Interview 2008).
While Hutto’s families were able to take advantage of the nearby pro bono legal
services described above, detainees’ lack of legal knowledge and services protract their
legal cases. As one detained parent stated, “When you’re inside, you don’t know nothing
about the law, you don’t know nothing what is going on. So everything some guy tell
you, you believe it, whether is true or false, you believe it. Because no one will tell you
what is your right” (America’s Family Prison Interview 2007). Without sufficient funds
for bond/parole, Hutto’s early residents spent up to 11 months at Hutto, until a federal
lawsuit required ICE to review families’ eligibility for release monthly (In re: Hutto
Settlement 2007). This situation is not unique to Hutto, as Berks’ families and adult
asylum-seekers have spent years in detention (Women’s Refugee Commission 2007). Fed
up with long detention stays, some detainees chose to sign voluntary deportation orders
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and forego legitimate claims and return home in order to avoid continued detention.
Long detention stays compounded the sense of physical isolation, as detained families’
felt more removed from their families, and more anxious about their potential removal.
Isolation
For detainees, family relationships spanned beyond Hutto’s fenced perimeter and
included kinship networks in the US and abroad.

Some families were settled into

marriage with US citizens, while others had both close and distant connections with
family members with refugee, asylum, legal permanent resident, and undocumented
status. Thus, Hutto’s enduring isolation, phone, visitation, and disciplinary policies
shaped families’ relationships to undetained family and friends. ICE sets minimum
detention conditions standards for its contractors, but these standards have no legal
“teeth.” That is, they are non-binding guidance documents and do not constitute legal
obligations, nor rights or entitlements. CCA (a for-profit firm) sets phone card and
commissary prices and sales that detainees can purchase either with their own money or
CCA’s $1/day work opportunities.

In many cases, however, phone cards are

prohibitively expensive or unavailable. One detainee, held for seven months, reported:
You buy a phone card, about $10 or $20 and you get 10 minutes, and that’s only
inside the US. Outside it’s going to be less [fewer minutes]. I think I talked to my
family about two times only. So I didn’t have much contact because the card was
too expensive. I was missing my family….Because before I was released, there
was a war in [my country]. And I didn’t know where they are, how can I connect
with them, if they’re okay (America’s Family Prison, Interview 2007).
For ICE, detaining parents and children together constituted family unity, but for detained
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families, contact with their families members in the United States and abroad mitigated
the isolation of detention and helped them manage their cases. Another detained parent
testified to the following in the 2007 lawsuit against Hutto’s detention practices:
We have not been able to purchase phone cards for about a week, and when I
asked about it, I was told by the officer, we have more important things to do
rather than worry about your calling cards. Without the phone card, I'm cut off
from anyone who can support me. That is not family friendly. I can't even talk to
my family. The Hutto overview says the facility operates in accordance with
certain standards. The CCA and ICE run the facility to suit themselves. (In re:
Hutto Detention Center Transcript of the Injunction for Equitable Relief, 21)
For this parent, communication sustains family relationships, and the control over—and
neglect of—this communication revealed the asymmetrical power relationships at work
between ICE, CCA, and detained families.
For those families who could afford to visit, Hutto’s visitation policies disrupted
families’ physical intimacy, as the traditional plexi-glass separators prevented physical
contact. This was particularly difficult for families who travelled long distances, and
found they were able to visit with their relatives for an hour (and sometimes less) at a
time. For detainees, the ordering of these visits, their uniforms and identity bracelets,
stigmatized them as criminals before their families, an intensely humiliating experience:
If my sister or my mother came to visit, the children and I would not be allowed
to hug them or even to talk directly to them. We would have to stay on the other
side of the glass and talk to them through the phone. I could not bear for my
family to see me and my children in jail like we are criminals trapped on the other
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side of a plexiglass wall, talking only through phone in the wall. That would be so
sad and upsetting that we have told our relatives not to visit us at Hutto. (In re:
Hutto Detention Center, Declaration of Deka Warsame, 7.)
Hutto’s visitation room now curtains these plexi-glass windows, and women currently
detained at Hutto retain the contact visits families won in the Hutto Settlement in 2007.
These visits are still overseen by CCA guards and limited to one hour, but are far more
hospitable than visitation polices in other adult facilities (which indicates that these
dynamics are likely more acute elsewhere in the detention system). In conversations with
detained women, however, the stigma of criminalized detention remains, and some still
refuse visits from family members (Fieldnotes March 2010). As Ruth Gilmore has
argued, families “on the outside” do time with their imprisoned loved ones, producing
emotional and financial effects that reverberate far beyond Hutto’s chain link fences
(Gilmore 2007). Thus, while detention centers’ enclosure creates a partitioned
cartography, the regulation of detainees’ access to “the outside” bears down on networks
of care.
Criminalization
The symbolic economy of detention relies upon archetypal imprisonment
practices, familiarized through popular representations of criminality.

“Feeling like

criminals,” parents and children both internalized and rejected their de facto punishment,
as reflected throughout these quotes. Children, for example, acted out the process of
being released, enrolling dolls as detainees, ICE officers, and lawyers (Interview 2008).
One parent recounted how her children stopped asking her for things, even after they had
been released. The “criminalization” of immigration enforcement unfolds not only
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through institutional linkages between the criminal justice and immigration systems, but
permeates the selection of detention centers, their internal spatio-temporal ordering, and
detainees’ relationships to surrounding communities and their kinship networks.
Detention’s disciplinarity works through the imbrication of public performance, the
controlled circulation of noncitizen bodies, and the scripting of detainees as prisoners; it
is thoroughly relational, presuming certain connectivities while wearing down others.
Forced Mobility: Transfers
Family detention diverges from broader detention trends in one important aspect:
inter-facility transfers. I note this here, because frequent transfers impact adult detainees’
relationships to their families, legal representation, and communities as much as isolation,
spatial enclosure, and criminalization. With two family detention centers, and now one,
detained families’ only transfers are from short-term CBP facilities to Hutto or Berks. In
2008, however, ICE transferred 52.4% of its detainees, up from 19.6% in 1999. In
addition, ICE transferred 24% of its detainees multiple times (compared to 5.6% in 1999;
Human Rights Watch 2009). Some detainees report being transferred six times over the
course of their detention (Del Bosque 2010). Considering that detention rates reached
369,483 in 2009 (and are expected to reach 400,000 in 2010), transfers require an entire
transportation and logistics system all their own.

This reveals, I think, that ICE’s

detention system utilizes forced mobility and relocation as much as confinement.
While isolation diminishes legal access, legal scholar Nancy Morawetz (2005) has
shown how ICE often transfers detainees to federal district courts that refuse to hear
habeas corpus complaints through which detainees constitutionally challenge their
detention, in order to ensure removal. Recent Supreme Court decisions state that
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detainees must file habeas corpus claims in the jurisdiction in which they are detained;
since ICE retains discretion over all detainee transfers, ICE effectively chooses the venue
for habeas claims. Louisiana’s Federal District Court refuses to hear habeas cases,
deferring to ICE in every case, even though other district courts commonly hear these
challenges and grant release. Transferring detainees between facilities allows ICE
manipulate “due process,” exploiting the US Federal Court’s uneven legal geography to
attain its desired legal outcomes. The remote location and arbitrary forced mobility
between facilities undermine detainees’ ability to retain lawyers, receive family support,
or build relationships with fellow detainees (Dow 2005, Del Bosque 2010). ICE is
known to transfer or seclude detainees who attempt to organize politically, and to move
known organizers frequently to prevent them from establishing relationships with new
groups of detainees. So while facility operators mediate detainees’ relationships to their
families and surrounding communities, ICE’s repeated and frequent transfers further
destabilize detainees’ relationships to each other. These affective and emotional
connections are of a different character than the transboundary conduits or risky
populations, yet detention bears down on them in ways that resonate.

CONCLUSION
Detention is not a single spatial practice of confinement, but a combination of
textual policy discourses, knowledge practices, geographical imaginaries, and material
orderings. Through “catch and remove” policy’s geopolitical design, ICE may imagine a
purified legal cartography of externalized, illegal others and documented, legalized
persons, but this dream of purified community does not determine the material conditions
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of actual detention centers. Instead, detention practices stitch together a range of
geographical imaginings, bureaucratic improvisation, and institutional legacies from the
criminal justice system. And even while detention depresses families’ communication
and visits, and Hutto’s interior ordering restricts personal mobility, neither are detained
noncitizens entirely locked down or enclosed from national space. Rather, on the one
hand, ICE’s discretionary transfers keep them in forced circulation, and on the other
hand, detainees do organize inside detention centers, make connections with community
members, and contest their detentions. ICE may seek to minimize territorial vulnerability
long the border, and embed confinement in complex system of digital surveillance and
risk analysis, but those detained produce detention discourses, as well, both through
everyday embodied routines and in their own narratives of it. Private corrections firm
employees perform detention, as do ICE policy-makers, detainees’ attorneys, families,
and surrounding communities.

Detention is, I have emphasized, a heterogenous

assemblage of knowledge practices, geographical imaginings, geopolitical designs,
infrastructure, institutions, daily routines, and media representations.
What I hope my analysis illuminates is that, in a particular way, disciplinary
relations of power haunt confinement and security practices. Neither ICE nor CCA may
seek to reform detained families, but family members react to and remake themselves
through the process of their criminalization. Detention policies may not seek to remake
detainees, but ICE does hope family detention deters future migration. Through the
spectacle of confinement, ICE seeks to perform its response to crisis and the inevitability
of deportation.

As a deterrence strategy, detention figures a transnational field of

potential, future migrants, subjects that calculate the risk of border crossing and seek to
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maximize their returns on migration. For Mountz (2010), this arrangement produces a
“transnational panopticism” through which migrants also produce surveillant state power
by presuming its omniscience. Immigration geopolitics works through, therefore, the
recalibration of disciplinary relations of power with emergent risk ontologies and security
institutions. So while constructing a whole, human individual is no longer the purpose of
confinement, detention does make relational, circulating, connected subjects that cannot
be reduced to the risk-pooled cohort alone.

Copyright © Lauren Leigh Martin 2011
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CHAPTER 6: THE GEOPOLITICS OF VULNERABILITY: CHILD-OBJECTS,
MIGRANT-SUBJECTS, AND IMMIGRATION LAW
INTRODUCTION
In April 2007, a group of lawyers sued the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) for detaining children at the T. Don Hutto Family Detention Center, a former
medium-security prison in Taylor, Texas (Bunikyte et al. v Chertoff et al. 2007). Citing
Hutto’s prison-like conditions, the plaintiffs argued that the facility violated noncitizen
children’s protections under an existing legal settlement, Flores v. Meese (1997), which
granted minors in federal immigration custody with the right to release, unrestrictive
environments, and a range of services unavailable in adult facilities.

Because ICE

detained parents and children together at Hutto, the case revolved, in particular, around
the spatiality of children’s legal protections in the immigration system. Specifically, the
parties to Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. debated whether existing law confined
children’s protections to children’s bodies, or included the relationships and spaces that
constitute “home-like environments.” Immigration law endows ICE with wide “discretion
to detain” noncitizens, and federal courts have limited power to intervene in immigration
enforcement practices (Coleman 2007a; Varsanyi 2008). Litigated in federal court (Fifth
Circuit Western District), Buniktye became a site of struggle over the limits of both ICE’s
discretion to detain noncitizen children and federal courts’ authority to challenge
immigration enforcement practices. This struggle unfolded through broader narratives of
American territorial sovereignty, childhood development, and immigrant criminality and
shows how immigration law (re)spatializes US geopolitical orders. I argue that debates
about children’s rights in the immigration system—understudied in geographic research
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on immigration, borders, and security—illuminate deeper struggles over executive power,
the spatial practices of immigration enforcement, and immigration law.
The case provides fresh empirical insights into the struggle over the role of
judicial, executive, and civil rights in current US immigration law, but Bunikyte et al. V.
Chertoff et al has wider implications for conceptualizing the spatiality of immigration law
and its geopolitical designs.

Since 1889, US immigration policy has fallen to the

legislative and executive branches of government, allowing them wide latitude to
formulate admission and exclusion policies beyond the purview of the Constitution.
Bunikyte’s transcripts demonstrate, as I show below, how positioning immigration as
foreign policy authorizes ICE’s broad administrative discretion, and does so in and
through federal court rulings. Immigration law-making is more than institutionally or
jurisdictionally geopolitical, however. As I show below, “geostrategic thinking” (Ó
Tuathail 2003) permeated the legal reasoning of both ICE and the federal judge, who
used parents’ asylum claims to map a world of vague external danger, and then twisted
children’s (essentialized) vulnerability with national security vulnerabilities, and
“children’s best interests” with the “public interest in enforcing immigration laws.” More
broadly, the case elucidates the ways in which formal immigration law includes ad hoc
mappings of (dangerous) global space, and how the blurring of these formal and informal
geopolitical discourses legitimates the spatial practices of detention.
Children’s specific legal figurations illuminate the ways in which this geopolitics
of vulnerability authorizes detention, family detention’s spatio-temporal ordering, and the
policing practices that channel noncitizen’s into detention. Below, I first situate my
analysis in recent work in immigration geopolitics, children’s rights, and feminist

111

political geography. In the second section, I trace out how current immigration law and
precedent figure a “child-object” rather than an agential “child-subject.” Intriguingly,
the presumed innocence and vulnerability of this child-object both restricts ICE’s ability
to detain children and reinforces parents’ status as criminalized migrant-subjects. The
third section analyzes how the parties to Bunikyte et al v. Chertoff et al articulated
different geopolitical visions in and through specific configurations of children’s and
families’ legal subjectivity. I show how the plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that children’s
right to release include family release and used children’s rights as the basis for more
expansive family rights. ICE, for their part, argued that parents retained custody of
children within Hutto, releasing the agency from its obligations to noncitizen children
under Flores. The judge, alternatively, argued that children’s rights to release did not
extend to parents, but that ICE had legal custody of children at Hutto and was bound by
Flores. In contrast to these formal legal arguments, parents’ descriptions of Hutto’s daily
life challenged the easy bounding of legal rights to children, forming a counter-narrative
to all three 'official' legal arguments. Approaching the practice of immigration law as a
polyvocal site of struggle (Chouinard 1994), I will argue that immigration litigation is a
critical site for feminist engagements with the geopolitics of mobility. I argue that these
geostrategic discourses spatially constitute a governmental regime that maximizes
precarity for “them” while minimizing it for “us” (Butler 2009), producing what I call a
“geopolitics of vulnerability.”
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CONCEPTUALIZING A GEOPOLITICS OF VULNERABILITY
Children's Legal Subjectivity
Migrating children present immigration authorities with specific legal challenges
that have not been taken into account in geographical research on detention or
immigration geopolitics. Children’s transboundary migration is rarely interrogated in
geographical analyses of children’s legal subjectivity and political agency. Recent work
on children’s political participation has, however, contemplated the methodological
difficulties studying children’s political agency (Bell 2008), and argued for a fuller
conceptualization of the ways in which children actively make spaces (Aitken 2001;
Bessant 2004; Jans 2004; Katz 2004; Leiter et al. 2006). In immigration law, children’s
immigration claims are solely derivative of parents’ claims (Thronson 2007-8), and for
Bhabha (2003, 2009), this displacement of children’s ‘best interests’ produces a
“citizenship deficit” through which children are rendered de facto stateless subjects. Yet,
children’s rights and feminist scholars have cautioned against fetishizing existing legal
regimes as sources of children’s empowerment, enfranchisement, or political
participation, however. For example, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) contains an expansive set of entitlements for children, but its realization has been
limited (Mayall 2006; Stasiulis 2002). Ruddick argues, further, that the child-subject
defined by “best interests” principles is “an impossible subject since, by liberal definition,
the child cannot speak for him or herself without adult authorization” (Ruddick 2007a:
514).

Intriguingly, some citizen children have been vocal spokespersons for their

undocumented parents, a form of political theater that dramatizes the parents'
displacement from their what is implicitly their proper role as family representatives
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(Pallares 2009). While child-subjects are always already in a relation of dependence with
a series of caregivers (Ruddick 2007a,b), the political agency of children is not materially
confined to the child-object of immigration law or the partial subject of domestic family
law.
As Katz (2004) argues, analyzing children's paradoxical legal subjectivity
evidences geopolitical processes difficult to see at other scales. At the margins of the
nation-state, where liberal law is suspended for noncitizens, how do we understand the
relationship between children and their caregivers, when immigration law considers
parents aliens not persons? How do we understand the position of the precarious childsubject in the context of an immigration regime that suspends constitutional rights for
adults? How do we understand children’s legal subjectivity where their immediate
caregivers are not full liberal subjects either? Where caregivers represent children in
family and children's courts, Bunikyte's plaintiffs were children. Flores v. Meese (1997)
created a contractual relationship between “minors in immigration custody” and
immigration officials, while adults' alien status prevented them from federal court
protections. Bunikyte reveals not only how US geopolitical agendas mobilize immigration
law to create wide spaces of administrative discretion over noncitizens’ bodies, but that
specific constructions of childhood and adulthood underly immigration law and
enforcement policy. In the context of immigration geopolitics, these categorical
differences are directly related to the spatialities of immigration enforcement: policing
and arrests, detention center conditions and location, deportation decisions, and the
embodied process of physical removal from the United States.
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Immigration Geopolitics
Beginning in 1889, the Supreme Court issued a series of rulings that the federal
government held “inherent sovereign powers” to determine political membership--and
exclusion--because otherwise it would be “subject to the control of another power” (Chae
Chan Ping v. United States 1889, 603 quoted in Varsanyi 2008, 884).

Mobilizing

“racialized narratives on the penetration of external menaces in national space through
immigration” (Nagel 2002, 972) the Supreme Court considered noncitizens’ admission an
issue of sovereign territorial power, enabling the limitation of judicial authority over
immigration matters, and culminating in what is understood as the federal government's
“plenary powers.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) took the plenary doctrine one
step further, ruling that the federal government retained sovereign right to deport
noncitizens from the territorial US without judicial intervention (Varsanyi 2008). Making
noncitizens subject to rejection and deportation, plenary power over immigration treats
noncitizens as “aliens” rather than “persons” (Varsanyi 2008). Authorizing a separate
immigration law regime, the plenary doctrine “works paradoxically through the law as it
at once holds [constitutional] law at bay,” thereby suspending constitutional protections
for noncitizens (Coleman 2007b, 62). In other words, noncitizens do not have recourse to
the full gambit of constitutional protections when encountering the law as via the
immigration system. Through this series of court decisions, federal courts made
non/citizenship a discursive, legal, and political axis in a broader “geopolitics of
mobility,” in which national elites used admission and exclusion policies to create
specific politico-territorial orders (Coleman 2007b, 2008a,b; Hyndman 2004a; Nagel
2002; Tesfahuney 1998). The plenary doctrine of immigration authorized, therefore, the
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suspension of noncitizen's constitutional protections—including the right to liberty—in
the interests of national security.
Criminalizing Asylum
In addition, immigration officials have approached asylum-seekers with
skepticism since the 1980s, when large numbers of Cuban and Haitian migrants arrived
on Florida's shores.

The refugee resettlement and asylum system has long been charged

with geopolitical bias (Cianciarulo 2007), and in the 1990s, immigration officials began
to view asylum as an immigration strategy abused by “bogus” claimants (see also Coutin
2003; Mountz 2010). Following the 1996 immigration reforms, asylum-seekers faced
indefinite detention while their claims were processed (Dow 2005). Current immigration
policy categorizes asylum-seekers declaring themselves at ports of entry as “arriving
aliens” until their claims are deemed credible by immigration officials. In other words,
asylum-seekers are classified as undocumented immigrants and thereby subject to
mandatory detention. Once detained, “arriving aliens” are not eligible for release on
bond, unlike undocumented migrants apprehended inside the United States. The asylumseekers’ position is particularly difficult because they cannot claim asylum until they are
physically in US territory and often cannot obtain valid travel documents from the
countries they are fleeing. Part of a global trend preventing and/or preempting asylum
claims (Dikec 2009; Hyndman 2005; Hyndman and Mountz 2008), classifying asylumseekers as aliens suspends international protections afforded them and criminalizes
undocumented arrival.

In this context, categorizing noncitizens has embodied and

material effects on noncitizens' pathways into and out of the US detention system
(Mountz 2004, Chapter 7).
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Geostrategic Discourse
In the context of this regime, administrative discretion and respatializing
enforcement capacities, detention operates as a spatial strategy of containment and forced
mobility imposed by federal immigration officials on noncitizens (Hyndman 2005).
Visually containing noncitizen bodies and the problem of 'illegal immigration,' detention
broadcasts state power in action, as discussed in Chapter. Thus, enforcement’s spatial
practices are critically linked to broader narratives of in/security.

Making “explicit

claims about the material national security interests of the state across a world map
characterized by state competition, threats and dangers,” this geostrategic thinking bases
its claims in “transcendent national interests and existential security concerns” (Ó
Tuathail 2003, 95). In Bunikyte in particular, ICE and the federal judge link “security
vulnerabilities” to children's “special vulnerability,” and “national interests in enforcing
immigration law “to “children's best interests,” suturing child and national protection
together in ways that have little to do with the material well-being of the children
detained at Hutto.
A Geopolitics of Vulnerability
To flesh out this geopolitics of vulnerability, I analyze the ways in which federal
actors deployed abstract, universalizing, and global discourses of vulnerability, threat,
and sovereign right to marginalize the cases of 26 individual noncitizen child plaintiffs.
Building on feminist political geography, this chapter conceptualizes immigration law as
a site of struggle over space (Chouinard 1994) that “link[s] international representation to
the geographies of everyday life” (Dowler and Sharp 2001, 171). Emphasizing the
embodiment of state policy-making (Mountz 2003, 2004), feminist political geographers
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have argued for new empirical material and new conceptualizations of “the political”
(Hyndman 2004b; Marston 2000; Secor 2001; Staeheli et al. 2004). Building on this
work, I approach immigration law, particularly litigation, as an active, embodied, and
situated set of institutional practices, a “tapestry of lived relations and practices
which…express multiple forms of empowerment and exclusion over how spaces can be
used and by whom” (Chouinard 1994, 430). As the court transcripts will show, litigation
does not produce coherent storylines, nor does immigration law specify enforcement
practices. As Coleman argues, immigration law is better understood as “an open-ended
and at times chaotic economy of discourses and practices” (Coleman 2008b, 1098). As I
describe below, the litigation became a struggle over the embodied boundaries of
children’s legal subjectivity and the spatio-temporal ordering of Hutto itself. Bunikyte
invites us to critically analyze, first, the ways in which immigration law relies upon
geostrategic discourses; second, the ways in which this immigration geopolitics includes
specific constructions of children's vulnerability against parents’ criminality; and third,
how immigration geopolitics authorizes material practices of family detention in and
through federal court authority.

CHILD-OBJECTS/SUBJECTS AND MIGRANT-SUBJECTS:
LIMITING PLENARY POWER OVER IMMIGRATION
Two previous cases illuminate how children’s derivative status limits local
policing of immigration. In Plyler v. Doe (1982), the Supreme Court considered whether
“Texas may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public education that it
provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.”
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Ultimately deciding that Texas did have the right to deny services to undocumented adult
migrants, the Court argued that “At the least, those who elect to enter our territory by
stealth and in violation of our law should be prepared to bear the consequences,
including, but not limited to, deportation.”

Children, though, “are not comparably

situated. … It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for penalizing these
children for their presence within the United States” (Plyler v. Doe, 220). Appearing to
support children’s rights to education, the case presumed a child-object, property of a
household, not a child-subject—a legal person—endowed with political agency
(Thronson 2002). Lacking the intentionality presumed of adult migrants, and therefore
grounds for punishment, children’s dependence limited local withdrawal of services.
This subordinate legal position is bound, however, to the full responsibilization of
parents, to the figure of an “illegal alien” who can be punished. Thus, decisions bearing
on noncitizen children elaborate an immigration geopolitics, in and through the
opposition between child-objects and criminalized migrant-subjects.
“Unaccompanied minors” present a more substantial challenge to immigration
officials, however, since their presence cannot be as easily explained by parental
coercion.

“Minors,” instead of “children,” unaccompanied children were detained,

processed, and deported through the adult system prior to the Flores Settlement
(Women’s Commission 2002). Engaged in immigration's adversarial legal process, even
the most litigiously competent children are often unable to obtain the necessary
documentation without adult assistance. Many countries require adults to request birth
certificates, so that age itself becomes a barrier to making successful claims. In the
asylum system, which limits claims to political and religious persecution, immigration
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judges routinely dismissed young people’s political activity as warranting persecution. In
the words of one judge, “it is almost inconceivable that the Ton Ton Macoutes could be
fearful of the conversations of 15-year-old children” (Civil v. INS, 140 F.3d 52,55 [1st
Cir. 1998] in Thronson 2002, p. 979). Thus, young people faced an immigration system
that discriminated against them on the basis of their presumed apolitical nature and the
age requirements of the administrative process.

The boundary between child- and

adulthood is woven into the legal categories of admission and exclusion and has wider
impacts on judicial decision-making, dramatically impacting children's location in the
detention system.
Seeking to ameliorate the effects of detention on children, advocates settled
Flores v. Meese, a decade-long lawsuit with the INS that achieved a substantial set of
protections for minors navigating the immigration system alone, based on their ‘special
vulnerability’ (see Figure 6.1). As a class action lawsuit, the Flores settlement produced a
contractual agreement between “all minors in federal immigration custody” and federal
immigration authorities. Stipulating INS release preferences, administrative procedures
and conditions of custody, Flores endowed children with the right to be released to
family members and guardians, to challenge INS/ICE detention decisions, and to access a
variety of services. In short, the settlement entitled children to a series of relationships,
binding children’s rights under Flores to particular spatial and temporal orders. Like
Plyler, Flores was based on the presumption of innocent child- subjects, and created a
more robust legal process for children navigating the immigration system. Flores did not,
however, reconfigure the admission or exclusion categories through which children’s
immigration status is ultimately decided, limiting children’s entitlements to conditions of
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release and confinement. Importantly, Flores delineated a difference between the
decision about whom to detain/release and where to detain them. The spatiality of
children's legal protections under Flores was particularly important in Bunikyte, when it
became unclear whether accompanied children would be granted access to those legal
protections.
Table 6.1: Flores Settlement Stipulations
Release of children to parent, legal guardian, adult relative, adult individual
designated by parent or guardian as capable, licensed program will to accept legal
custody, or an adult individual seeking custody;
Provide for physical, mental, and financial well-being;
Ensure child’s presence at INS (now ICE) and immigration court proceedings;
Maintain communication with guardians about address changes, transfer of custody,
leaving the country, and any dependency proceedings involving the child;
Provide bond hearings in every case and reasons for housing him/her in detention
facilities;
Meet minimum standards of care for children that remain in ICE custody:
• proper physical care, suitable living conditions, food, clothing, personal
hygiene;
• routine medical care;
• individualized needs assessment;
• appropriate educational services;
• at least one hour of exercise per day, recreation and leisure;
• at least one individual counseling session per week;
• group counseling at least twice per week;
• acculturation and adaptation services;
• orientation upon admission;
• religious services;
• contact visits with family;
• reasonable right to privacy;
• family reunification;
• legal services information;
• appropriate service delivery, sensitive to language culture, age;
• age-appropriate rules;
• no corporal punishment, humiliation, mental abuse, nor punitive interference
with daily life.
(Source: Flores v. Meese Stipulated Settlement)
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Families as Geopolitical Vulnerabilities
Heterosexual families have traditionally occupied a privileged position in
immigration law and enforcement (see Donovan et al. 1999; Elman 2000; Lubheid and
Cantu 2005; Simmons 2008 on immigration law's heteronormativity).

In admission

policy, “family unity” remains a stated goal of immigration law, and family sponsorship
remains the primary avenue to gain legal residency in the United States (US Department
of Homeland Security 2009). Yet the category of “child” exists in a dependent relation to
a “parent,” as children’s immigration claims are solely derivative of parents’ claims
(Thronson 2007-8).

Sponsorship requires accepting financial responsibility for

petitioning family members, making it impossible for citizen children, for example, to
sponsor their parents. Immigration law often conflicts with, however, legal regimes
elaborated by subnational jurisdictions, especially family, children’s, and custody laws
premised on the “best interests of the child.” Access to public services often requires (or
is perceived to require) parental involvement, which has prevented citizen children of
undocumented parents from receiving those services (Van Hook and Balisteri 2006). In
child custody decisions, there are no clear rulings on the relevance of parents’
immigration status, resulting in the informal use of a parents’ undocumented status to
deny custody. In these cases, federal immigration law operates as de facto child custody
law (Thronson 2007-8). Conversely, granting custody to unauthorized parents can bar
children from filing immigration claims, so that custody decisions often have dramatic
implications on the immigration status of children (Thronson 2002; and see Ruddick
2007a). Figured as child-objects and persons by different legal regimes, immigration
law's hierarchical family hinders children from receiving protections granted them by
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other courts (Thronson 2007-8; Bhabha 2009).
While admission categories both limit and privilege certain forms of family unity,
enforcement practices produce a more complex legal terrain for families migrating or
seeking asylum in the US. Families have traditionally been released with Notices to
Appear (NTAs) before an immigration judge, but in March of 2001, U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) contracted with Berks County, Pennsylvania, to detain
families in a recently vacated elderly care facility. Housing 84 people, the Berks County
facility opened as an extension of an existing juvenile detention program which was in
compliance with the Flores agreement (Women’s Commissions 2007). The INS claimed
to have opened Berks to allow the agency time to establish families’ identity, but for
asylum-seeking families, this process sometimes dragged on for years (Women's
Commission 2007). In 2003, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO)
stated plans to expand its capacity to detain families and other vulnerable populations,
citing its reliance on substandard and prison-like facilities as its primary impediment (US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2003).
Following the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the INS suspended all refugee
resettlement and the REAL ID Act (Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302) implemented new
security screenings and evidenciary requirements for both refugees and asylum-seekers
(Cianciarulo 2007). All noncitizens seeking entry—humanitarian or otherwise--to the US
were viewed with suspicion, and beginning in 2003, the new Department of Homeland
Security scoured immigration enforcement policies for vulnerabilities. In this context,
ICE argued that releasing families represented a ‘loophole’ that enabled adults who
would otherwise be subject to mandatory detention to be released from custody:

123

By expanding Expedited Removal to cover illegal alien families, DHS is closing
down a loophole that has been exploited by human smugglers and helping stop
future illegal immigration … This new facility enables us to have deterrence with
dignity by allowing families to remain together, while sending the clear message
that families entering the United States illegally will be returned home. Because
of limited family bed space families caught at the border were often released with
‘Notices to Appear.’ Smugglers were well aware of this practice and often
exploited this loophole to create the image of a family unit. In cases where
families were detained, the families, including children, were detained separately.
(US Department of Homeland Security 2006b)
Seeking exploitable opportunities for release, DHS came to understand families' special
status-- implicitly based on children’s special status—as a vulnerability in border
security. Emphasizing smugglers’ criminality over the children being trafficked, ICE
evoked the intentionality of illegal immigration, which framed family detention as both a
crime prevention strategy and a corrective to family separation (Bhabha 2000). As
described in Chapter 5, DHS collapsed smuggling with “future illegal immigration,”
criminalizing family migration in general and obscuring the legal grounds (such as
asylum) for families’ presence in the United States. In this context, ICE opened the T.
Don Hutto Correctional Facility as a “Family Residential Facility” in May of 2006. The
expansion multiplied family ‘bed-space’ six-fold, from 84 to 512 beds, in an effort to
hold all families of questionable immigration or asylum status.
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BUNIKYTE ET AL. V. CHERTOFF ET AL.
Built by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) in 1995, the T. Don
Hutto Family Residential Facility operated as a medium-security prison for prisoners
from Oregon, a federal pre-trial detention center, and a US Marshalls’ detention center.
In 2006, Williamson County, Texas, and ICE entered into an Inter-Governmental Service
Agreement (IGSA) authorizing the detention of “alien families” at Hutto, and Williamson
County subsequently changed its contract with CCA to accommodate the detainees. A
common arrangement between the federal government, countries, and private corrections
corporations, IGSAs devolve detention operations to counties and corporations (US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009b). Were it not for Flores, which created a
contract between ICE and minors in their custody, there would have been no legal
mechanism through which to hold ICE, Williamson County, nor CCA responsible for the
conditions at Hutto. As Flores is written, Williamson County and CCA were not parties
to the settlement, and while their actions were examined in Bunikyte, Flores bound
neither neither party to federal oversight.
When it reopened as a family facility, Hutto retained the double fencing,
concertina wire, automatically closing and locking doors, cell blocks, regimented daily
schedules, surveillance, discipline, and supervision of its previous life as a prison. CCA
staff issued families uniforms, prohibited them from bringing “contraband” (drawings,
crayons, toys) into their cells, and offered little medical or mental health care. Muslim
women were not allowed to wear their own headscarves, and the facility’s schedule often
prevented daily prayers. CCA staff performed headcounts two to three times per day, in
which families were required to stay in their cells until 2 staff members counted and
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recounted every detainee.

This amounted to 11-12 hours of confinement per day,

preventing outdoor recreation and exercise, not to mention freedom of movement. The
cells included a bunk bed, crib (if necessary), and open toilet. Children received one hour
of education per day, and many became ill from the food. A cement facility with little
natural light, the rooms were cold in the winter and humid in the summer, and toilets
frequently backed up. Trained as correctional officers, CCA staff threatened confinement
and separation as disciplinary tools, and received no re-training to address the needs of
asylum-seekers, migrants, children and families (American Civil Liberties Union 2007a;
Bunikyte v. Chertoff et al). Were it not for the presence of children, Hutto would have
blended seamlessly into the landscape of immigrant detention, populated by ‘repurposed’ prisons, military barracks and bases (including Guantanamo), county jails, and
juvenile correctional facilities (Dow 2005; Fernandes 2007).
Turning now to the text of Bunikyte's litigation, I analyze the ways in which
plaintiffs' attorneys, ICE, the federal judge, and the plaintiffs' parents, first, figured
children's and families' legal status in different ways. Second, I examine how broader
claims about the limits (or lack thereof) of ICE discretion to detain families relied upon
these subject formations. Third, I trace how ICE and the judge, in particular, wove
geostrategic discourses into their legal arguments, deploying abstract mappings of global
threat to justify expanding detention to noncitizen families. Litigation is not only a site of
struggle over the “limit case of the liberal subject,” as Ruddick (2007a) argues, but shows
how struggle over legal subjectivity are simultaneously struggles over political
recognition, state sovereignty, and the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that found
the nation-state.
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Children’s Rights as Family Rights
In April of 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union, University of Texas
Immigration Law Clinic, and private law firm LaBeouf, Lamb, Greene, and MacRae LLP
sued the Department of Homeland Security for non-compliance with Flores, on behalf of
26 children detained at Hutto. Based on the conditions described above, the lawsuit
charged ICE with violating its obligations under Flores on 17 counts, and sought “to
enforce the Flores Settlement on Saule’s behalf, to secure her release, and to ensure that
she is not separated from her mother and her sister” (In re Hutto Family Detention
Center, Bunikyte v. Chertoff et al, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 1, 4).
In addition to guaranteeing detained children “home-like” conditions and social services,
Flores mandated a preference for both release and family unity.

A pre-settlement

Supreme Court ruling stated, “The parties to [Reno v. Flores] agree that the [Immigration
and Naturalization] Service must assure itself that someone will care for those minors
pending resolution of their deportation proceedings. That is easily done when the
juvenile's parents have also been detained and the family can be released together” (Reno
v. Flores 1993). Figuring the plaintiffs as both rights-bearers and relational subjects, the
attorneys argued that children’s rights included family release. In effect, they sought to
create family rights in and through the dependent, rights-bearing child.
As the judge pointed out in the initial hearing, ICE could have complied with
Flores by releasing the children to other family members and keeping parents in
detention, a veiled threat that resulted in plaintiffs’ filing restraining orders to prevent
separation (Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al., Temporary Restraining Order). In response
to this legal—and potentially spatial—splicing of the family, the plaintiffs asserted
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children’s rights to family unity did not transfer rights from children to parents:
Plaintiff does not contend that the Settlement protects adults in ICE custody or
compels the release of her mother based on her claims under the Settlement, as
defendants suggest. Rather, plaintiff seeks to enforce her own rights under the
Settlement, and argues that her release from custody with her mother is compelled
by the Settlement’s fundamental imperatives to promote family unity and to house
minors in the least restrictive setting. … [H]er individual claims under the
Settlement are directly affected by her ability to remain in close proximity to her
mother--an outcome that is clearly favored by the general policy favoring release
to a parent under Flores… (Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Plaintiff’s Reply in
Support of her Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Ordering her Immediate
Release from Hutto With Her Mother, 2-3)
Children have a right to spaces with parents in them, therefore, but parents have no legal
right to the same. This configuration of child-based family rights did not technically
endow noncitizen parents with their own rights, but covered families under an umbrella
of children’s protections, without challenging the legal regimes that confine adults more
broadly. The plaintiffs' difficulties in developing even the most generous application of
children's rights to families highlights the contradictions between rights afforded the
child, who is always already in relation to a series of caregivers, and the suspension of
legal protections for their immediate caregivers.
The Right to Care
While the plaintiffs were children, the litigation revolved around parents’
testimonies of the disintegration of relations of care and psychological examinations of
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the detained plaintiffs. Primarily asylum-seeking families, the plaintiffs’ complaints
included details of their parents’ rape, torture, and persecution. Their testimonies bore
complex and contradictory tales of breakdowns and refusal, of the embodied effects of
carceral detention and of their rejection of that same criminality. Articulated through the
spaces of everyday parenthood--bedrooms, bathrooms, kitchens, and schools--parents’
testimonies revolved around the interdependencies necessary for the reproduction of
ways of life:
In this jail, Majid and I cannot be good parents. We cannot provide Kevin with
the basic things that he needs. We cannot give our sick child inhalers for his
asthma or cream for his eczema or food for his health. We cannot give him a pen
to write with or any books to read. We cannot teach him about the outside world
or let him run around the way young boys should. We are totally helpless as
parents and depend on the guards for everything.

They control our every

movement and activity, from the time we eat to the time we see each other. We
cannot even turn off the light at night when we want to go to sleep. (Bunikyte v.
Chertoff , Declaration of Masomeh Alibegi, 2)
Hutto’s disciplinary order disrupted, for these parents, the energetics of care--the eating,
playing, bathing, and napping--that defined their role as parents. The testimonies allude
to a litany of questions from children, and parents’ increasing frustration at their inability
to satisfy them.

These narratives belied, in minute detail, ICE’s claims about the

“residential” character of the facility, by showing how the normal relations of care and
parental authority, which implicitly defines “the home,” were disrupted by the power of
the guards.
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The spatiality of familial care was, therefore, regulated at a bodily and molecular
scale. The everyday metabolism of care, through which the plaintiffs’ mothers defined
their identities as mothers, was undone by the carceral ordering of space, time, and
authority within Hutto.
I can’t talk to anyone because I only speak Creole. I have to rely on Sherona to
translate from Creole to Spanish and then whoever else is around to translate from
Spanish into English if I need to ask for something. I am dependent on my
daughter in a way I would not be if were not in jail and it is inappropriate for a
mother to have to rely on her daughter this way, it is like making her into the
mother and me into the child and she is only thirteen years old. (Bunikyte v.
Chertoff , Declaration of Delourdes Verdeiu, 3)
These accounts of inverted familial authority illuminate a frustrated motherhood, in
which care and authority are mutually constitutive. Thus, these parents understood the
restrictions placed on parental authority as destruction of the family itself.

Parents’

dependency on guards and surveillance practices formed the basis of a counter-narrative
of impotent parental authority, articulated through distorted relations of dependency
between parents and children, the annihilation of private space, and emotional unease.
Mothers reported anxiety, sadness, exhaustion, crying, sleeplessness, and illness, these
physical weaknesses being evidence of their impotence as parents. These testimonies
narrated a relationality of parent- and childhood, of mutual interdependence, that far
exceeded the legal mechanisms through which the case proceeded. It is not simply that
these families viewed children’s rights as linked to the narrations of care, but that they
demanded more spatial autonomy than the law could provide, in and through these
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relations of care. Monopolizing access to food, clothing, blankets, toys, and books, CCA
staff overlaid carceral relations of authority over “the architecture of the family unit”
which undermined the relations of (inter)dependence between parents and children.
Thus, the normative distribution of rights and responsibilities within families is
reconfigured so that CCA operated as an in loco parentis, infantilizing parents with
respect to their children. Parents’ narratives of frustrated care figured, therefore, a range
of actors with variegated obligations under immigration law and a wider political
economy of deferred responsibility than could be accounted for in the lawsuit's “official”
legal argumentation.
ICE Discretionary Power: Displacing Custody
ICE’s defense counsel argued, however, that Flores did not apply because the
children were detained with their parents, and that parents’ were their practical guardians
while in detention. For ICE, parents’ illegal status displaced children’s rights, confining
children to the status of household property (Thronson 2002). The defense argued,
therefore, that the plaintiffs’ only case was “abuse of discretion,” which the defense then
argued was an invalid complaint since Congress has endowed the agency with the
authority to detain the parents:
In fact, you know, while there may be alternatives that the ACLU would like the
government to do, it’s not in the ACLU’s discretion to determine how the
government is going to operate its immigration program.

It’s the Court’s

decision, of course, of whether or not the government is abusing its discretion,
and in this case, I would suggest that the government was not. (ICE attorney
Victor Lawrence, Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Transcript of the Injunction for
131

Equitable Relief, 236)
ICE’s legal approach attempted to displace children’s rights to “home-like environments”
under Flores on the basis of their parents’ illegal status. Emphasizing the criminality of
the migrant-subject, ICE sought to shift the case to discussion of territorial sovereignty
and security, over which ICE had established authority and federal courts did not.
Approaching family detention in the context of enforcement-led immigration
policy, ICE emphasized the agency, autonomy, and intentionality of parents, especially
parents' intentional breaking of immigration law:
Of course, they’d rather be free, but they did break the law. They did break the
law, and they came to the United States illegally, and the government has the right
to detain them (ICE attorney Victor Lawrence, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Transcript of
the Injunction for Equitable Relief, 23).

Essentially what this case comes down to, your Honor, are four families who are
in the United States illegally, who are unhappy that they’re in a detention
environment, as the government is absolutely entitled to do given the fact that
they did arrive in the United States illegally (ibid., 231).
ICE's argument had three important effects. First, by emphasizing parents’ intentionality,
the defense erased children’s rights under Flores, effectively arguing that Flores did not
apply to children accompanied by undocumented parents. From this perspective, the only
way for children to access their entitlements under Flores would be to separate them from
their parents in ICE custody. (This would have resulted in their transfer to the Office of
Refugee Resettlement, who has managed custody for unaccompanied minors since 2003.)
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Secondly, therefore, ICE argued that families were legally considered accompanied
adults. Third, charging parents with custodial responsibility within Hutto transferred
responsibility for the care/harm of children from ICE to the parents. Their argument
consolidated rights in ICE’s executive discretion and responsibility for the rule of law,
childhood development, and everyday care in the parents, for whom there are few legal
frameworks to challenge ICE’s discretion.
ICE's legal arguments emphasized the plenary power over immigration law, a
position that relies upon a criminalized (adult) migrant-subject. Emphasizing territorial
vulnerability, ICE inscribed responsibility for border security onto each individual
migrant crossing the border, regardless of context of their individual migration. The
defense’s argument thereby mapped a geopolitics of vulnerability that figures the US as
the sole victim of violences large and small. Understood exclusively in terms of their
illegal entry, the parents faced a legal terrain of all-responsibility-no-rights, and the
corellary displacement of children's rights allowed them no agency and therefore no
rights.

This coupling of hyper-vulnerable American territory with the hyper-

responsibilization of individual adult migrants prioritized universalized “public interest”
over the claims of specific children.
Calculating Irreparable Harm
Where the plaintiffs sought to use children’s rights as an umbrella over the entire
family, the defense’s argument telescoped any family rights into a discussion of parental
illegality. The judge was unconvinced, however, by ICE’s argument that the agency’s
discretion to detain annulled the application of Flores to the Hutto facility, but worried
that the plaintiffs’ arguments transferred children’s rights to the parents that would
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eviscerate their responsibilities for legal border crossing:
So it is [plaintiffs’] position that as long as an illegal is in this country with a
child, the placing of that person in incarceration in jail, where they usually go
before I sentence them or before they're deported, they cannot go to jail anymore,
they are -- they get a free pass with their child? (Judge Sam Sparks, Bunikyte v.
Chertoff , Transcript of Injunction for Equitable Relief, 11)
The judge posed an opposition, therefore, between the rights of children (to release and
family unity) and ICE’s discretion, and by extension the plenary doctrine of immigration.
Ultimately, the judge agreed that ICE retained discretion over the detention of parents,
despite the Flores settlement and Reno v Flores' clear preference for releasing families.
The judge thereby affirmed children’s subordinate position in immigration law and
enforcement, reproduced the culpability and criminalization of parents, and voided the
possibility of family-based legal claims in enforcement matters.
But even without granting parents rights through their children’s claims to the
Flores agreement, the judge had the authority to release the families. To grant
preliminary injunction--in this case the immediate release of the families from Hutto--the
plaintiffs needed to meet four criteria: (1) substantial likelihood that Hutto violated
Flores; (2) substantial threat that the children would suffer irreparable injury if not
released from Hutto; (3) the threatened injury to the children outweighed any damage that
release would cause ICE; (4) release would not disserve the public interest (Bunikyte, et
al v. Chertoff et al. Order, 11). Because of the overwhelming evidence from parents’
testimonies that Hutto violated the Flores, the judge readily agreed that the conditions at
Hutto violated Flores’ stipulations on conditions of confinement. The remaining criteria
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demanded, however, a calculus of harm between detained children, ICE and a
universalized “public interest” (see also Bhabha 2000).

First, the judge refused to

undermine ICE's discretion to detain noncitizens in violation of immigration laws.
Coming to this conclusion invalidated, he argued, the plaintiffs’ claims to irreparable
harm because “the detentions themselves were entirely lawful” (Bunikyte, et al v.
Chertoff et al. Order, 36). That is, “irreparable harm” could only be established by
challenging the legality of ICE’s discretion, which is the basis for the plenary doctrine in
immigration law. Defining law and irreparable harm as mutually exclusive worked,
further, to cleanse the federal court of its own responsibility for children’s harm,
mystifying the violence authorized in and through the law.
Second, agreeing with ICE’s defense, the judge minimized the harm to the detained
children by emphasizing their small number and normalizing the trauma incurred during
migration. He did not dispute the fact that detention would harm children, but that
detention was the only harm done to them in the process of travelling to the US:
I am not convinced that there is irreparable injury to the children. I am convinced
that there could be injury psychologically to the children. These children come
extremely vulnerable because of the circumstances of their being here, not being
where they're secure, not being where they know where they are…. But I don't
think there's any doubt that living in the conditions that I've heard today before
the changes certainly didn't improve the psychological aspect of a young child or
adolescent's life. Now, oddly enough, it may have been a lot better than they were
when they -- before they were captured. May have been better than it was before
they got to this country. But that doesn't excuse the way we act in this country.
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(Emphasis added, Judge Sam Sparks, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Transcript of the
Injunction for Equitable Relief, 221; 238)

It's going to be expected that these children have had difficulties, and those
difficulties contributed, to some degree, to their mental status. How much and the
fact that they're still illegally here because of the acts of their parent or parents,
you know, I don't know how they could be severely damaged by facilities, but
we'll see. (Judge Sam Sparks, Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Transcript of the Status
Conference, 51)
The harm caused by detention is not irreparable, first, because it is legal and, second,
because it cannot be quantified separately from pre-detention trauma. This calculus of
harm generalized parents’ abuses across a dangerous “elsewhere” beyond US borders,
despite the fact that ICE has detained families from over 40 countries. Framing the US as
the space of law and order, asylum and immigration is both the proof of the American
“exceptional excellence” and the source of childhood trauma (Puar 2007). It is precisely
this exceptionality that justifies ICE’s discretionary power at the border, as these zones of
illiberal rule both legitimize and maintain the presumably liberal and democratic space of
the United States (Basaran 2008). This dichotomized figuration effectively pathologizes
transboundary migration, again displacing responsibility for the effects of detention onto
the parents’ choice to migrate.
Negotiating a Settlement
After the judge ruled that Flores did not establish the right to family release, and that
detention could not be proven to cause irreparable harm, the parties settled. Where early
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arguments in the case focused on the distribution of entitlements between family
members, the settlement negotiations focused on transforming the spatio-temporal
ordering at Hutto from “prison-like” to “home-like” conditions. (I explore this dichotomy
further in Chapter 8.) The settlement included a litany of changes to the physical
infrastructure, relationships between guards and detainees, and access to services (see
Figure 6.2). Further, the settlement required ICE to review parole, bond, and release
decisions for each family on a monthly basis, so that families would not be detained
indefinitely. Compliance with the settlement was evaluated semi-annually by a federal
magistrate, until June of 2009. Ironically, the “benefits” afforded to children under the
settlement accrued to not just the plaintiffs, but to their parents and to the families
detained at Hutto thereafter. Parents could not share children’s rights to release under
Flores, but could, by dint of their spatial co-presence, share their rights to “home-like
facilities,” so long as they remained segregated from the general population. The right to
certain conditions diverges from the spatiality of rights to release; like oil and water,
parents and children’s rights can share surfaces, but cannot mix.

CONCLUSION
Contrary to the more complex range of considerations taken up in children’s and
family law, I have shown that immigration law figures its subjects rather bluntly, as
innocent child-objects and criminalized migrant-subjects. Their mobility defines their
legal status, as child-objects are presumed to be apolitical, inert, and silent, while
migrant-subjects are highly politicized, self-conscious actors willfully choosing to violate
legal boundaries. In short, children are moved, passively, and adults move, actively and
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by choice, rendering family groups unintelligible. Ruddick has argued that children’s
“best interests" enables a ventriloquist politics of representation, in which “the child
Table 6.2: Provisions of In re Hutto Family Detention Center Settlement
Schedule: 6:30am earliest wake time; no wake-up time on weekends; flexible showering system.
Education: 5 hours of class/day; computers available; individual assessments for each child; certified
teachers; adult English as a Second Language classes available.
Recreation: All family members have open and outdoor recreation available every day; craft activities
available in the pods; movie nights and monthly birthdays available; children can have writing
utensils in living areas; field trips available; Spanish and English television available.
Living Conditions: 4” mattresses provided; painted walls and murals; room decorations allowed; porcelain
toilets to replace stainless steel; rooms unlocked at all times; room searches not conducted
arbitrarily.
Clothing: Families wear own clothing; CCA provides clothing if necessary.
Toys: communal toys in each pod; children allowed to keep toys in rooms during the day; facility accepts
donated toys.
Privacy: One room in each pod designated for private toilet use; privacy curtains added to cell toilets.
Grooming: Hair products and barber services available; supplies available at commissary.
Food: Menu revised regularly; cafeteria-style menu; salad bars available; meat-based courses available
every day; snacks available in refrigerators, vending machines, and at the commissary.
Mental Health Services: Town Hall meetings each week; Individualized needs assessments performed
upon admission; children have individual and group sessions available.
Medical & Dental Care: Full-time pediatrician on site; immunization available; more space provided for
consultation; Spanish-speaking staff; toothbrushes and over-the-counter medicines provided.
Visitation: Contact visits permitted; designated, private rooms available for meetings with attorneys; hours
posted clearly; children not required to accompany parents.
Detainee Movement: Interior doors open; freedom of movement between housing pods and non-restricted
areas; parental consent for children’s movement; check-ins replace headcounts.
Phone Access: Phone cards reasonably priced; detainees informed that calls are recorded, but not
monitored in real time; free telephones for legal services provided.
Mail: Staff does not read mail; families can receive books and clothing.
Staff: casual uniform replaces enforcement uniform.
Orientation: Explains rules, services, grievance procedures; local non-profits permitted to give legal
orientation programs; handbook provided to incoming families.
Legal Counsel Access: attorneys can leave phone messages for detainees; message delivered in a timely
manner; instructions for reaching pro bono legal representation provided in each pod; attorneyclient privilege respected by staff.
Library: legal materials available regularly; free access to library; stocked with sufficient books; facility
accepts book donations.
Facility: Razor wire removed; no fence or bars on front entrance; landscaping on grounds; intake doors
wooden, unlocked; no signs describing Hutto as ‘correctional.’
Record Keeping: Resident files to contain intake forms, disciplinarly reports, records of counseling,
commissary records; case records locked.
Work: Detained parents allowed to work for $1/day.
Employment Requirements: Experience/advanced education required for Child Care Professional staff.

(Source: In re Hutto Family Detention Center Settlement Exhibits A, B, C.)
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danced around the issue with a series of partners: parents who defend their liberty to raise
children as they see fit; the state, which has an abiding interest in the child as futurity;
and an increasingly complex array of representatives” (2007a, 520). As the plaintiffs'
attorneys, their parents ICE, and the judge purported to act in the plaintiffs' “best
interests,” and the children gave few testimonies, Bunikyte hardly broke new ground for
children's political agency. Intriguingly, however, children's 'best interests' and 'special
vulnerability' made the case possible, as the presumed dependence of children required
the creation of legal protections. Even while the child-objects figured by Flores and
Plyler were not quite persons, the protections granted them go far beyond what is
available to adult “aliens.” Children's and adult's legal subjectivity is mutually
constitutive, so that each displaces the other while neither achieve recognition as a
“person” before the law.
Immigration geopolitics unfolds, then, in and through an asymmetrical
distribution of liberal norms of right and responsibility among unaccompanied children,
families, and adult migrants. It is not the case, as others have argued, that the law is
suspended for those in detention, but that immigration law does not afford migrantsubjects a liberal balance of rights, obligations, and punishments. As Basaran argues,
“Border zones are legal constructions and law is an ordinary means by which the liberal
state legitimizes illiberal rule…” (2008, 341). Immigration law legitimizes the
geopolitical scaling of the plenary doctrine of immigration, and the particular post-9/11
fusion of national security and immigration legitimizes detention as a practice. The
illegality of the migrant-subject and illiberal immigration enforcement practices serve as
recursive justifications, each leading inexorably to the other. Thus, “border zones are
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characterized by legal proliferation rather than being outside the law, by juridical
complicity rather than executives acting on their own… These are not places without
rights, but places with difference--and thereby lesser—rights” (Basaran 2008, 340; 347).
Weighing the “best interests” of 26 individual children against “the public interest,” “the
rule of law,” “border security,” the judge used the ambiguity of children’s rights to create
an opening for judicial affirmation of the juridico-political configuration of immigration
geopolitics in the United States. Bunikyte's resolution did not, therefore, represent a shift
in federal court rulings on children in immigration custody, but does illuminate the
geopolitical implications of children's legal status, and the ways in which immigration
law pits children's vulnerability against criminalized, hyper-responsibilized parents.
Understanding these how these legal distinctions are put to work in immigration law and
enforcement is critical to understanding how geopolitical narratives create the conditions
for policing, detention, and deportation practices in the United States.
As this chapter has shown, the legal distinctions between children and adults are
bound up with geopolitical mappings of external danger and internal safety, such that
family detention protected both the US and noncitizen children.

As Mountz argues

(2003, 2004) and I explore in the next chapter, legal categorizations impact noncitizens'
pathways into and out of detention, even if, as Coleman (2005) argues, legal and policy
discourses do not map cleanly onto the sites of enforcement. For Butler (2009), ICE's
and the judge's legal arguments mobilize a narcissistic and uni-directional narrative of
victimhood that justifies policies that maximize the physical vulnerability of a litany of
others, under the assumption that “our” vulnerability will be minimized. Twinning
children's “special vulnerability” with perceived security vulnerabilities in the
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immigration enforcement system, this assemblage of institutions and practices displaces
physical vulnerability from the US nation-state onto an anonymous population of external
others and produces, I argue, a geopolitics of vulnerability. More than a discursive
coupling, the plenary doctrine frames immigration as a threat to territorial sovereignty,
authorizing wide administrative discretion to exploit the precarity of migrants’ legal,
political, and physical positions. Understanding emerging detention and enforcement
practices requires close attention to the intersections of law, administrative authority, and
enforcement practices. It is here that noncitizens continue to contest the legal apartheid
between “aliens” and “persons” and the spatial practices of securitized sovereignty.

Copyright © Lauren Leigh Martin 2011
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CHAPTER 7: DELEGATING DISCRETION: LAW, THE PLENARY DOCTRINE
AND SOVEREIGN POWER
“From the point of view of the law, detention may be a mere deprivation of liberty. But
the imprisonment that performs this function has always involved a technical project.”
(Foucault 1995 [1977], 257)
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 6, I described how Judge Sparks deferred, in the end, to ICE’s
discretion to detain whomsoever it deemed necessary to achieve compliance with
immigration law. Analyzing the Hutto litigation’s transcripts, however, I found that legal
precedent on administrative discretion—executive officials’ ability to make judgments
beyond regulations and statutues—also protected ICE, a legal regime that applies to all
executive agencies. For example, attorneys argued over the boundary of ICE Field Office
Director Marc Moore’s decision-making process. In his deposition, the FOD is allowed
to recount the content of his decisions, but, as the ICE attorney claimed, his “predecisional” thought process was off-limits to the plaintiffs. The following is one of many
discussions of Moore’s “deliberative privilege:”
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 1]: Have you kept women [at Hutto] that were pregnant?
[Moore]: Yes.
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 1]: So do you consider pregnancy not to be a significant
factor-[Defense Counsel]: I’m going to object to the extent we are starting to stray into
his deliberative process and making decisions on parole releases.
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 1]: It's in the regulations. I'm asking him how he applies the
regulations. He brought those up.
[Defense Counsel]: He considers all --- as he said before, he considers all of these
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criteria, but when you start delving into [how factors are] weight[ed], you're
going into the thought process he has behind the parole decision.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel 2]: He testified that he adheres to the regulations. So we are
saying he said he adheres to the regulations; he let some pregnant people out. He
adheres to the regulations; he doesn't let some pregnant people out. The policy is
that, obviously, some pregnancies can be paroled. It is perfectly acceptable and it
is not pre-decisional to ask how he distinguishes between those two.
[Defense Counsel]: His thought process behind each of those parole
determinations is pre-decisional to that parole decision.
[Plaintiffs’ Counsel 2]: But his adherence to the policy, he has distinguished
between the way that he adheres to a policy. We haven't asked him about a
specific parole decision. We are asking how he adheres to the policy. The policy
has already been set. He's not making policy. That's not pre-decisional. It says in
the regs, some pregnant woman must be paroled or should be paroled. How is he
applying that? That‘s not pre-decisional. It's in the regs. He says he obeys the
regs. Some pregnant people get out, some don't. So what's going on?
[Defense Counsel]: To the extent it involves a measure of his discretion, it is predecisional. (Emphasis added; Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore, 86-88)
“Straying into his deliberative process,” the plaintiff’s attorneys walked a delicate
boundary between the content of ICE’s agency-wide policies on release, Field Office
Directors’ application of these policies to individual cases, and the decision-making
process behind both individual and policy decisions. The difference, then, between policy
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and execution has a significant impact on the relationship between executive branch and
the federal courts. More importantly, the discussion above shows how the everyday work
of immigration officials—especially the categorizations, release decisions, and
deportation orders—cannot be judicially challenged.
For scholars of executive power, this is an intriguing discussion. The decision to
banish, to set outside political membership and national space, to exclude from the
normal juridical order constitutes, according to Giorgio Agamben and others, sovereign
power (Agamben 1998, 2005). Yet, the very decision-making process is, itself, excluded
from judicial review. Parole decisions occupy (and constitute) a specific discursive zone
between law and policy; ICE is Congressionally authorized to develop, implement, and
publish immigration enforcement

“regs,” but the deliberation process behind the

regulations is not judicially reviewable. “The Chevron deference,” (Chevron U.S.A Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 1984) prevents federal courts from rendering
judgment on executive policy-making, protecting executive policy-makers from personal
liability.

According to principles undergirding administrative law, courts defer to

executive agencies because those agencies are accountable to the voting public (via the
presidential office), and this accountability forces those agencies to work in the best
interests of affected populations (2008). Thus, a Field Office Director’s decision-making
process about who to detain, why, where, and for how long is exempt from federal court
review. The plaintiffs’ attorneys in Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. wanted to find out
how Moore applied “the regs” to individual cases, and to show that he did not, in fact,
evaluate each family’s eligibility for release, as required by the Flores settlement.
Protected by deliberative privilege, however, Moore’s thought-process for reaching those
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decisions could not serve as evidence, even though his written release decision letters
could. The attorneys ultimately showed that the letters shared the same boilerplate
language, except for detainees’ name and Alien Number, and contained nothing specific
to each families’ cases to indicate a detailed, individualized review.

The Hutto

Settlement required Moore (and subsequent Field Office Directors) to provide more
detailed rationales for approving or prohibiting release.
Interdisciplinary studies of immigration enforcement have explained immigration
law’s exceptionality as a consequence of the “plenary power doctrine,” a provision that
sets federal immigration law apart from the constitutional protections governing the
criminal justice system, citizen’s rights and entitlements, and local immigration initiatives
(see Varsanyi 2008). 4

Since the 1899 Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court has ruled

repeatedly that immigration policy is a foreign policy matter, belonging under the
purview of Congress and the Executive Branch, and is therefore beyond the Supreme
Court’s constitutional judgment. Delegating immigration law-making to Congress gives
politicians wide latitude to decide how (and whether) immigration law will adhere to
constitutional principles adhered to in other legal regimes (Neuman 2005). There is no
mandate—and therefore no guarantee—that immigration law share the same principles as
other US legal regimes. Enforcement policy-making falls therefore outside the purview
of Supreme Court intervention, severely restricting any due process or fundamental rights
claims noncitizens may have about their detention or deportation proceedings. For most
US legal immigration scholars, then, ICE’s authority to make and remake immigration
enforcement policies derive from the scaling of immigration as a foreign policy matter.
4

Monica Varsanyi (2005?) shows, however, how municipal governments and consulares develop their own
forms documentation and, therefore, local forms of citizenship, political membership, and immigration
geopolitics.
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For them, immigration law’s scaling sets it apart from domestic public policy, though the
physical presence of noncitizens muddles these distinctions in daily life (Coleman
2008b). While the plenary doctrine is the Supreme Court’s primary rationale for not
intervening in deportation and release decisions, however, a range of administrative laws
protect enforcement policy-making--including detention center operations—from judicial
oversight, as shown above.
Understood from the perspective of the plenary doctrine alone, immigration
enforcement is a matter of admitting suitable noncitizens and excluding those deemed
inadmissible at the border. Exclusion becomes considerably more complicated, of course,
when applied noncitizens already in US territory. In those cases, residents must be
rendered excludable; in De Genova’s terms, they must be illegalized. In the 1996 laws,
Congress to limited noncitizens’ access to judicial review of deportation and detention
decisions. As legal scholar Gerald Neuman (2005) argues, federal courts now police the
legal and constitutional boundaries of administrative discretion over immigration
enforcement, but do not rule on the validity of ICE’s use of that discretion. Immigration
officials retain the authority not to pursue deportation, to issue a “stay of deportation,”
and to develop procedures through which to pursue deportation. ICE leadership regularly
issues “prosecutorial memos” and other guidance on when and how to exercise
prosecutorial discretion. In other words, there are formal rules about how immigration
law is to be exercised, but administrative discretion protects this rule-making from
judicial oversight. These rules are not the same kind of legal instrument as immigration
legislation, but neither are they il-, or extra-legal. They may be, however, extraconstitutional, and among immigration scholars, extra-constitutionality and illegality
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often become collapsed. So while prosecutorial discretion was initially used for
humanitarian release, administrative discretion became a way of closing down appeals
and review opportunities for noncitizens in deportation proceedings under IIRIRA
(Johnson 2008, Neuman 2005). Thus, immigration agencies have wide authority to
achieve compliance with deportation orders, and “the Chevron deference,” prevents court
intervention in the implementation of immigration law.
Focusing on administrative discretion allows me to plot the different points of
contact between detainees and ICE officials, to trace migrants’ pathways into and out of
detention, and to thereby chart a geography of illegalization. As I explain in more detail,
a range of border and immigration enforcement agencies classify noncitizens according
to where and when they come into contact, and those arrested within the US are afforded
more due process protections than those arrested at a port of entry or outside US territory.
In addition to due process, “illegal aliens” are eligible for bond, while “arriving aliens”
can petition for parole. While the distinction seems heuristic, bond and parole require
different actions from detainees, so that access to parole and not bond, for example, has
dramatic impacts on detainees’ ability leave detention centers while their cases are
processed. In this chapter, I explore ICE’s “deportation power” through the series of
enforcement decisions in order to outline the kinds of discretionary decisions through
which ICE specifies practices of detention and release. I contrast ICE’s authority over
individual cases (and bodies) with ICE’s delegation of detention operations in order to
analyze the assemblage of institutions working on noncitizens’ bodies between migrants’
arrest and release/removal. Moving from bodies to spaces, in short, I seek to unpack the
assemblage of legal and policy instruments make detention possible.
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APPREHENSION, CATEGORIZATION AND DETENTION
Noncitizens come into contact with ICE in a variety of ways. Public institutions
have begun to request proof of legal residency, and failing to produce documentation can
result in being reported to ICE. While these policies vary from state to state, and county
to county, everyday bureaucratic activities, such as drivers’ license renewals, require
proof of residency (Shahani and Greene 2009). Departments of Transportation, social
services, schools, and streets have become, in some places, sites of surveillance, policing,
and potential arrest. Since 2006, ICE has also performed workplace enforcement actions
(popularly known as “raids”) and late-night visits to noncitizens’ homes. 5 In border cities,
local law enforcement regularly calls CBP to act as an interpreter in conversations with
non-English speaking victims, witnesses, or suspects. Once on the scene, CBP can
choose to ask for documentation and take people into custody. Noncitizens may,
therefore, be rendered excludable far from the border and long after entry. By linking
with local law enforcement and a range of banal state institutions, which have nothing to
do with federal law enforcement, ICE has been able to increase the potential points of
contact between its agents and noncitizens (Coleman 2009).
During this study, families came to Berks and Hutto in a variety of ways. ICE
apprehended some families at ports of entry, particularly those families who requested
asylum upon arrival. 6  A Somali mother and child crossed the Mexico-US border, and a
local resident advised them not to claim asylum; the mother maintained that, no, her
5

Raids came under fierce criticism, especially as reports surfaced about children left at school or ending up
in foster care after their parents were detained at work. The Obama Administration promised to end the
raids, but ICE has continued the practice of home raids and workplace actions, albeit under a lower profile.
6

ICE does not collect aggregated statistics about where families have been apprehended. My data should
not be taken as representative of detained families as a whole, but of the diversity of families’ interactions
with CBP, ICE, and other agencies.
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family members received asylum, and she would, too. The local resident called CBP,
who detained the mother and child in a temporary facility, separated them for 10 days,
then transferred them together to Hutto (explored in more detail below). Another family
crossed the Mexico-US border, only to have an acquaintance, who feared harboring them
would put her at risk, call CBP. Others were picked up from their homes, and still others
apprehended on city streets. ICE detained a Canadian-Iranian family when their flight to
Canada made an emergency landing in Puerto Rico, despite the fact that they had never
intended to enter the US (Democracy Now 2007). In another instance, ICE detained a
boy travelling to the US alone to join his mother. When his mother arrived to pick him
up from ICE, they detained her, as well, and transferred them both to Hutto. Noncitizen
families entered detention, therefore, in a variety of ways. As I elaborate below, when
and where noncitizens come into contact with ICE has significant implications for what
happens next.
Categorization and Detention
After “being picked up,” or apprehended in ICE’s terminology, families faced a
series of categorizations and re-categorizations that determine where they will be
detained, their opportunities for release, and the likelihood of their deportation. Two
factors have significant bearing on noncitizens’ detention trajectories: (1) the territorial
location of their apprehension and (2) the timing of their contact with CBP or ICE. As
one participant explained:
So you cross the border illegally, you're picked up on the southern border, for
example, or the northern border, and you've been in the United States for less than
14 days, and you're detained or arrested within 100 miles of the border, then
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you're put in Expedited Removal. If you're stopped at the border, then you're put
in Expedited Removal. If you're stopped at the airport, with no documents, with
false documents, or you actually ask for asylum at the border, you're arrested and
put in Expedited Removal.

And then in order to get out of Expedited Removal, you have to pass the Credible
Fear Interview, which shows that you have a reasonable fear of persecution if
you're returned. So, so that's how you get into Expedited Removal.

If you overstay your tourist visa…, and you got arrested with your children, you
should not end up at Hutto. Because, let's say you came in as a tourist and you
never went home and you got picked up in a raid. Or walking down the street with
your children. That family is not supposed to go to Hutto, unless Berks is filled.
Because that family that entered legally would not qualify to be in Expedited
Removal in the first place. (Interview April 2008)
The timing and location of noncitizens’ contact with ICE bears directly on noncitizens’
access to relief or release. As I have described elsewhere, Expedited Removal (ER)
deputizes ICE officers to issue deportation orders to certain noncitizens without those
persons seeing an immigration judge and triggers mandatory detention; ICE typically
deports ER detainees in under 30 days. This timing applies to families who request
asylum at a Port of Entry, as it applies to those apprehended along the southwestern
border. ICE classifies the former, however, as “arriving aliens” and the latter as “illegal
aliens,” and these categories determine their access to bond and parole later in the
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immigration process. Families can exit ER’s deportation “fast-track” by requesting a
Credible Fear Interview (CFI), in which an asylum officer with Citizenship and
Immigration Services will determine their fear of persecution. Thus, when and where
families come into ICE custody bears directly on their access to the immigration and/or
asylum adjudication process, where they are detained and the duration of their detention.
While the Hutto settlement stipulated that non-ER families would go to Berks,
because that facility was presumed to be more suitable for long stays, this was not always
the case:
LM: I know part of the settlement, too, was that the people detained [at Hutto]
would be those in Expedited Removal Processing, not people with some other
ambiguous status that would take longer to decide. Has that pretty much been the
case?

Participant: It's only people that are initially placed in Expedited Removal, unless
Berks is filled, which is the other facility. So our experience is that most people
are initially in Expedited Removal, but I talked to…to two families, uh, that were
not in Expedited Removal who were picked up, actually they were picked when
they went to, um, get their children who were trying to join them in the United
States.
…
LM: So Berks has really become--so now they're basically dividing families by
their status. If they're in ER, they go Hutto.
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Participant: Maybe, you know it's unclear to me. What I think it's also--it's
geographic…. [Hutto doesn’t] get a lot of people…stopped at the airport in New
York asking for asylum. So part of that might just be geographic. So if you're in
New York, it's closer to take you to Berks, than it is to get you to Hutto.
(Interview April 2008)
In practice, families’ pathways into and out of detention are not, therefore, entirely
predictable on the basis of their “arriving alien,” “illegal alien,” or ER classification.
Placement decisions (Berks, Hutto, or neither) rested with individual ICE officers, and
some regional field offices chose to release rather than detain families despite DHS’
“catch and remove” policy (Fieldnotes 2009). Even with seemingly clear-cut mandatory
detention cases, ICE officers retained much discretion to detain, release, or transfer
families within their regional field offices. ICE rule-making guides officers’ discretionary
decision-making, but does not bar them from taking other actions.
Families have been (and still are) apprehended by a variety of federal law
enforcement entities. While border and immigration enforcement officers often work
closely together, they work for different agencies, under different mandates, and with
different authority over the deportation process. Most families apprehended on the
Mexico-US border moved through CBP stations before being transferred to ICE. As
described in Chapter 4, CBP runs a number of temporary “staging areas” and temporary
detention centers that hold noncitizens for up to 72 hours. Those caught in the interior
might pass through a similar temporary detention center in an ICE office or a local jail.
As one mother reported:
I came, I crossed the border from Mexico to the United States... First, I met [a]
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lady. She said, gave us a sweater, me and my son. I said, I want to go. I’m looking
for immigration. She said, ‘No, don’t look for them, just run. If they catch you
they will deport you.’ I said ‘no, no, I need to go,’ and then she called them. They
came, they took me to a [Border Patrol station], they took a finger print and
everything. After 2 days we were at that place, they tell me that they have to
separate us—me and my son. They take him to the foster house, and me to the
adult detention. Then after 10 days we met. Then they took us to Hutto together.
(America’s Family Prison Interview 2007)
If families face difficulties navigating the legal cartography of their own cases, the
picture is seemingly equally obscure on ICE’s end. While Field Office Directors are
responsible for the case management of detainees in their regions, how families moved
from one place to another was not always clear to these officials either:
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL] Who does [the intake process for Hutto]?
[MOORE] Well, families are encountered by the Border Patrol or a Port of Entry
by a C[ustoms] and B[order] P[atrol] or maybe even the Office of Investigations
as they do their work. Those individuals – and I don't want to speak on something
I don’t clearly know. My understanding is that they contact the field office
juvenile coordinator for wherever they happen to be. And that the coordinator
makes a call, faxes or in some other fashion communicates with whoever is
assigned to those duties within the Hutto facility to determine whether that family
is suitable for housing there. (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore)
For families, this process is an anxious one, as it is never clear to them which agency is
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detaining them, for what purpose, and where. Nancy Hiemstra has tracked this process
for Ecuadorean deportees, and shown how many are unclear whether they are in Texas or
New Mexico, in a CBP or ICE facility, in prison or in detention (Hiemstra forthcoming).
For detained noncitizens, this labyrinth of legal distinctions, intended to differentiate
legitimate from illegitimate migrants, is confusing and frightening.
Review and Release
Flores also required, however, INS/ICE to review each child’s eligibility for
release (not only those whose attorneys request one) and a letter stating ICE’s reasons for
continued detention.

Because children faced greater barriers to fair immigration

processes, they often languished in the pre-Flores detention system for long periods of
time.

Prior to the Hutto settlement, bond and parole reviews were particularly

complicated because Flores required regular review of children’s detention decisions and
written justification for their detention in secured settings; ICE had no such obligation to
parents. As the litigation showed, ICE subordinated children’s claims to their parents’,
treating families like accompanied adults, and neglected Flores’ requirements to review
children’s detention decisions regularly. As one mother noted:
Mohammed, Asia, Bahja and I do not know why we are in jail. We never received
any notice of the reasons for why the children are imprisoned here. Mohammed
tells me it is not fair for him to be in jail because he’s never done anything wrong.
(Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Declaration of Deka Warsame.)
In cases where the ICE Field Office Director did review families’ eligibility for release,
he rubber-stamped his decisions without giving individualized reasons for denying bond
or parole. These practices reveal, advocates argued, a presumption of detention among
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ICE leadership. The settlement ultimately required that the Field Office Director review
and communicate individualized release decisions (with which the FOD complied;
Bunikyte v. Chertoff Final Compliance Report 2009). These technical struggles were
particularly important because review and relief decisions cannot be appealed to a higher
or external body. In the past, federal courts adjudicated appeals, but Congress limited
these appeals to increase “administrative efficiency” and move noncitizens through the
deportation process more quickly. Once detained, ICE Field Office Directors and the
Deportation Officers assigned to specific facilities can singlehandedly decide a family’s
fate.
Above, I described how the place and time of a family’s apprehension determined
their denomination as “illegal” or “arriving aliens” and how this categorization impacted
where and how long they are detained. This initial encounter determines families’
eligibility for release from Hutto and Berks. As Field Office Director Marc Moore
explained, Expedited Removal’s expansion complicated what used to be fairly clear
release policies:
[Plaintiffs’ counsel] And during the time that you have been involved at Hutto
have bonds always been set for persons who pass their credible fear [interview]?
[MOORE] Well, I don’t know – I can’t recall exactly when that Board of
Immigration Appeals decision occurred that – I’m speaking from memory
because remember that up until the Secure Border Initiative, almost all expedited
removals anywhere were issued at Ports of Entry. So they were all arriving aliens,
so there was really no question. Then as you moved in to between the Ports of
Entry, the immigration court -- and actually, I believe the case was brought out of
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San Antonio -- the immigration court did not believe those fell within the terms of
an arriving alien. So they rendered a decision that they believe these cases fell
within the purview of the Court to set a bond. I think the agency disagreed, and
BIA ultimately ruled that the immigration court was correct. (Emphasis added;
Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore)
Privileging those within US territory over those outside of it (or in the process of passing
into it), “illegal aliens” can “bond out” of detention, while “arriving aliens” can only be
released on parole. This differentiation affords noncitizens present in US territory more
procedural rights than those who have never been admitted, and this territorial hierarchy
has long been considered precedent in immigration law (Neuman 2005). Once ER
applied to areas between and beyond Ports of Entry, ICE faced the possibility of bondeligible ER cases. Prior to the 2004 expansion of ER, placement in ER proceedings
effectively eliminated noncitizens’ opportunities for release.
The difference between bond and parole is particularly important for asylumseekers who claim asylum at a port of entry--that is, those who avoid undocumented
entry and seek legal entrance under established humanitarian refugee law. Immigration
judges determine bond eligibility and set bond amounts in noncitizens’ initial hearings.
ICE Deportation Officers have the discretion to set parole, however, on the basis of their
evaluations of families’ “flight risk:”
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL] And regardless of who actually prepares document,
who is the person that considers a successful applicant who passes the CFI? Who
is the person that makes this consideration as to whether the person is going to be
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released or not?
[MOORE] It would probably be the case officer.
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL] Is that the same as the-[MOORE] Deportation officer.
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL] --- deportation officer? And do you review these
document decisions?
[MOORE] Me, personally, no, ma'am.
[PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL] And where are those deportation officers located?
[MOORE] They're located at Hutto. They are assigned dockets. Each docket
consists of any number of individuals or families, in this case. And it is their day-to-day responsibility to review those cases, act on the information that's changed
in those cases and move those cases with the best efficiency through the case
system.

(Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore, pp. 102-105)
Hutto’s Deportation Officers apply these evaluations differently, so that families’ (and
now women’s) release on parole often depends on which officer they are assigned
(Bunikyte et al. v. Chertoff et al. Compliance Review 2, 2008; Fieldnotes June 9, 2010).
Both bond and parole require substantial financial deposits, ranging from $1,000 to
$14,000 per person, but gaining parole requires that “arriving aliens” find a sponsor to
take responsibility for their welfare and court appearances. For families arriving without
existing family or community support, raising this kind of money was impossible,
marking the gulf between technical and real relief (White 2002). The asylum process
takes from six to twelve months, so prohibitively expensive parole amounts guarantee
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long detention stays, despite a Deportation Officers’ evaluation of a families’ low flight
risk.
The terminology of “relief,” the official term ascribed to detention release and
stays of deportation, is revealing, because discretionary relief is not a right, but an
administrative decision made by ICE or an Immigration Judge.

Because relief is

discretionary, it is not bound by the norms of due process set out in the Constitution
(Reno v. AADC 1999). Federal courts have ruled, on these grounds, that constitutional
due process norms do not apply to relief hearings. Because noncitizens cannot appeal
discretionary relief decisions on due process grounds, relief decisions are exempt from
federal or appellate court review (Neuman 2005). ICE and immigration courts retain,
therefore, discretion over noncitizens’ pathways through the immigration system. Though
distinct, these two forms of discretionary authority resonate and work together to limit the
ability of noncitizens to appeal for relief from detention and deportation.
ICE’s discretionary authority bore down on families arriving in the US without
prior authorization in numerous ways. First, ICE has the discretion to initiate (or not)
deportation proceedings against groups identified by Congress in immigration legislation,
and the decision to withhold an order of deportation. Second, Immigration Judges have
the discretion to grant relief to deportable noncitizens, but not “arriving aliens.” With the
exception of certain categories of mandatory detention, ICE’s authority to detain
noncitizens, to transfer them between detention centers, and to release them under various
forms of supervision rests in its administrative discretion to execute immigration law.
Making families detainable, therefore, required policy changes within the then-new
Department of Homeland Security, but did not require new legislation. Just as ICE began
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detaining families by way of administrative policy-making, the agency ceased placing
families in Expedited Removal, circumvented the mandatory detention requirements of
ER, and thereby emptied Hutto of its families in September 2009 (Email Correspondence
September 14, 2009). Thus the history of family detention policy reveals much about the
ways in which ICE maneuvers between legislative constraints like mandatory detention.

DELEGATED DISCRETION: GOVERNING DETENTION CENTERS
IIRIRA requires ICE to detain particular noncitizens prior to deportation, and
charges the agency with ensuring noncitizens’ compliance with admission and exclusion
laws.

As such, the choice, location, and daily operation of detention—the entire

detention system—falls within ICE’s policy-making prerogative. Yet contracts, previous
legal settlements, state licenses, and performance guidelines govern detention center
operations. To this point, the chapter has focused on ICE’s discretion over families’
pathways into and out of Hutto, specifically the ways in which ICE officers’
categorizations structure families’ legal options. My focus has been, then, on the ways in
which ICE officers put immigration law to work, and the ways in which categorization
practices are applied to individual cases and noncitizen bodies, i.e. the production of
detainability through legal discourse. Actualizing detainability requires, however, spaces
of confinement, so here I turn to analyze the governance of detention spaces. I outline
how federal and state oversight overlapped with internal

ICE inspections,

intergovernmental service agreements, and contracts. Paradoxically, multiple legal
frameworks intersect, making Hutto hardly an extra-legal space, yet these legal
frameworks do not found a basis for rights claims by detainees. Rather, these different
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legal regimes work to continually defer liability for detention conditions.
Flores v. Meese (1997) and In re: Hutto Detention Center (2007), federal
litigation settlements in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits respectively, created binding legal
requirements that set family detention apart from adult detention centers. Family
detention facilities are different from adult-only facilities (including Hutto in its current
role as a female detention center) in that these two settlements require additional
oversight. In particular, Flores requires that all children’s custodial facilities obtain
childcare licenses. State licenses are supposed to insert a layer of external oversight and
to ensure that ICE facilities operate at a minimally accepted standard of child welfare.
This requirement devolves certain oversight responsibilities to states, which are
traditionally excluded from immigration policy-making and enforcement (Plyler v. Doe
1983; see Varsanyi 2008), but also recognizes that children’s rights regimes are statelegislated and litigated and child welfare is state-managed.
Here, Texas and Pennsylvania diverged. Upon discovering that Pennsylvania did
not license secured family shelters like Berks, the county asked the state to create a
license for their facility, rather than go unlicensed.

Texas’ Department of Family

Protective Services, however, exempted Hutto from its child care license because parents
were present. As Judge Sam Sparks noted: “A state license is qualitatively different
from a state license exemption. A state license subjects the facility to periodic health and
safety evaluations by an outside regulatory body, while a state licensing exemption, by its
very nature, removes that layer of oversight” (Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Order). Judge Sparks
accepted the exemption, on the grounds that his court did not have jurisdiction to
mandate state licensing policies. In re: Hutto Detention Center Settlement also included
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regular, unannounced visits from a federal magistrate, who oversaw compliance with its
list of specific requirements until it expired in December 2009. Executed in federal court,
these stipulations went beyond the Detention Standards, the Family Residential
Standards, and ICE’s monitoring practices that leave detained adults with “really
nothing…no court-enforceable standards other than a constitutional claim, other than a
substantive claim of violations of due process” (Interview April 2008). For Berks and
Hutto, then, child-specific rulings imposed direct judicial oversight of detention center
conditions, where there has been little for adults. The particularity of family detention—
made so by the presence of children—highlights the ways in which children’s rights
serve as limits to ICE’s discretion, but in comparison, reveals the fragility of those
protections in the broader context of immigration enforcement.
In line with broader Bush-era directives to privilege the private sector in
homeland security operations, the majority of immigration-related detentions are held in
contract facilities, both public and private. ICE procurement officers request and award
bids, draw up contracts, and monitor facilities, nesting an additional set of institutional
relationships within ICE’s administrative purview.

While prisons are by no means

transparent institutions, state-level agencies license, certify and hear complaints about
prisons and jails in the criminal justice system. Federal detention centers are, however,
overseen by the same agencies that contract them, and because immigration enforcement
issues are extra-constitutional, challenging detention conditions, practices, or policies is
exceedingly difficult. ICE owns and operates neither Berks nor Hutto, but subcontracts
with Berks and Williamson Counties, respectively, through Inter-Governmental Service
Agreements (IGSAs). As of September 2009, ICE held noncitizen detainees in seven
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dedicated and approximately 240 shared-use county jail facilities contracted through
IGSAs (see Chapter 3; US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009, 10). Contracting
between government entities escapes the competitive bid process required for private
sector contracts, and devolves detention center operations to county governments. Here,
the differences between Berks and Hutto reveal dynamics at work throughout ICE’s
detention system (and the criminal justice system, as well). Berks County owns and
operates the Berks County Family Shelter Care Center in a facility built by the county,
located on county land.
The Corrections Corporation of America, however, built the T. Don Hutto
Correctional Facility in 1995, on land the firm purchased from the Catholic Dioceses of
Austin. Williamson County sub-contracted with CCA to provide the IGSA-stipulated
family detention services. As the ICE Field Office Director explained, “in our IGSAs,
our contractual arrangement is with the local government, the entity, state, county or local
entity that has the facility. The county or whoever we have that contractual arrangement
with, it’s their choice who operates that facility for them. And that's the matter for the
county in this case and CCA” (Bunikyte, et al. v. Chertoff, et al. Deposition of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc Moore). The ICECCA-Williamson County triumvirate became particularly complex during and after the
lawsuit, as the federal court held ICE liable for its noncompliance with Flores, ICE held
Williamson County liable for completing stipulated changes at Hutto, and Williamson
County directed CCA to complete those changes:
As I mentioned on the phone, I want to make sure that Williamson County
understands the current activities occurring at T. Don Hutto Residential Facility
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and changes required under the IGSA. More importantly, the IGSA is between the
County and ICE, and Williamson County, TX is responsible for performance
under the terms of the agreement. As background, Williamson County was issued
a change order under the IGSA on 2/16/2007 to make improvements to the
facility to bring it more in-line with a non-secure facility required for ICE
Residential Facilities. The Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
authorized improvements and ICE is in the process of negotiating a final price for
these changes with CCA.However, any changes to the IGSA should be directed by
CCA through Williamson County, and then to the ICE Contracting Officer, as
that's who the agreement with ICE is with. … We are in the process of negotiating
this change order and Williamson County must be at the table for these
negotiations and changes to the agreement. (Emphasis added; Email from
Anthony Gomez, ICE Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Acquisition
Management, Detention and Removal Operations to Hal Hawes, Assistant
Williamson County Attorney, April 5, 2007)
In most cases, CCA then sub-contracted with other private firms for painting, bath fixture
replacement, fence removal, installing new child-safe doors, social services, and
education (Email Correspondence from Damon Hininger, CCA). This created some
confusion, as the functional relationships between ICE, CCA, and Williamson County did
not cohere with the legal hierarchy of contracted responsibilities. Ultimately, Williamson
County Commissioners’ Court agreed to delegate authority to CCA, allowing ICE and
CCA to negotiate Hutto’s changes directly (Email Correspondence between Ashley
Lewis, ICE Head of Contracting Activity and Gary Mead, Assistant Director of ICE
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Detention and Removal Operations, June 8, 2007). This web of sub-contracted authority
over detention demonstrates, however, the gulf that can develop between the legal and
practical control of detention centers.
The Hutto Settlement required ICE to develop Family Residential Standards
(FRS), a 26-part document meant to set a baseline standard for family detention
operations (analyzed in Chapter 8). In its form, content, and references, the FRS mimics
the Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) for adult facilities, which
is based on the American Correctional Association (ACA) standards for jails and prisons
in the criminal justice system. ICE enforces these standards through periodic audits by
the Nakamoto Group, Inc., a private firm specializing in prison oversight.

These

monitoring reports contain both qualitative descriptions and “box-checking.” Unlike the
federal magistrate’s Compliance Reports filed with Judge Sparks, the FRS and its
compliance reports are not legally enforceable. That is, they serve as internal ICE reports
that rank detention center conditions ICE sets for itself.
Berks is governed by Pennsylvania shelter licensing procedures, non-binding
Family Residential Standards, Flores stipulations (but not In re: Hutto), and Berks
County’s IGSA with ICE, while Hutto’s family detention operations were governed by
the Family Residential Standards, the In re: Hutto Settlement, a contract between
Williamson County and CCA, an IGSA between Williamson County and ICE, and
Flores. In both facilities, ICE contracts out its authority to detain noncitizens, and in
many cases this authority is re-contracted to various service providers. Thus, employees
of the State of Pennsylvania and the Corrections Corporation of America have more
control over the everyday spatial ordering of family detention facilities. This situation
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became particularly salient when CCA fired a guard for having “consensual” sexual
relations with a mother held at Hutto in 2007, and Williamson County charged a CCA
guard with five counts of sexual assault in 2010. In both cases, ICE’s delegated authority
over detention created the possibilities for CCA guards to engage in illegal behavior.7
Administrative and prosecutorial discretion define only the official scope of formally
delegated powers, but this devolution of detention creates opportunities for a wider range
of nominally “nongovernmental” actors to assume the prestige and authority afforded the
state in immigration proceedings. Technically and practically, it becomes difficult to
delineate the limits, legal and material, of state power over noncitizens in immigration
proceedings.

DISCRETION AND THE PLENARY DOCTRINE
Adjudication, services, and enforcement are formally separated in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), so that any of these three components may be
delegated to different agencies. When the Homeland Security Act (HAS) amended the
INA in 2003, it allocated enforcement and administrative services to Secretary of
Homeland Security, while adjudication authority was shared by the Secretary and the
Attorney General (AG). The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the
Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA), responsible for adjudicating immigration cases,
remain in the Department of Justice under the AG’s leadership. Prior to the 2003
reorganization, the INS managed both enforcement and administration, while EOIR and

7

The Prison Rape Commission considers all sexual relations between detainees/prisoners and guards
nonconsensual, due to the severely uneven power relations between guards and prisoners. See National
Prison Rape Elimination Commission 2010.
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the BIA managed adjudication, as they do now. The HSA reorganized immigration
functions in operational terms: “. . . a Federal official to whom a function is transferred . .
. may, for purposes of performing the function, exercise all authorities under any other
provision of law that were available with respect to the performance of that function to
the official responsible for the performance of the function immediately before [transfer]”
(P.L. 107-296, §456 in Viña 2003, 2). The delegation of enforcement-related activities
dictates the distribution of immigration-related authority, while adjudication—the
categorization, review, and release decisions above—falls to both the AG and DHS
Secretary. Discretion over detention spaces and immigration cases are, therefore,
separated and distributed over two DHS agencies and the Department of Justice. The
relationship between noncitizens’ bodies—before, during, and after detention—and the
federal government is mediated by these delegated powers, rule-making, and
administrative privileges.
Coleman (2008a) has delineated how the deportation power applies to citizens
already living in the US, and production of immigration enforcement’s “postentry
landscape.” The threat of deportation works to discipline transboundary migrants, De
Genova (2002) argues, and produce a docile labor force. The point of immigration
enforcement is not, De Genova points out, to actually “deport all deportable aliens,” as
DRO’s Operation Endgame projects, but that “some are deported in order that most may
remain (un–deported) as workers, this particular migrant status may thus be rendered
‘illegal’” (De Genova 2002, 39). For Coleman (2008a) and Kanstroom (2000b), the US
immigration enforcement regime serves post-entry social control functions. This chapter
supplements this work by focusing on ICE’s under-examined power to detain noncitizens
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in the services of immigration law.
If the legal exception has been understood as a legal suspension (Agamben 2005),
and immigration law as particularly exceptional within the American legal domain
(Coleman 2007a), how do we understand the cordoning off of banal, executive decisionmaking? Is it immigration law’s particularity, or does the removal of judicial oversight
characterize a broader range of governmental practices? If the latter is true, might
immigration law’s discretionary elements point towards more pervasive patterns of
“exceptional” decision-making throughout federal bureaucracies? Does administrative
law’s banality undermine the exceptionality of immigration law? What kinds of spatial
practices are these categorizations, and these decisions to release or expel? Specifying the
authorization of ICE’s power to detain has important implications for our understanding
of how spatialities of law, sovereign power, and, more broadly, biopolitical governance
are interlaced.
The dialogue with which I opened the chapter illustrates the material
ramifications of these seemingly arcane legal distinctions.

“Deliberative privilege”

protects executive decision-making from judicial review, though the product of specific
decisions may be subjected to review. Immigration law’s foreign policy status converges,
therefore, with administrative discretion, giving ICE wide berth to determine (1)
noncitizens’ pathways into and out of detention centers, and (2) the location, form, and
ordering of detention centers. In other words, the plenary doctrine shields deportation
decisions and relief applications from judicial review, while the Chevron deference
shields ICE policy-making and enforcement practices from judicial review. Analyses of
rescaling nor the respatialization of the border do not completely explain how, where, or
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who manages detention and deportation proceedings. It is in the constitutional “juridical
void” or “grey area,” however, that ICE and DRO officials make daily decisions about
who to detain, who to release from detention, where to detain them, how many beds they
need, etc. The plenary power doctrine denominates immigration a foreign policy issue,
but a host of administrative rule-making, regulations, guidance, and delegation of
authority govern the everyday practices of ICE and DRO officers, just as in other
Executive Branch agencies. Nor does plenary power inherently prevent oversight of ICE
activities, as federal administrative functions are subject to judicial oversight in most
cases.
Analyzing the intersections of administrative discretion and the plenary doctrine
makes three specific contributions to the growing geographical and interdisciplinary
literatures on immigration enforcement. First, tracing how the HSA and INA
differentiated between immigration adjudication and detention center operations allows
me to analyze ICE’s authority detain noncitizens, independently of its ability to deport
them.

Most scholarly work on immigration enforcement focuses on surveillance,

policing and deportation, the first and final points of contact between noncitizens and
state immigration officials. Second, administrative law intersects with—and extends—
the discretionary authority enshrined in the plenary doctrine. Focusing on the power to
deport, geographic research on immigration enforcement has explained immigration
enforcement actions through “the plenary doctrine” of immigration.

While ICE’s

discretionary authority works to close detention off from external oversight, on the one
hand, and legal contestation, on the other, it is important to conceptualize how ICE’s
administrative privileges are critical to the materialization of executive power more
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broadly. That is, immigration enforcement policy and practice shares much with more
mundane agencies. Understood as “efficient decision-making,” ICE’s administrative
privilege resulted from Congress’ concerns that the appeals process allowed noncitizens
to forestall their deportation for years. The 1996 laws and changes to INS prosecution
policies “streamlined” INS decision-making, allowing the agency to deport noncitizens
more quickly.
Third, prying apart intersecting legal regimes reveals a more complex legal
geography of US noncitizen detention. Immigration detention has often been
characterized as a “space of exception,” a specific spatio-temporal location in which legal
norms are suspended for noncitizens.

I argue, however, that the suspension of

constitutional norms should not be confused with the suspension of “the law.” Rather, as
Basaran (2008) argues, the selective suspension of constitutional norms for noncitizens
constitutes liberal security; in other words, illiberal border zones are required to
constitutes zones of liberal, “normal” law. From this perspective, a critique of detention’s
exceptionalism relies upon a liberal universalism that fails to address the ways in which
the Constitution requires its own suspension in order to work.
Following Agamben, analyses of detention have focused on the relationship
between “the sovereign” and the detained body on opening the depoliticized body up to
sovereign power directly. But how do detention centers come to be?

Who detains

noncitizens, and with what authority? Who makes the decision to open a new detention
center? Who decides who should be detained there? Who manages detainees within the
det,ention center? Do detention center managers have the same kind of authority as
deportation officers or immigration judges? How do we understand the distribution of
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“sovereign power” throughout the administrative complex of immigration enforcement?
Can we understand these bureaucracies as “petty sovereigns,” through whom sovereign
power flows (ala Butler 2003)? By rolling back constitutional protections for noncitizens
in the US, the ‘96 laws and their post-9/11 extensions effectively erased the traditionally
recognized distinction between noncitizens within and outside the US. Documented
permanent residents can find themselves in the same detention center, with little more
grounds for relief than arriving aliens, even if ICE grants them bond and releases them
from detention. As Neuman argues, “Discretionary elements of deportation policy may
serve important purposes, but they also have the potential to reduce the legal status of
lawfully admitted aliens to their insecure constitutional status, and to blur the distinction
between admitted and not admitted aliens” (2005, 655). Whether living in the US, or
arriving for the first time, noncitizens are much like Franz Kafka’s peasant, perpetually
waiting at law’s gate, held there by the promise of lawful entry, materialized in the
presence of the gate itself and the gatekeepers incessant vigil (Kafka 1995).
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CHAPTER 8: DOMESTICATING DETENTION: IMAGINING FAMILY
SPACES IN US IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION
Family unity occupies a privileged and highly politicized role in US immigration
policy. Family sponsorship remains the primary mode of state-sanctioned immigration,
and “family unity” a dominant discourse in immigration politics more broadly (US
Department of Homeland Security 2008; Lubheid 2002). Immigration law’s “family
unity” is defined by heterosexual marriage and consanguinity, privileging biological
relatedness and state-recognized kin ties over extended and “fictive” kin networks. What
counts as a family has, however, expanded and contracted over time, at times excluding
all but the nuclear family and at other times including extended biological relatives
(Inniss 2004). Family sponsorship requires that the sponsor provide proof of financial
support, and Citizenship and Immigration Services, the department charged with
administrating immigration procedures, subjects families to state surveillance and
questioning. So while admissions policies privilege certain forms of “family unity,” for
noncitizen and mixed-status families, immigration status and kinship intersect in complex
and unpredictable ways. For example, noncitizen’s homes have also become sites of ICE
intervention. Between 2003 and 2009, when “home raids” became a common practice of
ICE’s Fugitive Operations Team (FOT). Migrant “illegality” transects “family unity” in
complex, problematic, and unpredictable ways.
Detention policies have targeted parents traveling with minor children in new
ways, as well. In 2005, US Department of Homeland Security expanded its Expedited

171

Removal Program from ports of entry to all borderlands within 100 miles of the border,
and to migrants arrested within 14 days of arrival. “Sympathetic humanitarian cases”
previously released from detention (such as families with children, the elderly, seriously
ill, and seeking asylum) became subject to mandatory detention, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement’s detention system expanded to accommodate new populations.
For ICE, the need for family detention arose from a contradiction between mandatory
detention and humanitarian release categories, and between parents’ and children’s legal
protections during the immigration enforcement process (as discussed in Chapter 5). For
ICE, automatically releasing families represented a “procedural loophole,” one that
presumably allowed “illegal” workers or smugglers to enter the country. ICE also sought
to “deter future illegal family immigration,” a more diffuse policy goal (US Department
of Homeland Security 2006a). The specter of “rented children” exploits an “American
value” at the heart of both social and immigration policy-making. Framed in a period of
immigration and border enforcement still defined by the attacks of September 11,
sympathetic and vulnerable groups, like children, could provide a means for “the enemy
in our midst.” Refracted through a highly securitized lens, privileging “the family”
became understood as a vulnerability in US border and immigration enforcement.
Since the 1980s, the figure of the “bogus asylum-seeker” framed increasingly
penal approaches to asylum processing in the US, Canada, and elsewhere (Mountz 2010;
Garcia 2006). Large simultaneous influxes of Cuban and Haitian refugees in the early
1980’s, and Central American refugees in throughout the 1980s and 1990s heightened
fears that the American way of life was being exploited for economic migration purposes.
While these arguments presupposed a problematic distinction between economic and
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political strife in civil war-torn countries, these discourses worked to reproduce a
distinction between economic choice and political necessity. The underlying assumption
of human rights law is that political persecution threatened the right to life in ways that
shrinking economic opportunities did not. Framing non-political refuge as choice also
worked to criminalize migrants, as their “choice” to cross the Mexico-US boundary and
break US immigration law became the dominant logic of enforcement-led immigration
policy in the 1990s.

Penalizing migrants responsible for their migration choices

resonated with broader discourses heaping harsher punishments on drug offenders,
removing voting rights from felons, and withdrawing welfare benefits from single parents
who did not marry or become economically productive. Across the field of
neoconservative and neoliberal reform, “vulnerable populations” have become
understood as threats to “the population and the way of life,” as vectors of illegality, risk,
racial difference, and cultural dissolution.
A similar logic justified family detention, but in this case, it was the fraudulent
biological relationship between parent and child that immigration officials find
threatening, signaling a deeper interest in immigrant reproduction. Notions of care,
biological descent, and conjugal relationships permeate ICE detention and deportation
policy-making. These relationships temper enforcement-led immigration policy at times,
but, in the home raids described above, domestic cohabitation can serve as a medium of
apprehension. Suspicious in terms of both conjugal and descent relations (in
anthropological kinship terms), “the immigrant family” becomes an object of state
interrogation, surveillance, and intervention. The securitization of “vulnerable
populations” reveals tensions between logics of territorial control and population
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management. In this chapter, I show how these tensions played out in ICE’s proposed
family detention center design.
Scholars examining the relationship between sexual citizenship and immigration
law, in the US and abroad, focus on the ways in which marriage requirements for family
reunification (Simmons 2008), the exclusion of recognized same sex relationships
(Elman 2000), and the gendered differentiation of citizenship transfer through marriage
(de Hart 2006) privilege not only heteronormative but patriarchal family forms to gain
access to legal immigration status, social service benefits, and family unity (see also
Binnie 1997; Stychin 2001). Fears of marriage fraud have, however, permeated
immigration discourses for decades (Jones 1997), so that the privileging of heterosexual
nuclear families has, in the context of neoconservative pro-marriage social policymaking, become recast as a vulnerability in the immigration system. Similarly, recent
preoccupation with “terrorist” and “anchor” babies reveal significant political
ambivalence about who is having children, and what kinds of citizens those children will
become (e.g., Federation for American Immigration Reform 2010).
Much of the sexual citizenship literature begins and ends analysis at the heterohomo boundary, failing to take seriously the intersectionality of race, gender, class, and
sexuality at the border. As Jasbir Puar (2007) notes, however, the expansion of gay rights
through rights to private space (e.g. Lawrence v. Texas 2003) has unfolded alongside
increased state intervention for poor, noncitizen, and non-white families. Welfare reform
laws excluded all documented and undocumented noncitizen families, and placed steeper
responsibilities on citizen families, while immigration law linked criminal and
immigration policing in new ways (Fischer 1993; Gedalof 2007; Leiter et al. 2006;
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McLaren and Dyck 2004). As Amy Brandzel (2005) argues,
Gays, homosexuals, and queers are certainly not the only ‘deviants,’ and gay
rights do not take place in a vacuum; they are inextricably linked to negotiations
over ‘terrorism,’ immigration, welfare reform, and abortion rights, to name a few.
A properly angled queer lens, then, analyzes how heteronormativity functions
through the production and taxonomy of racialized, gendered, sexualized, and
classed behaviors and practices (Brandzel 2005, 172).
US citizenship is defined, therefore, by myriad overlapping exclusions, and these
registers of exclusion are deployed in different ways across space and time (Lubheid
2002; Somerville 2005).
This chapter asks: what, then, is the state’s abiding interest in immigrant families
and children? That material form does that interest take? And what are the relations of
power undergirding family custody, within and without detention centers? This chapter
explores how the noncitizen border-crossing family became a site of intervention, state
control, and public contest over the meaning of custody, or the authority to feed, care for,
and supervise noncitizen bodies.

Here I analyze how ICE's custody of families, and

parents' custody of children came into conflict with each other, and how these conflicts
revolved around competing norms security, safety, and autonomy. In particular, I trace
how the bi-polar “home-like” and “prison-like” formulation was put to work and explore
how these struggles over the spatial ordering of “residential facilities” unfolded through
orderings of parent-child relationships, private space, state-family relationships, visibility,
and mobility. I argue that the regulation of familial relatedness—in and through the
spaces of state custody—is critical to the reproduction of certain forms of state power and
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citizenship.
To do this, I draw on my analysis of semi-structured interviews, participant
observation, and documents collected from governmental and non-governmental sources.
While other chapters focused on specific aspects of family detention policy, this chapter
traces a textual, but highly politicized conversation between ICE employees, advocates,
and attorneys. This exchange unfolded in the press and in closed NGO Working Group
meetings between ICE and a select group of Washington-DC-based advocacy
organizations. The Bush Administration set itself apart from previous administrations in
its refusal to engage with immigrants, advocates, and service providers, and this
antagonism bled into mundane interactions between pro bono attorneys and ICE officers.
High profile reports, such as the Women’s Refugee Commission’s Locking up Family
Values and the Hutto lawsuit, made Berks and Hutto staff wary or inimical to interviews,
inquiries, or visits (Women’s Commission 2007). In the rare instances where advocates
were granted visits, advocates remarked ICE employees were openly hostile to their
presence. Throughout this research, I worked with Texas and DC-based organizations on
research and media responses to the lawsuit, the Request for Proposals (RFP), family
residential standards (FRS), and detention reforms. I provided an analysis of the RFP to
the Women’s Refugee Commission, and organized academic “experts” to provide
comments to ICE on the FRS. I was, therefore, directly involved in producing some of
the categories analyzed here, and had occasion to observe and participate in the
conversation’s unfolding.

My participation focused, however, on the pragmatic

campaign demands, whose timelines and conceptual demands depart from the analytic
work presented in this chapter. This analysis is, therefore, an effort to interrogate the
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received categories of this conflictual terrain, and to problematize state’s under-examined
relationship to reproduction, kinship, and domesticity.

DETAINING FAMILIES
The vast majority of detained families (and now women, at Hutto), pass Credible
Fear Interviews (CFIs) and eventually gain asylum. As such, these families are not
“illegal immigrants,” if we accept, for a moment, immigration law’s highly constrained
terms. Not only are families usually considered “low flight risk,” and therefore ideal
candidates for bond or parole, but families usually fall into a number of “vulnerable
populations” categories. Deportation Officers and Immigration Judges are supposed to
consider these factors and, in the past, have released families based on these criteria. ICE,
and the INS before it, retain “prosecutorial discretion” over immigration cases. That is,
immigration legislation affords the executive branch the discretion to decide which cases
warrant prosecution and which do not. In the past, prosecutorial discretion memos (the
medium through which INS/ICE legal guidance is communicated) have stipulated that
“vulnerable populations” deserve to be reviewed for release from detention and for a
broader range of extenuating circumstances, such as mothers nursing:
Field agents and officers are not only authorized by law to exercise discretion
within the authority of the agency, but are expected to do so in a judicious manner
at all stages of the enforcement process. For example, in situations where officers
are considering taking a nursing mother into custody, the senior ICE field
managers should consider:
• Absent any statutory detention requirement or concerns such as national
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security, threats to public safety or other investigative interests, the nursing
mother should be released on an Order of Recognizance or Order of Supervision
and the Alternatives to Detention programs should be considered as an additional
enforcement tool… (Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion Memo, Julie Meyers,
Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, November 7,
2007)
These memos prioritize the exclusion of some noncitizen groups, such as “criminal
aliens,” over those who pose relatively less threat to public safety or public coffers.
Families migrating with minor children have traditionally demonstrate “sympathetic
humanitarian factors:”
Deferred action should be considered when the situation involves symphathetic
humanitarian circumstances that rise to such as level as to cry for an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. Examples of this include where the alien has a citizen
child with a serious medical condition or disability or where the alien or a close
family member is undergoing treatment for a potentially life threatening disease.
(Emphasis added’ Prosecutorial Discretion Memo, William J. Howard, Principle
Legal Advisor, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, October 24, 2005.)
The same memo advises less aggressive prosecution for family members of Armed
Forces personnel, confidential informants, and those involved in smuggling
investigations. In other words, familial care and service to the state are the most
significant circumstances warranting relief from detention and exclusion proceedings.
These memos offer guidance only, however, and do not stipulate the discretionary actions

178

of individual ICE attorneys, and do not confer noncitizens in custody rights; the right to
release remains solely with ICE.
In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union, University of Texas Immigration
Law Clinic and a private law firm sued the Department of Homeland Security for holding
families in “prison-like” conditions at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor,
Texas. As described in Chapter 6, the plaintiffs charged that Hutto violated the conditions
of Flores v. Meese, a 1997 lawsuit that creates certain norms for children’s treatment in
INS custody. Flores requires ICE to hold children in “the least restrictive” conditions
available while options for release are evaluated. Where release was impossible, Flores
required that INS/ICE custody gain a state license for a family shelter. Hutto violated
Flores on this and nearly every other count, and the case came to revolve around Hutto’s
architectural design, disciplinary control, and the psychological effects of this spatial
ordering on children. The plaintiffs’ case turned on proving that Hutto, a former mediumsecurity prison, was a restrictive facility. While the plaintiffs sought to invalidate the
legal grounds for family detention through the cases of 26 child plaintiffs, the judge ruled
the psychological harm caused by Hutto could not be separated from the psychological
trauma of migration. The plaintiffs were largely asylum-seekers fleeing political
persecution and domestic abuse.

The ruling effectively exploited their status as

“vulnerable populations” and victims of abuse to solidify the legal grounds for family
detention.

PRISON VS. HOME
The Hutto lawsuit dominated media attention, and Flores’ categories of “least
179

restrictive” facilities and “presumption of release” for children influenced local activism
and policy advocacy around family detention. Within this milieu, critiques of Berks’ and
Hutto’s physical conditions settled along a polarized axis of “prison-like” and “homelike” environments, articulated through children’s freedom, parental authority, and
autonomy. Throughout the lawsuit and the subsequent years of public contest of family
detention at Hutto, critics contrasted the facility’s “look and feel,” disciplinary ordering,
and carceral architectural design with normatively imagined, but rarely described “homelike facilities” (ACLU 2007a,b,c; Women’s Commission 2007). Advocates primarily
criticized Hutto for what it lacked, and “home-like facilities” served as an undescribed,
abstractly desirable negative space that was irreconcilable with prison spaces in its very
essence. It was inconceivable to most to imagine a possibility for home-like custody
overlain with carceral spatial ordering. When the lawsuit was successful, and ICE, CCA,
and Williamson County made changes at Hutto, the facility’s built purpose served as
evidence of its lasting inadequacy. Thus, critiques of Hutto rested on a spatial
essentialism that marked clear poles between home-like and prison-like spaces.
The image of “children in prison,” in particular, formed a rather spectacular
backdrop against which a range of arguments unfolded. For example, Free the Children
organizers stated: “ICE, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrests innocent
children and their mothers and turns them over to a private ‘for profit’ prison which, as of
today, receives some $20,000 per child...per month...to keep an innocent child in an 8' x
12' prison cell” (Moses 2007).

Yet, focusing on children created certain frictions

between advocacy and activist organizations. The Texans United for Families coalition,
for example, was disturbed by the ways in which “children in prison” demarcated an age-
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based exceptionalism, and implied that adult immigrants were, first, criminals and,
second, justifiably detained. Prison’s sharp edges, automatically closing doors, barbed
wire, and uniformed guards clashed with normative imaginings of safe childhood spaces,
even while these imagined “home-like” spaces remained implicit.
Figure 8.1: America's Family Prison (Film) Blog Banner

(Source: Gossage and Keber 2007; tdonhutto.blogspot.com)
In addition, some worried that focusing on “children in prison” weakened
arguments against family detention policy as a whole, and the Berks facility in particular
(Porter et al., n.d.). Because Berks is a former nursing home, not a former prison,
criticisms of family detention became discursively attached to Hutto’s prison-like
architecture. For example, in its 2007 report, the Women’s Refugee Commission’s
repeatedly asserted that “both facilities place families in settings modeled on the criminal
justice system” (Women’s Commission 2007, 2). In media coverage of the Bunikyte et al
v. Chertoff et al, however, Berks’ compliance with Flores and its nonpenal architectural
design provided a seemingly innocuous counterexample to Hutto. Even while advocates
fought to position release as the preferable alternative, Berks’ less penal exterior and
residential purpose seemed to set it aside as a suitable alternative.
For others, ICE’s intervention in family life undermined the “architecture of the
family unit,” particularly parents’ ability to comfort and protect their children.
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Participant: I think one of the things to keep in mind also about the facility also is
that parents are deprived of their parental authority. I think that must be, you
know I'm not a psychologist, but I think that's probably distressing for a child.
Somebody else is making the decisions at Hutto. And it's not the parents.
LM: Did a lot of the parents express that that was a problem?
Participant: Yeah, they did. Yeah, and the inability to -to protect, to be able to
remedy the situation, where children turn to their parents as their protectors and as
the people that are going to protect them, and they [the parents] weren't able to do
that. (Interview April 2008)
Parental authority was, in addition, linked to families’ constrained mobility within and
beyond Berks and Hutto, as parents at Berks still relied upon facility staff for the
provision of basic care.

At Hutto, one mother resorted to hiding blankets in her

pillowcases, and lying to CCA employees about not having enough, to keep her children
warm at night (Gossage and Keber 2007). Critiques of children’s (lack of) freedom and
parental (lack of) authority crystallized, therefore, around the problem of autonomy.
Constrained mobility within Berks and Hutto, families’ inability to leave the detention
center, and their inability to choose how, when, and in what way to carry out daily
activities epitomized the “unhomeliness” of family detention facilities:
It's still, you know, it is a former prison. You know, because the children aren't
free to walk out the door. They're not going to public school. Their parents are
not making decisions daily about how they want to spend their day, what time
they want to eat. I mean so, it goes back to the fact that it is still detention. It is
still detention of children. (Interview April 2008)
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Even while Hutto’s early conditions represented the starkest physical constraints, as
headcounts confined families to their cells for up to 11 hours per day. Not only was
personal mobility constrained, at first to living areas, and later to residential areas, but
detained families did not have a choices about how they organized their day.
ICE, for its part, appeared to draw its detention policies from adult detention and
corrections fields. In 2008, the agency released “Family Residential Standards,” (FRS
hereafter) as required in the Hutto Settlement. Consisting of 26 standards, each section
cites an intertextual field of state and federal laws, ICE policies, and supporting
documents. The majority of the standards cite American Corrections Association (ACA)
standards for jails and prisons and detention standards for adult facilities. Stipulating
protocols for contraband, physical constraints, disciplinary procedures, escape attempts,
security, and other components associated with “prison-like” facilities, the FRS indicated,
to advocates, that despite the Hutto Settlement, ICE intended to retain a carceral model
for family detention:
The standards that ICE has drafted are fundamentally misguided and
inappropriate, as they are an adaptation of standards from the American
Correctional Association (ACA) for the incarceration of adult criminals. The
parents and small children ICE holds in immigration detention are in civil
administrative detention related to their immigration proceedings. As ICE has
previously recognized, they are not criminals serving penal sentences. (Emphasis
added, ICE NGO Working Group, Letter to ICE Re: NGO Response to Family
Residential Standards 2009)
The reliance on correctional expertise rather than more appropriate experts, such as child
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advocates, social workers, psychologists, and counselors was a key problem for
advocates. Seeking to offer a new paradigm of custody, advocates critiqued ICE’s penal
disciplinary regime through norms of child welfare:
Even if it's good that the families have better conditions, it's still a prison-like
environment which is inappropriate for a family. Congress has told ICE to
implement more humane, less-costly alternatives to family detention. ICE should
be implementing home-like alternatives to detention that allow children and their
families to lead normal lives, [we’re] not talking about more Hutto-like detention
centers. (Emphasis added; Fieldnotes 4-23-08)

…[Th]e only acceptable place for a family is in a non-penal, homelike residence
that is bound by standards based upon child-welfare/family service principles, not
guided by standards appropriate only for adult prisons. The standards developed
by ICE should reflect this strong preference against detention of families. For
those few families who may not be immediately released and who may remain in
ICE custody for any period of time, we encourage ICE to rely upon policies,
procedures and guidance for shelters, hospitals, children’s homes or other civil
facilities. While these sources will need to be modified to address the needs of
families in ICE custody, they would provide a more appropriate framework to
adequately address the physical, social, emotional, educational and recreational
needs of accompanied children and their parents.

Using these policies as a

reference, families should be housed in residential shelters that replicate homelike
environments. (Emphasis added; ICE NGO Working Group, Letter to ICE Re:
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NGO Response to Family Residential Standards 2009)
“Normal family life” would serve to, advocates presumed, decriminalize detained
families, and to flesh out the “home-like spaces” ICE failed to produce.

Basing

arguments implicitly on children’s inherent un-criminality, these strategies emphasized
the family as a site of care, child development, and reproduction. They work from both
family and child policy, which are developed at subnational, state jurisdictions, and
children’s human rights frameworks, which require signatories to offer a “thicker” set of
institutional entitlements than offered in (adult-focused) human rights frameworks. The
struggle over family detention reveals a deeper tension, therefore, between disciplinary
regimes of incarceration and social welfare. Here, children’s welfare, a key site for the
normalization of child behavior, became a vehicle through which to challenge “the
severity revolution” (Miller 2002-2003) in the corrections and immigration enforcement
fields.
While this strategy appealed (begrudgingly and a bit cynically) to neoconservative
“family values,” the majority of Hutto’s families were single, asylum-seeking mothers.
As the judge’s comments in the Hutto lawsuit demonstrate, this appeal is far more fragile
than advocates may have expected, as Hutto’s families were poor, of color, and fleeing
domestic and geopolitical violence. Seeking to appeal to a heteronormative citizenship
for strategic purposes, these discourses also recall previous exclusions of women “likely
to become a public charge,” namely unmarried and pregnant women (Lubheid 2002). So
while some activists sought to “free the children,” this freedom was couched within
hegemonic social policy terms that relied on norms of child behavior and development. In
the current moment, as feminist scholars have pointed out, US family policies are more
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likely to justify state intervention in poor and immigrant households than to protect them
from state intervention.
As ICE and CCA brought Hutto’s physical plant into compliance with the
settlement, focus shifted from critiques of detention management, that implied that family
detention was excusable under certain conditions, to a broader critique of family
detention policy and its connections with the private prison industry, the criminalization
of immigration, and human rights discourses. Anti-family detention activism and
advocacy was, therefore, hardly a settled discursive field, as individuals and groups
reacted to new developments in immigration enforcement, pursued a diversity of issues
via anti-detention organizing, and worked with new national and international groups.
These discourses settled around a constellation of nodal points: children’s innocence and
dependence, prison-like spaces, home-like spaces, and familial exceptionality. How, then,
were “home-like facilities” imagined? How were the embodied and spatial relationships
between parents, children, and ICE ordered and enclosed in opposition to detention
centers?

IMAGINING “HOME-LIKE SPACES”
Early anti-family detention advocacy promoted the use of “alternatives to
detention” over detention in carceral facilities, as these typically allowed noncitizen
adults to stay at home. ICE ran (and has since expanded) two versions of its Intensive
Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP): phone or in-person reporting and electronic
monitoring with an ankle bracelet. The former required noncitizens to call ICE at regular
intervals and/or to be home to receive calls or visits from ICE officers. Electronic
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monitoring required noncitizens to wear a thick plastic band (often called an “ankle
bracelet” by newsmedia) that recorded their movements outside of a certain range of their
homes. If permitted to work, the band notified ICE of curfew infractions. The ankle
bands required daily charging, and were heavy enough to cut into a person’s ankle,
causing distress for pregnant women in particular. Between curfews and charging the
device, participants in both ISAP programs complained that these alternatives restricted
their everyday mobility, extending detention rather than offering a serious alternative to
it. According to critical participants, ISAP’s mobility restrictions transformed the home
into a detention center, opened their families to disruptions and surveillance from ICE,
stigmatized noncitizens in their neighborhoods, and isolated them from others in the same
situation (Fieldnotes September 2008). ISAP came to be seen as an alternative form of
detention, as its spatial control mimicked detention and moved its panopticism to the
private sphere. In addition, advocates began to notice that these “alternatives” were not
used to decrease the detained population, but were used to surveil asylum-seekers, for
example, who would previously have avoided any ICE supervision. Thus, some
advocates accused ICE of using these strategies of spatial control as an extension of the
detention system and a way of bringing more, not fewer, noncitizens into ICE custody.
Still others accepted ISAP as an improvement on detention, but sought to employ it only
for those subject to mandatory detention, rather than detaining new groups.
As anti-detention advocates rejected existing “alternatives to detention,” ICE
began to demand that advocates provide concrete models for their vision of alternatives
(Fieldnotes May 6, 2009). In addition, the change in administration brought new staff to
ICE, including those more sympathetic to critiques of detention. Two models dominated
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advocates’ proposals: a service provision model and a shelter model. In 1996, the INS
contracted with the VERA Institute of Justice to pilot an “Appearance Assistance
Program,” (AAP) which provided low-flight-risk noncitizens in INS custody with access
to legal counsel, social workers, and other services (VERA Institute of Justice 1998).
The pilot program’s goal was to increase immigration court appearances for noncitizens
released from detention and to test the efficacy of different levels of supervision.
Program officers screened noncitizens for “strong community ties,” a permanent address,
and threat to public safety. Under “intensive supervision,” AAP participants reported
regularly to AAP field officers and worked with “community sponsors” who
communicated with both the AAP field officer and the noncitizen in question. Under
“regular supervision,” noncitizens receive an orientation, reminders about court dates,
and access to resources to fight their case. In this model, AAP officers monitored and
supervised noncitizens in addition to providing legal services, assisting with court
appearances, and resolving case issues with INS. Where noncitizens failed to appear for a
court date or notify VERA case workers of an address change, AAP officers reported
their non-compliance to INS. Here, a contracted NGO both supports and mediates
noncitizens’ relationship to immigration enforcement agencies.
The shelter model focuses on housing provision, and builds on experiences of
shelters housing undocumented noncitizens.

Where the AAP required “strong

community ties,” lack of housing or contacts is common among newly arriving migrants
and prevents them from being released where they would otherwise be considered low
risk. A few shelters serving immigrant populations around the US work informally with
ICE to provide housing to those without family or friend networks to sponsor them. The
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shelters usually have relationships with local social service agencies, pro bono attorneys,
and work placement services. In the case of Casa Marianella, held up as an exemplar by
Austin-based advocates, the shelter itself provided housing alone, and provided phone
numbers for local services. The shelter organizers repeatedly stated, “we are not a
detention center” (Interview 2008). Besides a curfew, the shelter does not restrict
residents’ comings and goings or supervise them beyond the facilities’ ground rules. In
this model, the shelter serves as a verifiable address for detainees seeking release, and
connects noncitizens to network of organizations. But shelter organizers were adamant
about remaining neutral with respect to their residents’ immigration cases and citizenship
status. Those released to shelters like Casa Marianella gained freedom of movement and
autonomy over daily decision-making, but the shelter itself refused to mediate
noncitizens’ relationship to ICE.
In either case, advocates sought to buffer noncitizens’ relationships to ICE with
non-governmental and social service organizations, to mediate what was almost
universally understood to be violent state power. Differences emerged, however, over
the extent to which NGOs should do ICE’s work for them (including the development of
alternatives). Shelters worried that cooperating with ICE beyond their current role would
rupture trust relationships with residents. NGOs worried that taking ICE funding for
alternative custody programs would tarnish their reputations and prevent them from
doing other work with immigrant communities.

And for those that questioned the

validity of national borders or the right of the federal government to police and detain
noncitizens, these programs only served to make noncitizens more open to ICE
intervention. These differences over ICE-NGO-noncitizen relationships reveal diverse
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on-the-ground theories of state power and the state’s proper relationship to noncitizens’
bodies and homes amongst advocates.

RE-DESIGNING FAMILY DETENTION
As advocates offered a range of models and alternative institutions for family
custody, ICE continued to hone its family detention policies. The 2007 Hutto Settlement
and the cost of refitting Hutto’s physical infrastructure and institutional culture revealed
shortcomings in the agency’s strategy. Internal memos listed Hutto’s non-compliance
with Flores before and during the lawsuit (contradicting ICE’s own legal strategy), and
the federal magistrate’s final reports revealed resistance to the paradigm shift from
medium-security prison to family residential center. In the spring of 2008, ICE issued a
Request for Proposals (RFP) from the private sector for three new family detention
centers. ICE and other state agencies issue RFPs for a wide range of governmental tasks,
and any federal procurements must be open to a competitive bidding process. RFPs are
published on the Federal Business Opportunities website (www.fbo.gov) Contracts
between federal and county entities are not, however, subject to this process, allowing
counties to serve as intermediaries for private companies seeking federal contracts.
ICE’s contract at Hutto is, for example, between ICE and Williamson County, Texas, and
the county subcontracts to the Corrections Corporation of America. RFPs are required,
however, for federal-private relationships, and are the primary mechanism by which
specific federal functions are privatized. They are also one medium through which
advocates, activists, and journalists discover detention plans, as ICE does not publicize
detention expansions until after procurement awards are made. RFPs are not open to
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public comment or input, and because proposals are considered intellectual property,
proposals are not open to public scrutiny.

The privatization of detention unfolds,

therefore, through legal instruments meant to protect private property and profitability,
but not public access to information.
While the RFP signaled an expansion of the family detention program, I examine
it here because it reveals much about ICE’s response to critiques of Hutto’s “prison-like”
spatial order and its obligations under Flores and the Hutto settlements. In particular, the
RFP included a Family Residential Facility Design Standards manual (FRFDS) with
visual schematics of an urban single-building unit and a rural campus, illustrations of the
movement of detainees, visitors, and staff into, within, and out of the facility, and the
spatial organization of different various detention center tasks. (The development of the
FRFDS was, itself, subcontracted to a private firm that exists exclusively on federal
corrections-related contracts.) The RFP also included a “Monitoring Tool” by which the
contractors would be audited for compliance with the Family Residential Standards
described above, and ICE responses to contractor questions. Altogether the RFP’s
component parts reveal how ICE re-imagined family detention spaces to address the
Hutto settlement, increased attention to family detention policy, and activists’ critiques.
Here I focus on the FRFDS, in particular, as it illustrates the ways in which ICE
conceived of a spatial order that balanced security, surveillance, and population
management.

Figure 8.2: Rural Campus Master Plan
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design
Standards 2008b)

Figure 8.3: Single-building (Urban) Campus Master Plan
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design
Standards 2008b)

Figure 8.4: Building-As-A-Whole Relationship Diagram
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design
Standards 2008b)
The bulk of the FRFDS is spent outlining the spatial arrangement of operational
components: Office, Living, Court, Service, and Support. The spatial arrangement of the
component zones reflects, for ICE, the relations of authority within the facility, as well.
ICE staff, who oversee conditions, health and operational staff, and government agency
personnel, are located towards the front of the facility. Visitors are confined to the public
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lobby and monitored visitation room, which is located near the front door. Moving
downward and rightward on the Organizational Chart (Figure 8.5), one also moves
farther back into the facility, as detainee services and upkeep are located towards the
back of the facility. Each of these Operational Components have slightly different
security requirements, depending on the extent to which detainees interact with external
visitors, staff, dangerous materials, or tools. Central Control sits between the public
lobby, for example, and the living unit, while the Support Zone (maintenance, deliveries,
and supplies) is closed off to detainees altogether, but is functionally connected to the
kitchen. For both the rural and the urban plans, the FRFDS stipulates secured (fenced
and patroled) premises, but within this secured boundary, semi-secure and non-secure
zones are organized to enable families’ mobility within living areas, to facilitate
surveillance and “positive behavior management,” and to mediate the relationship
between detained family populations and the non-detained population. As ICE grants
detainees greater freedom of, high staff-detainee ratios maintain behavior management,
and divide families into “manageable groups of no more than 50 residences per living
unit and 25 residents per pod.” Zones of relative mobility are nested within zones of
semi-security and security, while preserving the contractor’s (theoretical) surveillance
and monitoring of the detained population.
The FRFDS includes a dedicated section on design criteria, requiring that “the
design should consider the use of architectural roofing to give a residential family
housing appearance, either through sloped roofing, roofing break lines and facility

Figure 8.5: Generic Organizational Chart for Family Residential Facility
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(Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Residential Facility Design
Standards 2008)
exterior design” and that “roof design shall be conducive to a residential feeling” (US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2008b, 4.2, 4.3). Generally, the facility “should
take on a more residential appearance, less institutional or correctional…to give a
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residential family housing appearance,” and the public.lobby should display “a noninstitutional appearance and welcoming/non-intimidating interior environment” (ibid.,
4.3). The rest of the design requirements concerned detainees’ movement through the
intake process, and the division of the space into manageable units, the provision of
living areas, and the regulation of access to entrances. For ICE, then, “security” is
defined by detainees’ personal mobility, spatial segregation, and relationship to authority.
Secure, semi-secure, and non-secure spaces are defined by the contractor’s direct control
over detainees’ bodies, activities, movement, and location. “Residential feel” becomes a
matter of roofing angle, a performance to the public with no direct relevance to detainees’
experiences of detention.
While families move freely within their living areas, these zones of relative
mobility are sequestered from the facility’s entrances, so that family residential facilities’
surveillance and mobility constraints are designed into the facility rather than visually
and aesthetically salient. In the Campus Plan, for example, “structures can be dispersed
on the site to allow for visual observation as well as to provide open green spaces” (US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2008b, 4.2). The “residential aesthetic” became a
means of “designing in” surveillance, balancing security with the appearance of free
movement within the facility. ICE’s concern for security is particularly salient in the
“Monitoring Tool” distributed to potential contractors. The FRFDS’ authors combined
spatial partitioning and categorization, aesthetic design, and surveillance as nested zones
of security clearance. The plans allocate Visitors, contracted staff, ICE, and residents
task-specific spaces, so that detainees may circulate with little direct intervention in the
innermost spaces. Enclosing detainee-denominated space is a buffer zone government
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officials with different levels of security clearance. The building is, in turn, enclosed by a
patrolled perimeter and a fence. The Family Residential Standards contain—and the RFP
required—specific escape scenario plans (which were withheld from my FOIA requests
“for security purposes”).
As a response to criticism and legal challenges launched at Hutto, the RFP
tempers the carceral model initially used at Hutto by “designing in” surveillance,
mobility management, and “residential feel.” The problem of family detention revolved
around, for ICE, security, surveillance, and enclosure, where advocates had worked for
remote supervision—at most—and a buffer zone of non-governmental representatives, at
best. The privacy, autonomy, and time management that defined families’ and advocates
conceptions of “child” and “family-appropriate” spaces were mediated, in ICE’s version,
by a “hard perimeter” of fencing, and highly surveilled pathway into and out of the
detention center. Defined as accompanied minor children, families are alternatively
understood as limits to federal intervention or special populations requiring dedicated
facilities.

CONCLUSION
For ICE and the range of organizations criticizing family detention practices, the
protection of spatial enclosure defined the different imaginings of family custody. Few
advocates or activists were willing to proscribe what a “proper” or “ideal” family looked
like, but were more interested in securing spaces in which families retained autonomy
over daily social reproduction. For example, advocates sought to ensure that families
resided in places where they felt safe and secure, and this required privacy from
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surveillance and monitoring built into prison architecture. ICE, on the other hand, sought
to nest spaces of open mobility within rigid authoritative hierarchies, which were
spatialized in the fencing of the facility, the control of visitation, and the arrangement of
administrative offices.
revolved

around

That is, the struggle over prison-like and home-like spaces

competing

axes

of

autonomy/parental

authority/privacy and

security/surveillance/residential aesthetic. The spatial ordering of Berks and Hutto were
critical to the problematization of family detention as a policy, focusing ICE’s attention
on the aesthetic presentation of “family residential facilities” and the balance of mobility
and security within them.
“The immigrant family” is a site of struggle over mobility rights, human rights,
inclusion and exclusion, belonging, and citizenship.

While the procreative and

consanguinity of US immigration policy produces clear lines of demarcation between
“deserving”

heterosexual

immigrants

and

“undeserving”

sexual

deviants,

the

heteronormativity of US immigration policy operates within a more complex matrix of
exclusion than the hetero/homo dichotomy can capture. Efforts to protect “vulnerable
populations,” like families, often rely upon and reproduce the heteronormativity of
immigration law in ways that undercut more fundamental critiques of American
citizenship and the exclusions on which it has relied. In the same way that queer theorists
call upon same-sex marriage proponents to remain conscious of the boundaries required
for such claims, immigrant rights advocacy need to consider how our discourses redeploy
mechanisms of exclusion. A more productive analytic frame would consider how states
continue to “govern through the family” (Donzelot 1979). In the case of immigration
enforcement, consanguinity, marriage, care, and reproduction become sites of anxiety,
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intervention, and securitization. As debates over family detention demonstrate, ICE
mediates territorial presence and political membership in and through its interventions in
home, private, and family spaces. Kinship and sexual regimes are, therefore, important
modalities through which ICE performs its control over borders, territoriality and
citizenship. Debates over family detention spaces are, therefore, proxy struggles over the
futurity of the state, and the conditions of possibility for making life.

Copyright © Lauren Leigh Martin 2011
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In researching and writing this dissertation, my objectives have been (1) to
delineate and critique the textual, legal, and embodied practices that produce “immigrant
families” as detainable subjects; (2) to analyze the discursive suturing of children’s and
family law to immigration detention to the private corrections industry to border security;
(3) to conceptualize detention in relation to a broader topography of border enforcement;
and (4) to critical engage with contemporary anti-detention and pro-immigrant
movements in the US. In this final chapter, I draw together the empirical contributions,
analysis, and theories explored in the chapters above, and distill the points of intersection
between them. As imprisonment becomes the social policy of choice over education,
rehabilitation, or welfare, and as detention becomes to domestic and wars on
terror/drugs/crime, these new institutional alignments are reconfiguring the relationship
between law, space, and life.

THE CURRENT STATE OF FAMILY DETENTION POLICY
As of this writing, ICE detains noncitizen families at the Berks County Family
Shelter Care Center in Pennsylvania. Hutto’s last families were released in September
2009. Even before Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement John
Morton issued new prosecutorial guidance that deprioritized detention for families and
caretakers, ICE instructed its field officers to classify apprehended families as “illegal”
instead of “arriving families.” This categorizational change allowed ICE and arriving
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families to circumvent IIRIRA’s mandatory detention clause, in the absence of legislative
changes to admission and enforcement policies. Barack Obama’s presidential campaign
promised immigration reform, and 2009 and 2010 saw immigration rights rallies, lobby
days, and a massive “Reform Immigration for American” campaign. The “comprehensive
immigration reform” agenda traded away, however, border militarization for a “path to
citizenship,” a move that angered pro-immigrant coalitions in border states, who would
receive the bulk of these “border security” efforts. To demonstrate its commitment to
enforcement, ICE deported over 400,000 noncitizens in FY2010, outstripping the Bush
administration’s immigration crackdowns (Vedantam 2010). The Secure Communities
program, which allows local law enforcement to check immigration status of anyone
coming through its jails, now operates in every Texas county and will be in place in every
US jurisdiction by 2013 (Associated Press 2010). In addition, the Democratic Congress
passed the $600 million 2010 Southern Border Security Act in August of 2010 in the
hopes of bartering with Republicans for a comprehensive overhaul. In December 2010,
however, Republicans successfully prevented a vote on the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, widely considered the most palatable of
immigration reform initiatives. The current “post-entry landscape” is, unfortunately, one
of expanding illegalization, detainability, and deportability for noncitizens.
In the absence of Congressional action on immigration reform, family detention
policy continues to evolve under ICE’s discretionary authority. Berks continues to
undergo regular audits from the state of Pennsylvania and ICE’s subcontracted overseers,
and its contract stipulates compliance with the Family Residential Standards. Family
detention is no longer central to ICE discussions of immigration enforcement and border
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security, as the Obama Administration’s emphasis has shifted towards “civil detention.”
Hutto continues to hold around 500 noncitizen women, and current members of the Hutto
Visitation Program in Austin, Texas, report detention stays of 1 month to years. In a
number of cases, women have refused to sign their own deportation orders, leaving them
caught between “Final Order of Removal” and repatriation without opportunities to
appeal for release. Because detained noncitizens’ civil rights are limited, possibilities for
contesting detention and immigration policies remain limited. This has not stopped,
however, multiple hunger strikes, “noncompliance,” or civil disobedience outside
detention centers (Bernstein 2010; del Bosque 2010). Rehabilitated from its “prison-like”
past, Hutto now stands as ICE’s “model civil detention facility.” The In re: Hutto
Detention Center Settlement served, in the end, to improve “conditions of confinement”
for “low security” noncitizens. In short, family detention “civilized” the prison, reformed
its penal character, and rehabilitated its spatial ordering. Family detention policy follows
therefore the contours of a broader terrain of sovereign and governmental power, as the
powers to categorize and banish remain intimately bound.

THE ETHICS OF PRECARITY
Within both real and imagined family detention centers, at the territorial boundary
and within it, ICE polices the juridical boundaries of the US nation-state. In Chapter 4, I
argued that border construction projects and detention centers work as a series of
connected, but distinct spatial strategies that form a border assemblage. The walls,
lights, cameras, patrol vehicles, interview rooms, staging areas and detention centers
produce the conditions of possibility for noncitizen’s banishment, both symbolically and
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materially. Thus, while IIRIRA expanded detainability, brick-and-mortar capacity was
required to raise deportation rates. The T. Don Hutto Detention Center, transformed from
medium-security prison to family detention center to “model civil detention facility”
exemplifies the ways in which infrastructure lends symbolic and textual constructions a
certain durability. But as Chapter 5 showed, detention’s disciplinarity is not defined by
the prison’s spatial ordering. Rather, detention is itself an assemblage of spatial strategies
and knowledge practices—deterrence, isolation, criminalization, and forced mobility—
that produce both subjects and populations. In the context of risk-based security
ontologies and preemptive politics, detention works, in part, by displacing vulnerability
from the US onto a population of transnational potential migrants. The geostrategic
imaginaries of threatening outside/safe inside permeated the Hutto litigation, as I showed
in Chapter 6, allowing the judge to argue that family detention worked in both children’s
and the public’s best interests.
Distributed through individualized legal decisions and reverberating through
networks of care, detained families’ traumas were borne both individually and
collectively. The domestic and political violence fled by Berks’ and Hutto’s parents does
not dissolve upon approval of their asylum claim, but endures in both memory and for
those left behind. For DHS, achieving security requires a hardening of territorial borders
and the externalization of insecurity. So while transboundary migrants and US security
professionals think and act in starkly different terms, they do work upon each other.
Spectacularly banal, detention’s disciplinarity works through a heterogeneous assemblage
of spatial practices. As Sexton and Lee write, the prison “participates in a reconfiguration
and redeployment of repressive state powers, displacing while retaining spectacles of
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corporal punishment and public execution” (Sexton and Lee 2006, 1008). Detention’s
disciplinarity does not reverberate seamlessly between registers, does not scale up or
down in a coherent fashion, nor produce singular subjects. Rather, as Mountz argues,
detention’s panopticism “straddle[s] scales, including transnational individual, family,
and community, each asserting the possibility that ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ or separate
yet intimately intertwined” (Mountz 2010, 156). Emerging alongside the “society of
control” described by Deleuze (1988) and Rose (1999), the prison has been emptied out,
released from its moral function, and redeployed as risk containment. Diffused
throughout state and non-state institutions, public spaces, and transactional databases, the
prison’s panopticism is a generalized “diagram of power,” and its gaze works far beyond
the prison walls. Yet the detention center has become a central component of border
security in the US and elsewhere, repositioning spatial confinement within a wider set of
modulated disciplinary technologies.
For noncitizens entering the US and other countries of the global north without
proper documentation, detention has become a condition of both admission and
exclusion, a “long tunnel” towards uncertain destinations (Mountz 2010); for noncitizens
residing in increasingly securitized global north countries, detention and deportability
work as a form of social control (Coleman 2008a; de Genova 2002; Kanstroom 2000b).
In the context of this assemblage of spatial strategies and legal machinations, what is the
law and what does it mean to suspend it? Is immigration law “extra-legal law,” as
Mathew Coleman (2007a) argues? Throughout this dissertation, I have maintained that
law is a site of struggle over space and political recognition, and have outlined the ways
in which different legal regimes overlap, resonate, and come into conflict with each other.

205

As Chapter 6 described, the Hutto lawsuit concluded with a specific distribution of liberal
rights and obligations between parents and children. The hyper-responsible migrantsubject and the innocent child-object are not extra-legal subjects; they are inscribed in
and through the law. Rather, these legal subjects are produced through illiberal legal
norms. Hutto and Berks are not extra-legal spaces, either. A series of different legal
instruments delegate the various elements of detention and deportation to county, federal,
and private institutions. The contract discussed in Chapter 7 is not, however, a social
contract between citizen and state, but a neoliberal contract devolving state functions to
the private sector.
This arrangement reveals a certain neoliberalization of border policing itself,
through which the state becomes the source and the guarantor of capitalist accumulation.
Others have noted a neoliberalization of citizenship, a differentiation of mobility rights
distributed according to economic productivity (Ong 1999, 2006). Warehousing bodies
and profiting from “bedspace” amounts to, for Gordon (2006) and Sexton and Lee (2006)
and other prison abolitionists, a reinscription of racialized exclusion at the heart of
“liberal” governance. The transgressions of the war prison and the detention center find
their source in the US prison system, where torture and arbitrary power are “the norm.”
Rather angrily, these authors point to the (white) privilege underlying dominant
narratives of detention’s exceptionality. If, as Benjamin argues, “the tradition of the
oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception
but the rule,” then scholars’ indignation at law’s suspension reveals a deep naivete about
for what, exactly, the law is used (Benjamin 2003 [1940], 392). Focusing on the material
infrastructure of detention, its political and economic relationships, belies dominant free-

206

trade-versus-security narratives and reveals, instead, a relationship of convenience
between border and economic security.
For Tugba Basaran (2008), illiberal border zones constitute liberal, normal, law.
“Included through exclusion,” noncitizens in detention and deportation proceedings
create the conditions of possibility for liberal peace.

As Achille Mbembe argues,

biopolitical security relies upon a certain necropolitics, here revealed in the DHS’
displacement of vulnerability onto noncitizen families (Mbembe 2003). As detention
functions are devolved and outsourced, detained and imprisoned bodies become a sort of
raw material, capitalizable and exchangeable commodities caught up in circuits of forced
mobility. In our current moment, federal outsourcing devolves necropolitical functions to
private entities, and these governmental arrangements suture detention to a range of nonstate relationships. We face, therefore, a geopolitical and geoeconomic milieu in which a
diverse array of actors have vested interests in the continued normalization—if not
expansion—of the material, political, and legal production of exclusion. As legalistic and
human rights-based arguments continue to dominate immigrant rights organizing and
challenges to US wartime detention practices, the historical, metaphysical, and material
limits of US liberalism and law must be taken seriously.
“At stake,” Judith Butler writes, “are communities that are not quite constituted as
such, subjects who are living but not yet regarded as lives” (Butler 2009, 32). These nonlives are not natural, unqualified, nor “bare life” but “bound and constrained by power
relations in a situation of forcible exposure” (ibid., 29). Amplifying precarity for detained
noncitizens, presuming that this diminishes vulnerability, detention-as-deterrence
operates as what Lauren Berlant calls “slow death:” “… the physical wearing out of a
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population and a deterioration of people in that population…. The phenomenon of mass
physical attenuation under global/national regimes of capitalist structural subordination
and governmentality” (Berlant 2007, 754). This points to, she argues, “something
important about the space of slow death that shapes our particular biopolitical phase;
mainly, people do live in it, just not very well” (ibid.). While we have seen a rise in
deaths along the border, immigration policing, detention, and deportation has also simply
made life harder for noncitizens in the United States, and as Nancy Hiemstra has shown,
at home (Hiemstra forthcoming). This has important implications for the revitalization of
sovereign power. If sovereign power is, according to Foucault (2003), the ability to “take
life and let live,” what if we need not die, physiologically, in order to be killed? If
detention works on networks, it is to wear thin the relationships on which life depends, to
make life in the United States not worth living. These tactics exploit the interdependency
inherent and necessary to human life, using the recognition of our relationality against us.
In her recent book Frames of War, Butler attempts to think ethics beyond liberal
norms by rethinking what it means to be human:
We have to ask about the conditions under which it becomes possible to
apprehend a life or set of lives as precarious, and those that make it possible, or
indeed impossible. …If we are to make broader social and political claims about
rights of protection and entitlements to persistence and flourishing, we will have
to be supported by a new bodily ontology, one that implies the rethinking of
precariousness, vulnerability, injurability, interdependency, exposure, bodily
persistence, desire, work, and the claims of language and social belonging.
(emphasis added; Butler 2009, 2)
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Analyzing the structures of dehumanization, through which we might understand life
without recognizing its worth as a rights-bearing subject, Butler recenters politics on
collective humanness, rather than identity, nationality, citizenship, and so forth. From this
perspective, she argues, U.S. geopolitics produces precarity, has used the inherent
interdependency of life against particular groups. For Butler, precarity’s universality
provides onotological grounds on which to build a coalitional politics around the struggle
to thrive. Intriguingly, her approach resonates with the political ontology of circulation,
connection, and contingency. But rather than entering into political groupings to avoid
chaotic states of natures (following Hobbes) and to order the distribution of property
(following Locke), building a political ethic around precarity works through struggles
over the material conditions of being human: housing, healthcare, sustenance, space for
the performance of different lifeways, and political inclusion. Butler’s is a normative
experiment, an effort to address embodied and categorical difference as an ontological
universal. More to the point, she seeks to reinscribe liberalism’s universal individualism
around precarity and interdependence, to recast the political around a feminist and queer
ethic of care. As a political ontology, precarity reorients possibilities for recognizing
“enduring ties” of queer relatedness, the relationality of parenthood (through birth or
adoption), transnational families (heterosexual and otherwise), and our own relationships
to strangers. In effect, Butler seeks to reconstruct a leftist agenda not around the
antagonisms of class, gender, racial or other identity positions, but around a biopolitical
universal: we will die with out each other—not because of each other—and this is why
we belong to each other. Refocusing politics from inclusion/exclusion to precarity
privileges relational subjects, interdependence, and a biopolitics of mutual aid.
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Beyond family detention, “the family” remains central to immigration geopolitics,
as admission, relief, and risk categories privilege consanguinity over other forms of
belonging. Spectacular public debates over immigrants' birthright citizenship, "anchor" or
"terrorist babies," healthcare, and "bogus" asylum claims polarize immigration politics,
yet family, gender and the home remain important metaphors for nation and territory
(McClintock 1993; Stevens 1999; Walby 1996; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). In many
countries, family unification remains a dominant avenue for legal entry, but as this
dissertation makes plain, exclusion practices--immigration policing, detention, and
deportation--privilege familial relatedness and private space as sites of state intervention
rather than pathways to political membership. As described above, detention and
deportation practices revolve around legal and spatial conceptions of the home and the
family in previously unexamined ways. This dissertation has focused on the legal and
material infrastructures of detainability, but what comes into view when we focus on care
practices, home spaces, and social reproduction?

How do we understand the state’s

enduring interest in immigrant reproduction, both biological and social? Analyzing
immigration and border enforcement practices from this perspective brought deterrence’s
reverberating impacts (Chapter 5), parents’ relational rights claims (Chapter 6), and
family detention’s spatial ordering (Chapter 8) into sharper view.
Unpacking the state’s interest in foreign familiarity requires that working across
sites and state programs and ask different kinds of questions about immigration
enforcement. What is the state’s enduring interest in immigrant reproduction, family
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unity, and care networks? How do these relationships, spaces, and circulations come to be
apprehended—understood and confined—by immigration and security professionals?
How does the US regulate political membership in and through care, consanguinity, and
“family unity”? And how does “the family” regulate political membership for citizens
and noncitizens alike? Heeding Butler (2002, 2009), Puar (2007), and Brandzel (2005),
asking these questions elicits common political and theoretical ground between
disenfranchised felons, queer communities, and noncitizens, allowing us to explore the
topographies and topologies of exclusion.

In future research, I plan to expand my

empirical focus from family detention to a series of flashpoints that distill key
contradictions between immigration, family, reproduction, and privacy regimes.
Home Raids
Since 2005, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fugitive Operations
Teams have performed “home raids,” sweeping up “collateral” residents unable to prove
legal status. Noncitizens detained in their homes can appeal to the Constitution’s Fourth
Amendment protections from illegal search and seizure to avoid detention and
deportation.

Thus, private homes endow noncitizens with constitutional protections

unavailable to those caught up in workplace raids, traffic stops, or profiling in public
places. Intriguingly, the protection of private space has also served as the basis for
constitutional challenges to anti-sodomy laws. As critics of gay marriage have pointed
out, sexual citizenship has become the price of assimilation to the nuclear, single-family
home-owner ideal. In addition, to analyzing the ways in which the legal geographies of
public and private space intersect with immigration enforcement, this project will allow
me to trace the co-constitutive character of il/liberalism and il/legality.
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Family Custody
Family courts and social service agencies have ruled that parents’ undocumented
status constitutes a risk to their children and justifies removing custody rights (Thronson
2007-8). For example, the Mississippi Department of Human Services deemed an
indigenous Mexican woman unfit to mother her newborn, pathologizing immigration
status as a threat to family life. As described above, there are no clear rulings on the
relevance of parents’ immigration status to child custody rulings, and parents’
undocumented status has been cited as grounds to deny custody. In these cases, federal
immigration law operates as de facto child custody law (Thronson 2007-8). Conversely,
granting custody to unauthorized parents can bar children from filing immigration claims,
so that custody decisions often have dramatic implications for children’s immigration
status. This project would allow me to expand my analysis of parents’, children’s, and
families’ legal status, and to explore how theories of state and family custody cohere and
conflict. Focusing on the bodily inscription of legal categories, this research serves as an
important counterpart to my analysis of public and private space.
Borderland Births
US immigration officials have challenged birth certificates of American citizens
birthed by midwives. These challenges target specific (Mexican-American) populations
in and through their reproductive practices. For undocumented migrants more used to
consulting curaderas than doctors, home births are a common reproductive practice.
Hospitals issue birth certificates on site, however, so that home-birthed citizens do not
gain documented citizenship at the moment of birth. In addition, border midwives are not
necessarily certified by state or national midwifery associations. These cases demonstrate
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not only how immigration enforcement is raced and classed, but how medical
certification can become a medium of illegalization. This project explores the biopolitics
of citizenship at its most intimate and provides a unique perspective on the imbrication of
medical knowledge, intimacy, and citizenship.
Private Contracting
My dissertation research raised important questions about the role of non-state
actors in immigration enforcement, and I am developing a project will explore these
relationships in more detail. As described in Chapter 3, ICE contracts with private firms
and non-governmental organizations to provide key immigration enforcement services,
e.g. detention, family shelters, and security services. Under intellectual property law, this
"immigration industrial complex" (Golash-Boza 2009) is exempt from public information
laws and prison boards' oversight. Focusing on non-state corrections and security
organizations, this project will ask how borders, citizenship, and migration are managed
by new sets of actors in the context of globalized, privatized service-provision. The
Corrections Corporation of America, for example, owns and operates detention centers
internationally, and U.S. security and military personnel frequently offer consultation to
foreign governments and global corporations on “mobility management” issues.

In

addition, non-profit NGOs provide immigration services, share strategies and expertise
across borders, and participate in the implementation of rights-based immigration
regimes. This project will (1) question the boundaries of the state in the context of
transnational service-provision; (2) contribute to research on the political economy of the
security industry; and (3) allow me to build a novel conceptual framework for grappling
with neoliberal governance, capital, and state power. This research will be a
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collaborative, multi-year project that will contribute to geographical and interdisciplinary
research on international governance, immigration, and security.

CONCLUSION
Expanding on themes explored in this dissertation, my future research will trace
the logics that make family custody, homes, births, and privacy objects of both special
legal protection and exceptional state intervention. Others have analyzed enforcement's
psychological, economic, and social impacts and border policies, inspection technologies,
and governmental logics, but these studies focus on either individual or state behavior. In
contrast, my future research will analyze how subnational actors—social service
agencies, courts, and contractors—mobilize immigration status beyond the border.
Moving from family detention this series of flashpoints, my work illuminates the
contradictions between foreign and social policy and the centrality of reproduction to
immigration geopolitics.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAP
BP
CBP
CCA
CFI
CIS
DHS
ER
EOIR
FRFDS
FRS
FOIA
HSA
ICE
IGSA
IIRIRA
IRCA
INS
INA
ISAP
RFP
SBI

Appearance Assistance Program
Border Patrol
Customs and Border Patrol
Corrections Corporation of America
Credible Fear Interview
Citizenship and Immigration Services
Department of Homeland Security
Expedited Removal
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Family Residential Facility Design Standards
Family Residential Standards
Freedom of Information Act
Homeland Security Act
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Intergovernmental Service Agreement
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
Immigration Reform and Control Act
Immigration and Naturalization Services
Immigration and Nationality Act
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program
Request for Proposals
Secure Border Initiative

215

References
Ackelson, Jason. 2005. "Constructing security on the US-Mexico border." Political
Geography 24(2): 165-184.
Ackers, L. and H. Stalford. 1999. "Children, migration and citizenship in the European
Union: Intra-community mobility and the status of children in EC law." Children
and Youth Services Review 21(11-12): 987-1010.
Adey, Peter. 2009. "Facing Airport Security: affect, biopolitics, and the preemptive
securitisation of the mobile body." Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 27: 274-295.
Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. State of Exception. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Aitken, Stuart. 2001. Geographies of Young People: The Morally Contested Spaces of
Identity. New York: Routledge.
Aitken, Stuart. C. 2001. "Global crises of childhood: rights, justice and the unchildlike
child." Area 33(2): 119-127.
Aldana, Raquel. 2004. “The September 11 Immigration Detentions and Unconstitutional
Executive Legislation.” Southern Illinois University Law Journal 29: 5-43.
American Civil Liberties Union. 2007a. “Case Summary in the ACLU’s Challenge to
the Hutto Detention Center.” Available at:
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/28870res20070306.html. Accessed
August 30, 2009.
American Civil Liberties Union. 2007b. “Family Profiles in the ACLU's Challenge to
the Hutto Detention Center.” Available at:
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/28868res20070306.html.Accessed:
February 8, 2008.
American Civil Liberties Union. 2007c. “Landmark Settlement Announced in Federal
Lawsuit Challenging Conditions at Immigration Detention Center in Texas.”
Press Release August 27, 2007. Available at: URL:
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/31469prs20070827.html. Accessed:
February 8, 2008.
Amoore, Louise. 2006. "Biometric Borders: governing mobilities in the war on terror."
Political Geography 25: 336 – 351.
Amoore, Louise. 2009. "Algorithmic war: everyday geographies of the war on terror."
Antipode 41:49-69.
216

Amoore, Louise and Marieke de Goede. 2008. "Transactions after 9/11: the banal face of
the preemptive strike." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33:
173-185.
Amoore, Louise and Alexandra. Hall. 2009. "Taking people apart: digitized dissection
and the body at the border." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space
27:444-464.
Andreas, Peter. 2000. Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Associated Press. 2010. "Fingerprint checks go statewide." Houston Chronicle.
September 29, 2010. Available at:
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7223407.html. Last Accessed
January 12, 2011
Bain, Alison and Catherine Nash. 2007. "The Toronto Women's Bathhouse Raid:
Querying queer identities in the courtroom." Antipode 39 (1): 17-34.
Basaran, Tugba. 2008. Security, Law, Borders: Spaces of Exclusion. International
Political Sociology, 2: 339-354.
Beckett, Katherine. 1997. Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary
American Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Belcher, Oliver. 2008. "Fatal Distraction." Human Geography. 1(2).
Belcher, Oliver and Lauren. Martin, Anna Secor, Stephanie Simon, Tommy Wilson.
2008. "Everywhere and Nowhere: The Exception and the Topological Challenge
to Geography." Antipode 40(5): 499-503.
Bell, David and John Binnie. 2000. The Sexual Citizen, Queer Politics, and Beyond.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bell, David and John Binnie. 2006. “Geographies of Sexual Citizenship.” Political
Geography 25 (8): 869-873.
Benjamin, Walter. 2003 [1940]. “On the Concept of History” in Selected Writings
Volume 4: 1938-1940, translated by Harry Zohn. Edited by Howard Eiland and
Michael W. Jennings, 389-400. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
University.
Berelowitz, Jo-Anne. 2005. "The spaces of home in Chicano and Latino representations
of the San Diego - Tijuana borderlands (1968-2002)." Environment and Planning
D-Society & Space 23(3): 323-350.
Berlant, Lauren. 2007. "Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency)." Critical
Inquiry 33(4): 754-780.
217

Bernstein, Nina. 2010. "Jail Protest by Immigrant Detainees Is Broken Up by Agents."
New York Times January 20, 2010. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/nyregion/21jail.html. Last Accessed January
12, 2011.
Bessant, Judith. 2004. "Mixed messages: Youth participation and democratic practice."
Australian Journal of Political Science 39(2): 387-404.
Bhabha, Jacqueline. 2000. "Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the
Transnational Immigration of Unaccompanied Children." University of Chicago
Law School Roundtable. 7: 269-294.
Bhabha, Jacqueline. 2003. "The Citizenship Deficit: on being a citizen child."
Development. 46(3): 54.
Bhabha, Jacqueline. 2009. "Arendt’s Children: Do Today’s Migrant Children Have a
Right to Have Rights?" Human Rights Quarterly. 31: 410-451.
Bialasiewicz, Luiza and David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey,
Alison Williams. 2007. "Performing Security: The imaginative geographies of
current US strategy". Political Geography 26: 405-422.
Bigo, Didier. 2001. "The Möbius ribbon of internal and external security(ies)." In
Identities, borders, orders: Rethinking international relations theory, edited by
Mathias Albert, Yosek Lapid, and Davod Jacobsen. University of Minnesota
Press, Minneapolis.
Bigo, Didier. 2002. "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the
Governmentality of Unease." Alternatives. 27 (1): 63-92.
Bigo, Didier. 2007. “Detention of Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social
Practices of Control of the Banopticon.” In Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies
and Politics at Territory’s Edge, Edited by Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl
Grundy-Warr. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Binnie, John. 1997. “Invisible Europeans: sexual citizenship in the New Europe.”
Environment & Planning A 29: 237–248.
Black, Richard and Michael Collyer, Ronald Skeldon, Clare Waddington. 2006. "Routes
to illegal residence: A case study of immigration detainees in the United
Kingdom." Geoforum 37 (4): 552-564.
Blatter, Joachim. 2004. "'From spaces of place' to 'spaces of flows'? Territorial and
functional governance in cross-border regions in Europe and North America."
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28 (3): 530.

218

Blomley, Nicholas. 2003. "Law, property, and the geography of violence: The frontier,
the survey, and the grid." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 93
(1): 121-141.
Blomley, Nicholas. 2005. "Flowers in the bathtub: boundary crossings at the publicprivate divide." Geoforum 36 (3): 281-296.
Blunt, Alison. 2005. Domicile and Diaspora. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Bondi, Liz. 1991. "Gender Divisions and Gentrification: A Critique." Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers 16 (2): 190-198.
Bonds, Anne. 2006. Profit from Punishment? The politics of prisons, poverty and
neoliberal restructuring in the rural American Northwest. Antipode 38 (1):174177.
Borjas, George J. 2001. Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American
Economy. New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press.
Borneman, Jon. 2001. "Caring and Being Cared For: Displacing Marriage, Kinship,
Gender, and Sexuality," in The Ethics of Kinship: Ethnographic Inquiries. Edited
by J. Faubion, 29-46. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Brandzel, Amy. 2005. “Queering Citizenship?: Same-Sex Marriage and the State.”
GLQ: A Journal of Gay and Lesbian Studies 11(2): 171-204.
Braun, Bruce. 1997. “Buried epistemologies: the politics of nature in (post)colonial
British Columbia." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 87 (1): 332.
Browne, Kath. 2006. "Queer Migrations: Sexuality, US citizenship and border
crossings." Gender Place and Culture 13 (4): 461-463.
Burawoy, Michael. 1998. "The Extended Case Method." Sociological Theory 16 (1): 433.
Burridge, Andrew and Jenna Loyd. 2007. "La gran marcha: Anti-Racism and Immigrant
Rights in Southern California." ACME 6(1): 1-35.
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New
York: Routledge.
Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York:
Routledge.
Butler, Judith. 2002. "Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?" Differences 13(1): 1444

219

Butler, Judith. 2004. Precarious Life. New York: Verso.
Butler, Judith. 2009. Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? New York: Verso.
California Coastal Commission. 2003. Staff Report and Recommendation on
Consistency Determination. San Francisco, CA: California Coastal Commission.
Che, Deborah. 2005. "Constructing a prison in the forest: Conflicts over nature,
paradise, and identity." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95
(4): 809-831.
Chouinard, Vera. 1994. Geography, Law, and Legal Struggles: Which Way Ahead?
Progress in Human Geography 18(4): 415-440.
Christou, Anastasia and Russell King. 2006. "Migrants encounter migrants in the city:
the changing context of 'home' for second-generation Greek-American return
migrants." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 30 (4): 816835.
Cianciarulo, Marisa S. 2007. “Counterproductive and Counterintuitive Counterterrorism:
The Post September 11 Treatment of Refugees and Asylum-seekers.” Denver
University Law Review 84(4): 1121-1144.
Clark, Gordon L. and Meric Gertler. 1983. "Migration and Capital." Annals of the
Association of American Geographers 73 (1): 18-34.
Coleman, Mathew. 2005. "US statecraft and the US-Mexico border as security/economy
nexus." Political Geography 24(2): 185-209.
Coleman, Mathew. 2007a. "Immigration Geopolitics Beyond the Mexico-US Border."
Antipode 39 (1):54-76.
Coleman, Mathew. 2007b. "Review: State of exception." Environment and Planning D:
Society and Space 25 (1):187-190.
Coleman, Mathew. 2008a. "US immigration law and its geographies of social control:
lessons from homosexual exclusion during the Cold War." Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space 26: 1096-1114.
Coleman, Mathew. 2008b. "Between Public Policy and Foreign Policy: U.S.
Immigration Law Reform and the Undocumented Migrant." Urban Geography
29(4): 4-28.
Coleman, Mathew. 2009. "What Counts as the Politics and Practice of Security and
Where? Devolution and Insecurity After 9/11." Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 99(5): 1-10.

220

Collins, Jock. 2006. "The changing political economy of Australian immigration."
Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 97 (1): 7-16.
Collyer, Michael. 2007. “In-Between Places: Trans-Saharan Transit Migrants in
Morocco and the Fragmented Journey to Europe.” Antipode 39: 668-690.
Cope, Megan. 2005. "Coding Qualitative Data." In Qualitative Research Methods in
Human Geography, edited by Ian Hay, 222-233. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publication.
Cornelius, Wayne. 2001. “Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences
of US Immigration Control Policy.” Population and Development Review 27(4):
661-685.
Coutin, Susan B. 2003. Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants Struggle for U.S.
Residency. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Coutin, Susan B. 2010. "Confined within: National territories as zones of confinement."
Political Geography 29(4): 200-208.
Cox, Rosie and Rekha. Narula. 2003. "Playing Happy Families: rules and relationships
in au pair employing households in London, England." Gender, Place and
Culture 10(4): 333-344.
De Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translsted by Steve Randall.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
De Genova, Nicholas. 2002. "Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life."
Annual Review of Anthropology 31: 419-47.
De Genova, Nicholas. 2007. "The Production of Culprits: From Deportability to
Detainability in the Aftermath of “Homeland Security.” Citizenship Studies 11(5):
421–448.
de Hart, Betty. 2006. "The morality of Maria Toet: Gender, citizenship and the
construction of the nation-state." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32 (1):
49-68.
Dean, Mitchell. 1999. Governmentality: power and rule in modern society. London:
Sage.
Del Bosque, Melissa. 2010. "Hungering for Justice at the Port Isabel Immigration
Detention Facility." Texas Observer February 10, 2011. Available at:
http://www.texasobserver.org/lalinea/hungering-for-justice-at-the-port-isabelimmigration-detention-facility. Accessed January 12, 2011.
Delaney, David. 2001. "Making nature/markling humans: Law as a site of (cultural)
production." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91 (3): 487-503.
221

Deleuze, Gilles. 1988. Foucault. Translated by Seán Hand. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Democracy Now. 2007. " 'I Want to be Free': 9-Year-Old Canadian Citizen Pleads From
Texas Immigration Jail." February 23, 2007. Available at:
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/2/23/i_want_to_be_free_9. Accessed
January 12, 2011.
Dikeç, Mustafa. 2009. "The Where of Asylum." Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space 27: 183-189.
Dillon, Michael. 2007. "Governing through contingency: the security of biopolitical
governance." Political Geography 39: 71-79.
Dillon, Michael. 2008. “Underwriting security.” Security Dialogue 26: 309-332.
Dobrowolsky, Alexandra and Jane Jenson. 2004. "Shifting representations of
citizenship: Canadian politics of 'women' and 'children'." Social Politics 11(2):
154-180.
Donovan, Catherine and Brian Heaphy and Jeffrey Weeks. 1999. "Citizenship and same
sex relationships." Journal of Social Policy 28: 689-709.
Donzelot, Jacques. 1979. The Policing of Families. New York: Random House.
Dow, Mark. 2005. American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Dowler, Linda and Joanne Sharpe. 2001. A Feminist Geopolitics? Space & Polity 5(3):
165-176.
Dunn, Timothy. 2001. "Waging a war on immigrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border:
Human Rights Implications" in Militarizing the American Criminal Justice
System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police, edited by Peter
Kraska, 65-81. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Dunn, Timothy. 1996. The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992. Austin:
University of Texas at Austin Press.
Ehrkamp, Patricia. 2005. "Placing identities: Transnational practices and local
attachments of Turkish immigrants in Germany." Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 31 (2): 345-364.
Ehrkamp, Patricia. 2006. ""We Turks are no Germans": assimilation discourses and the
dialectical construction of identities in Germany." Environment and Planning A
38 (9): 1673-1692.

222

Elden, Stuart. 2007. "Governmentality, calculation, territory." Environment and
Planning D-Society & Space 25 (3): 562-580.
Ellis, Mark. 2006. "Unsettling immigrant geographies: US immigration and the politics
of scale." Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 97 (1): 49-58.
Elman, R. Amy. 2000. "The limits of citizenship: Migration, sex discrimination and
same-sex partners in EU law." Journal of Common Market Studies. 38 (5): 729749.
Email Correspondence between Ashley Lewis, ICE Head of Contracting Activity and
Gary Mead, Assistant Director of ICE Detention and Removal Operations, June 8,
2007.
Esparza, Adrian and Brigitte S. Waldorf, Javier Chavez. 2004. “Localized Effects of
Globalization: The Case of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico.” Urban
Geography 25(2): 120-138.
Fairclough, Norman. 2003. Analysing Discourse: textual analysis for social research.
New York: Routledge.
Falah, Ghazi-Walid. 2007."The politics of doing geography: 23 days in the hell of Israeli
detention." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25 (4):587-593.
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) 2010, “Immigration Issues:
Birthright Citizenship”, Updated August 2010. Available at:
http://www.fairus.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=16535&security=1601
&news_iv_ctrl=1007. Last accessed 7 February, 2011.
Feeley, Malcom and Jonathan Simon. 1992. "The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implication." Criminology 30(4): 449474.
Fernandes, Deepa. 2007. Targeted: National Security and the Business of Immigration.
New York: Seven Stories Press.
Fischer, Judith L. 1993. "Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act on
families." Marriage and Family Review 19 (3-4): 233-239.
Forrest, James and Michael Paulsen, Ron Johnston. 2006. "A 'multicultural model' of the
spatial assimilation of ethnic minority groups in Australia's major immigrantreceiving cities." Urban Geography 27 (5): 441-463.
Foucault, Michel. [1975] 1995. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. New
York, NY: Vintage Books.
Foucault, Michel. 1991. “Governmentality.” In The Foucault Effect, eds Burchell,
Gordon, Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 87-104.
223

Foucault, Michel. 2003. Society Must Be Defended. New York: Picado.
Foucault, Michel. 2007. Security, Territory, Population: Lecture at the College de
France 1977-1978. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Garcia, María Cristina. 2006. Seeking Refuge: Central American Immigration to Mexico,
the United States, and Canada. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Garland, David. Editor. 2001. Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences.
London, UK: Sage Publications.
Gedalof, Irene. 2007. "Unhomely homes: Women, family and belonging in UK
discourses of migration and asylum." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33
(1): 77-94.
Gidwani, Vinay. 2000. "The Quest for Distinction: A Reappraisal of the Rural Labor
Process in Kheda District (Gujarat), India." Economic Geography 76 (2): 145168.
Gidwani, Vinay and Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan. 2003. "Circular Migration and
the Spaces of Cultural Assertion." Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 93 (1): 186-213.
Gilbert, Elizabeth. 2005. "The inevitability of integration? Neoliberal discourse and the
proposals for a new North American economic space after September 11." Annals
of the Association of American Geographers 95 (1): 202-222.
Gilbert, Elizabeth. 2007. "Leaky Borders and Solid Citizens: Governing Security,
Prosperity and Quality of Life in a North American Partnership." Antipode 39 (1):
77-98.
Gill, Nick. 2009. "Governmental mobility: The power effects of the movement of
detained asylum seekers around Britain's detention estate." Political Geography
28(3): 186-196.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. 2007. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in
Globalizing California. Berkeley: University of California.
Golash-Boza, Tanya. 2009. “The Immigration Industrial Complex: Why We Enforce
Immigration Policies Destined to Fail” Sociology Compass 3(2): 295-309.
Gordon, A. F. 2006. "Abu Ghraib: imprisonment and the war on terror." Race & Class
48 (1):42-59.
Gossage, Matt. and Lily. Keber. 2007. Hutto: America's Family Prison [Film]. Available
At: http://vimeo.com/3286457. Last Accessed January 12, 2011.

224

Graham, Stephen and Nigel Thrift. 2007. "Out of Order: Understanding Repair and
Maintenance." Theory, Culture, and Society 24(3): 1-25.
Gregory, Derek. 2004a. "The angel of Iraq." Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space. 22 (3): 317-324.
Gregory, Derek. 2004b. The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq. Malden,
MA: Blackwell.
Gregory, Derek. 2006a. "The black flag: Guantánamo Bay and the space of exception."
Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography. 88 (4):405-427.
Gregory, Derek. 2006b."Vanishing Points: Law, Violence and Exception in the Global
War Prison." in Violent Geographies: fear, terror, and political violence. eds. D.
Gregory and A. Pred. New York: Routledge.
Grundy-War, Carl. and Clive Schofield. 2005. "Reflections on the Relevance of Classic
Approaches and Contemporary Priorities in Boundary Studies." Geopolitics 10:
650-662.
Haddal, C. and A. Siskin. 2010. Immigration-related Detention: Legislative Issues.
RL32369. Congressional Research Service: Washington, D.C.
Haggerty, Kevin D. and Richard V. Ericson. 2000. "The surveillant assemblage."
British Journal of Sociology 51: 605-622.
Hall, Alex. 2008. " 'Keeping the Initiative': Detention in the British Immigration and
Asylum System." Conference paper presented April 16, 2008, the Annual
Association of American Geographers Conference, San Francisco, CA.
Hannah, Matthew. 2000. Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenthcentury America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hannah, Matthew. 2006. "Torture and the Ticking Bomb: The War on Terrorism as a
Geographical Imagination of Power/Knowledge." Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 96 (3): 622-640.
Harker, Chris. 2009. "Spacing Palestine through the home." Transactions of the Institute
of British Geographers. 34(3): 320-332.
Harker, Chris. 2010. "Geopolitics and family in Palestine." Geoforum. In press.
Doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.06.007
Harris, Dan. and Aude Soichet. 2008. "All (Illegal Immigrants) Aboard ICE Air."
ABCNews. December 16, 2008. Available at:
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=6472915&page=1. Accessed January
12, 2011.

225

Harvey, David. 1982. The Limits to Capital. Oxford: Blackwell.
Herman, Holly. 2001. “Shelter Opens at Heim for noncitizens.” Reading Eagle March
16, 2001. A15.
Hiebert, Daniel. 1999. "Local geographies of labor market segmentation: Montreal,
Toronto, and Vancouver, 1991." Economic Geography 75 (4): 339-369.
Hiebert, Daniel. 2006. "Winning, losing, and still playing the game: The political
economy of immigration in Canada." Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale
Geografie 97 (1): 38-48.
Hiemstra, Nancy. forthcoming. "Geopolitical reverberations of US migrant detention
and deportation: The view from Ecuador." Geopolitics.
Hing, Bill Ong. 2001. "The dark side of operation gatekeeper." U.C. Davis Journal of
International Law & Policy 7(2):124-167.
Hing, Bill Ong. 2006. "Misusing Immigration in the Name of Homeland Security."
Centennial Review 6:195-224.
Homeland Security Act 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
Hostelge, Sean. 2008. “Longer, taller fencing gives illegal migrants a higher hurdle.”
Resource Document. The Arizona Republic, November 13, 2008. Available at:
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/11/13/20081113bor
derclimb1113.html. Accessed November 13, 2008.
House, John W. 1982. Frontier on the Rio Grande: a political geography of social
deprivation. New York: Clarendon Press.
Human Rights Watch. 2009. Locked Up Far Away: The Transfer of Immigrants to
Remote Detention Centers in the United States. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Hyndman, Jennifer. 2004a. “The (Geo)Politics of Gendered Mobility.” In Mapping
Women, Making Politics. Eds. L. Staeheli, E. Kofman, L. Peake. Routledge, 169184. New York: Routledge.
Hyndman, Jennifer. 2004b. Mind the gap: bridging feminist and political geography
through geopolitics. Political Geography 23: 307-322.
Hyndman, Jennifer. 2005. “Migration Wars: refuge or refusal?” Geoforum .36: 3-6.
Hyndman, Jennifer. 2007. "Feminist Geopolitics Revisited: Body Counts in Iraq." The
Professional Geographer. 59(1): 35-46.

226

Hyndman, Jennifer and Alison Mountz. 2008. “Another Brick in the Wall? NeoRefoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe.”
Government and Opposition 43(3): 249-269.
Ibrahim, Maggie. 2005. "The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse."
International Migration 43 (5): 163-187.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 104th
Congress. P.L. 104-208, Division C.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement-NGO Working Group. 2009. “Letter to ICE Re:
NGO Response to Family Residential Standards.” On file with author.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 82nd Congress. P.L. 82-414.
Inniss, Lolita Buckner. 1997-8. “Dutch Uncle Sam: Immigration Reform and Notions of
Family.” Brandeis Journal of Family Law 36: 177.
Jones, John Paul and Janet E. Kodras. 1990. "Restructured Regions and Families: The
Feminization of Poverty in the U.S." Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 80 (2): 163-183.
Jans, Marc. 2004. “Children as citizens - Towards a contemporary notion of child
participation.” Childhood-a Global Journal of Child Research 11 (1): 27-44.
Jimenez, Hortencia. 2009. “Anti-Immigration Legislation and the Emergence of
Immigrant Rights Coalitions.” Presented October 17, 2009, at the Undocumented
Hispanic Migration Conference, Connecticut College, New London, CT.
Johnson, Kevin. 2008. "Hurricane Katrina: Lessons about Immigrants in the
Administrative State." Houson Law Review. 45(1): 1-71.
Jones, James. 1997. “The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham Marriages
or Sham Legislation?” Florida State University Law Review 24: 678-701.
Kafka, Franz. 1995. The Trial. New York: Schocken.
Kanstroom, Daniel. 2000a. "Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue."
Boston College Law Review. 41:771-788.
Kanstroom, Daniel. 2000b. "Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases." Harvard Law Review.
113:1890-1935.
Katz, Cindi. 2004. Growing up Global: Economic Restructuring and Children's
Everyday Lives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

227

Knowles, Anne Kelly. 1995. "Immigrant Trajectories through the Rural-Industrial
Transition in Wales and the United States, 1795-1850." Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 85 (2): 246-266.
Kofman, Elanor. 2002. "Contemporary European migrations, civic stratification and
citizenship." Political Geography 21 (8): 1035-1054.
Leiter, Valerie and Jennifer L. McDonald and Heather T. Jacobson. 2006. "Challenges
to children's independent citizenship - Immigration, family and the state."
Childhood-a Global Journal of Child Research 13 (1): 11-27.
Leitner, Helga. 1995. "International Migration and the Politics of Admission and
Exclusion in Postwar Europe." Political Geography 14 (3): 259-278.
Leitner, Helga. 1997. "Reconfiguring the spatiality of power: the construction of a
supranational migration framework for the European Union." Political Geography
16 (2):123-143.
Leitner, Helga. and Patricia Ehrkamp. 2006. "Transnationalism and migrants' imaginings
of citizenship." Environment and Planning A 38 (9): 1615-1632.
Ley, David. and Audrey. Kobayashi. 2005. "Back to Hong Kong: return migration or
transnational sojourn?" Global Networks-a Journal of Transnational Affairs 5 (2):
111-127.
Lubhéid, Eithne. 2002. Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Lubhéid, Eithne. and Lionel Cantú Jr. 2005. Queer Migration: Sexuality, U.S.
Citizenship, and Border Crossings. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Lyda, Clark and Jesse Lyda. 2009. The Least of These [Film]. Available at:
http://www.snagfilms.com/films/title/the_least_of_these/
Lyon, David. 2003. Surveillance After September 11th. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
Lyon, David. 2006. "Airport Screening, Surveillance, and Social Sorting: Canadian
Responses to 9/11 in Context." Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal
Justice 48(3): 397-411.
Mahtani, Minelle. 2002. "Tricking the border guards: performing race." Environment
and Planning D-Society & Space 20 (4): 425-440.
Marston, Sallie. 2000. "The Social Construction of Scale." Progress in Human
Geography 24 (2): 219-242.
Marston, Sallie. 2004. “Space, culture, state: uneven developments in political
geography.” Political Geography 23 (1): 1-16.
228

Marston, Sallie, and John Paul Jones III, Keith Woodward. 2005. "Human geography
without scale." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30:416-432.
Martin, Lauren. 2010. "Bombs, Bodies, and Biopolitics: Securitizing the Subject at the
Airport Security Checkpoin." Social & Cultural Geography 11 (1):17-34.
Martin, Lauren and Stephanie Simon. 2008. "A formula for disaster: the Department of
Homeland Security’s virtual ontology." Space and Polity 12: 281-296.
Mayall, Berry 2006. “Values and Assumptions Underpinning Policy for Children and
Young People in England.” Children’s Geographies 4(1): 9-17.
Mbembe, Achille. 2003. "Necropolitics." Public Culture 15(1): 11-40.
McClintock, Anne. 1993. "Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family."
Feminist Review .44: 61-80.
McDowell, Linda. 2004. "Work, Workfare, Work/Life Balance and an Ethics of Care."
Progress in Human Geography. 4 (1): 1-15.
McDowell, Linda. 2007. "Spaces of the Home: Absence, Presence, New Connections
and New Anxieties." Home Cultures. 4 (2): 129-146.
McLaren, Arlene T. and Isabel Dyck. 2004. "Mothering, human capital, and the "ideal
immigrant"." Womens Studies International Forum 27 (1): 41-53.
Miller, Teresa. 2002-3. "Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the
New Penology." Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 29: 618.
Miller, Teresa. 2004. "Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime
Control After September 11th." Boston College Third World Law Journal 25:81123.
Minca, Claudio. 2005. "The Spatiality of the Camp." Progress in Human Geography. 29
(4): 405-412.
Mitchell, Don. 1996. "Political violence, order, and the legal construction of public
space: Power and the public forum doctrine." Urban Geography. 17 (2): 152-178.
Mitchelson, Matthew. 2007. “Mass imprisonment is social justice: The ‘ends’ is near!”
Conference paper presented at the 14th Annual Conference on Critical Geography,
University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky, Friday, October 5, 2007.
Morawetz, Nancy. 2000. "Understanding the Impact of the Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms." Harvard Law Review. 113:1936-1962.

229

Morawetz, Nancy. 2005. "Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for
Immigrants Facing Deportation." Boston College Third World Law Journal.
25:13-33.
Moses, Greg. 2007. "Crossing the Lind in Texas: Sundown Action Brings Toys to
Imprisoned Children." Counterpunch. December 17, 2007. Available at:
http://www.counterpunch.org/moses12172007.html. Accessed January 12, 2011.
Mountz, Alison. 2003. Human Smuggling, the Transnational Imaginary, and Everyday
Geography of the Nation-State. Antipode 35 (3): 622-644.
Mountz, Alison. 2004. "Embodying the nation-state: Canada's response to human
smuggling." Political Geography 23 (3): 323-345.
Mountz, Alison. 2010. Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the
Border. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Muller, Benjamin J. 2004. "(Dis)Qualified Bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and
'Identity Management'." Citizenship Studies 8 (3): 279-296.
Mutersbaugh, Tad. 1998. "Women's work, men's work: gender, labor organization, and
technology acquisition in a Oaxacan village." Environment and Planning DSociety & Space 16 (4): 439.
Mutersbaugh, Tad. 1999. "Bread or chainsaws? Paths to mobilizing household labor for
cooperative rural development in a Oaxacan village (Mexico)." Economic
Geography 75 (1): 43-58.
Nagel, Caroline. 2002. “Geopolitics by another name: immigration and the politics of
assimilation.” Political Geography 21: 971-987.
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission. 2009. National Prison Rape
Commission Report. Washington, D.C.
Neuman, Gerald. 2005. "Discretionary Deportation." Georgetown Immigration Law
Journal 20:611.
Nevins, Joseph. 2002. Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the 'Illegal Alien' and the
Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary. New York: Routledge.
Nevins, Joseph. 2007. Dying for a Cup of Coffee? Migrant Deaths in the US-Mexico
Border Region in a Neoliberal Age. Geopolitics 12 (2): 228-247.
Nevins, Joseph. and Mizue Aizeki. 2009. Dying to live: a story of U.S. immigration in
an age of global apartheid. San Francisco: Open Media/City Lights Books.
Newman, David. 2006. “The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our
‘borderless’ world.” Progress in Human Geography 30(2): 143-161.
230

NGO Working Group. 2009. Letter to Immigration and Customs Enforcement re: NGO
Response to Family Residential Standards. On file with author.
Nguyen, Tam. 2005. We Are All Suspects Now: Untold Stories from Immigrant
Communities after 9/11. Boston: Beacon Press.
Nuñez-Neto, Blas and Yule Kim. 2008. Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S.
International Border. Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.
Ó Tuathail, Gerard. 2003. “Geopolitical Structures and Geopolitical Cultures: Towards
Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics.” In Geopolitical
Perspectives on World Politics, edited by Lasha Tchantouridze, 75-102.
Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies.
Olivio, Antonio. 2009. "ICE Airline Flies Tens of Thousands of Deportees Out of U.S."
Chicago Tribune. Feb. 9, 2009. Available at:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-deportees-09feb09,0,5333975.story. Accessed January 12, 2011.
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and
Sovereignty. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 2008.
Webcast of Public Hearings, 133rd Period of Sessions, October 22, 2008.
Resource document.
http://www.oas.org/oaspage/videosasf/2008/10/CIDH5_texan_border.wmv.
Accessed: November 17, 2008.
Oyewumi, Oyeronke. 2000. "Family Bonds/Conceptual Binds: African Notes on
Feminist Epistemologies." Signs. 25 (4): 1093-1098.
Pallares, Anna. 2009. Family Matters: Strategizing Immigrant Activism in Chicago.
Series on Latino Migrant Civic Engagement. Report no. 7. Ed. Xóchitl Bada,
Kate Brick, Jonathan Fox, and Andrew Selee. Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars.
Peck, Jamie. 2003. "Geography and public policy: mapping the penal state." Progress in
Human Geography 27 (2):222-232.
Peck, Jamie. 2004. “Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism.”
Progress in Human Geography 28 (3): 392-405.
Porter, Nicole and Bob Libal, Lauren Martin. N.d. " 'A prison is not a home': Notes from
the Campaign to End Immigrant Family Detention." Unpublished Manuscript. On
File with Author.
231

Pratt, Geraldine. 2002. "Collaborating across Our Differeces." Gender, Place and
Culture 9 (2): 195-200.
Pratt, Geraldone. 2004. Working Feminism. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Pratt, Geraldine. 2005. “Abandoned Women and Spaces of the Exception.” Antipode
37(5): 1052-1078.
Puar, Jasbir. 2007. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Purcell, Mark and Joseph Nevins. 2005. "Pushing the boundary: state restructuring, state
theory, and the case of US-Mexico border enforcement in the 1990s." Political
Geography 24 (2): 211-235.
Ramji-Nogales, Jaya and Andrew Schoenholtz, Philip G. Schrag. 2007. “Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication.” Stanford Law Review 60(2): 295412.
REAL ID Act. 109th Congress. Pub.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302.
Reid-Henry, Simon. 2007. "Exceptional Sovereignty? Guantanamo Bay and the ReColonial Present." Antipode 39 (4):627-648.
Rose-Redwood, Ruben. 2006. "Governmentality, geography, and the geo-coded world."
Progress in Human Geography 30 (4): 469-486.
Rose, Gillian. 2001. Visual Methodologies. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Rose, Nicholas. 1996. "Governing ‘advanced’ liberal democracies." in Foucault and
Political Reason, edited by Andrew Barry, Nikolas Rose, 37-64. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Rose, Nicholas. 1999. Powers of Freedom. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Rosin, Hannah. 2001. "Asylum Seekers Decry Detention by INS - Agency's Family
Shelter Opened to Meet Family Needs, but Grievances Remain." Washington
Post. June 17, 2001, A 6.
Ruddick, Susan. 2007a. “At the Horizons of the Subjct: Neo-Liberalism, neoconservatism and the rights of the child. Part One: From ‘knowing’ fetus to
‘confused’ child.” Gender Place and Culture 14 (5): 513-526.
Ruddick, Susan. 2007b. “At the Horizons of the Subject: Neo-liberalism, neoconservatism and the rights of the child Part Two: Parent, caregiver, state.”
Gender, Place and Culture 14(6): 627-640.

232

Salter, Mark. 2006. “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the
International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics.” Alternatives. 31(167-189).
Samers, Mark. 2002. "Immigration and the Global City Hypothesis: Towards an
Alternative Research Agenda." International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research. 26 (2): 389-402.
Samers, Michael. 2003. "Invisible capitalism: political economy and the regulation of
undocumented immigration in France." Economy and Society. 32 (4): 555-583.
Saulny, Susan. 2008. “Hundreds are Arrested in U.S. Sweep of Meat Plant.” The New
York Times, May 13:A13.
Schmitt, Carl. 1985. Political Theology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schmitt, Carl. 2003. The Nomos of the Earth. New York: Telos Press.
Schmitt, Eric. 2001. "New Shelter Seeks to Place Asylum-Seeking Families in More
Hospitable Surrounding." New York Times, June 14, 2001, p. A 16.
Secor, Anna. 2004. “‘There Is an Istanbul That Belongs to Me’: Citizenship, Space, and
Identity in the City." Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 94 (2):
352-368.
Secor, Anna. J. 2001. Towards a Feminist Counter-Geopolitics: Gender, Space and
Islamist Politics in Istanbul. Space and Polity 5(3): 191-211.
Secor, Anna. J. 2007. "Between longing and despair: state, space, and subjectivity in
Turkey." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 25 (1):33-52.
Secure Fence Act. 2006. P.L. 109-367.
Sexton, Jared, and Elizabeth Lee. 2006. "Figuring the Prison: Prerequisites of Torture at
Abu Ghraib." Antipode 38 (5):1005-1022.
Shahani, Aarti and Greene, Judy. 2009. Local Democracy on ICE: Why State and Local
Law Enforcement Have No Business in Immigration Law Enforcement. Brooklyn,
NY: Justice Strategies.
Silvey, Rachel. 2004. "Geographies of Gender and Migration: Spatializing Social
Difference." International Migration Review. 40(1): 64-81.
Simmons, Tracy. 2008. Sexuality and immigration: UK family reunion policy and the
regulation of sexual citizenship in the European Union. Political Geography 27:
213-230.
Somerville, Siobhan. 2005. "Sexual Aliens and the Racialized State: A Queer Reading
of the 1952 U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act," in Queer Migrations:
233

Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings, edited by E. Lubhéid and L.
Cantú, 75-91. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Sparke, Matthew. 2006. "A neoliberal nexus: Economy, security and the biopolitics of
citizenship on the border." Political Geography. 25 (2): 151-180.
Staeheli, Lynn and Nagel, Caroline. 2006. "Topographies of home and citizenship:
Arab-American activists in the United States." Environment and Planning A
38(9): 1599-1614.
Staeheli, Lynn and Kofman, Elanor. and Peake, Linda. 2004. Mapping Gender, Making
Politics: Feminist Perspectives on Political Geography. New York: Routledge.
Stasiulis, Davina. 2002. “The Active Child Citizen: Lessons from Canadian Policy and
the Children’s Movement.” Citizenship Studies 6 (4): 507-532.
Stevens, Jacqueline. 1999. Reproducing the State. Trenton: Princeton University Press.
Stychin, Carl F. 2001. "Sexual Citizenshp in the European Union." Citizenship Studies
5(3): 285-301.
Sundberg, Juanita. 2008. " 'Trash-talk' and the production of quotidian geopolitical
boundaries in the US-Mexico borderlands." Social & Cultural Geography
9(8):871-890.
Sundberg, Juanita. and Bonnie Kaserman. 2007. “Cactus carvings and desert
defecations: embodying representations of border crossings in protected areas on
the Mexico-US border.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25:
727-744.
Tesfahuney, Mekonnen. 1998. “Mobility, racism, and geopolitics.” Political Geography
17(5): 499-515.
Thronson, David. 2002. “Kids Will Be Kids?: Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's
Rights Underlying Immigration Law.” Ohio State Law Journal 63: 979-1016.
Thronson, David. 2007-8. “Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as
Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody.” Hastings Law Journal 59:
453-514.
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. 2009. Huge Increase in Transfers of
Detainees. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University). Available at:
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/220/. Last accessed December 2, 2009.
US Congress, House Committee on Appropriations. 2005. Department of Homeland
Security appropriations bill, 2006: report together with additional views (to
accompany H.R. 2360). 109th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: US
Government Printing Office.
234

US Congress, House of Representatives. 2007. H.R. 4088: Secure America through
Verification and Enforcement (SAVE) Act. 110th Congress, 1st Session 6
November. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
US Congress, Senate. 2007. Bill 2368. 2007. S. 2368: Secure America through
Verification and Enforcement (SAVE) Act. 110th Congress, 1st Session 15
November. Washington, D.C. US Government Printing Office.
US Congress, Senate. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001. 107th Congress. P.L. 107-56.
US Customs and Border Protection. 2004. National Border Patrol Strategy Department
of Homeland Security: Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
US Government Accounting Office. 2001. INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource
and Impact Issues Remain after Seven Years. GAO-01-842. Washington, D.C.:
US Government Printing Office.
US Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics 2009.
Immigration Enforcement Actions Annual Report 2008. Government Printing
Office: Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
US Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics 2010.
Immigration Enforcement Actions Annual Report 2009. Government Printing
Office: Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office.
US Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics. 2009. 2008
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Available at:
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf.
Last Accessed August 30, 2009.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2005. “Fact Sheet: Secure Border Iniative.”
Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0794.shtm.
Accessed March 14, 2011.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2006a. “DHS closes loophole by expanding
Expedited Removal to cover illegal alien families,” Press Release May 15, 2006.
On file with author.

US Department of Homeland Security. 2006b. “Remarks by Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff, Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar and Acting
Director of Detention and Removal Operations John Torres at an Operational
Briefing on the Secure Border Initiative.” February 9 2006. Available at:
235

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0852.shtm. Accessed
December 20, 2009.
US Department of Homeland Security 2006c. Detention Operations Manual. Available
at: http://149.101.23.4/partners/dro/opsmanual/index.htm.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2008a. “Secure Border Initiative.” Resource
Document. Department of Homeland Security.
http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/programs/editorial_0868.shtm. Accessed October 29,
2008.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2008a. “Secure Border Initiative.” Resource
Document. Department of Homeland Security.
http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/programs/editorial_0868.shtm. Accessed October 29,
2008.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2008b. “The Southwest Border Fence.” Resource
Document. Department of Homeland Security.
http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/border-fence-southwest.shtm. Accessed
November 2, 2008.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2008c. Immigration Enforcement Actions
Annual Report 2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Office of Immigration Statistics.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2008d. Immigration Enforcement Actions
Annual Report 2007. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Office of Immigration Statistics.
US Department of Homeland Security. 2009. 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration
Statistics.
US Department of the Interior. 2008. Effects of the International Boundary Pedestrian
Fence in the Vicinity of Lukeville, Arizona, on Drainage Systems and
Infrastructure, Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, Arizona. Ajo, AZ:
National Park Service.
US Government Accountability Office. 2001. INS’ Southwest Border Strategy:
Resource and Impact Issues Remain after Seven Years. GAO-01-842.
Washington, D.C.: US Government Accountability Office.
US Government Accountability Office. 2008. Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2008
Expenditure Plans Show Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional
Oversight and DHS Accountability. GAO-08-739R. Washington, D.C.: US
Government Accountability Office.

236

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2003. Endgame: Office of Detention and
Removal Strategic Plan, 2003-2012. Washington, D.C.: US Department of
Homeland Security.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2005. "Prosecutorial Discretion Memo."
William J. Howard, Principle Legal Advisor, Office of the Principle Legal
Advisor, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, October 24, 2005.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2006a. "Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2005.”
February 5, 2005. Washington, D.C.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2006b. "Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2005.”
February 5, 2006. Washington, D.C.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2006c. “Intergovernmental Service
Agreement DROIGSA-06-0001 HSCEOPP06FIG0001.” On file with author.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2007a. "Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2008.”
December 28, 2007. Washington, D.C. On file with author.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2007b. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement: Fiscal Year 2006. Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland
Security.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2007c. “Fact Sheets: The ICE T. Don Hutto
Family Residential Facility: maintaining family unity, enforcing immigration
laws.”
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2007d. "Prosecutorial and Custody
Discretion Memo." Julie Meyers, Assistant Secretary of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, November 7, 2007.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2008a. "Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2009.”
February 1, 2008. Washington, D.C. On file with author.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2008b. Family Residential Facility Design
Standards. On file with author.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2008c. Family Residential Standards.
Washington, D.C. On file with author.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2008d. Fact Sheet: ICE Office of Detention
and Removal. November 2, 2006. Updated January 16, 2008.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2008e. Solicitation hscedm-08-r-0005. On
File with Author.

237

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2009a. “Press Release.” August 6, 2009.
Washington, D.C.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2009b. Immigration Detention Overview
and Recommendations (by Dora Schriro) Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2009c. "Fact Sheet: 2009 Detention
Reforms." file://localhost/Available at/
http/::www.ice.gov:news:library:factsheets:reform-2009reform.htm. Last
Accessed January 12, 2010.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2010a. "ICE Fiscal Year 2010 Enacted
Budget.” November 5, 2009. On file with author.
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2010b. "Fact Sheet: T. Don Hutto
Residential Center." Updated March 24, 2010. Available at:
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/facilities-hutto.htm. Last Accessed
January 12, 2010.
US Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1996. Building a Comprehensive Border
Enforcement Strategy. U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C.
US Immigration and Naturalization Service. N.d. Responsive Materials to American
Civil Liberties Union Freedon of Information Act Request 09-FOIA-3528. On file
with author.
Vadantam, Shankar. 2010. "U.S. deportations reach record high." Washington Post,
October 7, 2010, Section A. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/06/AR2010100607232.html. Accessed January 12,
2010.
Valentine, Gill. 2008. "The ties that bind: towards geographies of intimacy." Geography
Compass. 2(6): 2097-2110.
Van Hook, Jennifer and Kelly Stamper Balisteri, 2006. “Ineligible parents, eligible
children: Food Stamps, allotments, and food insecurity among children of
immigrants.” Social Science Research 35: 228-251.
van Houtum, Henk and Martin van der Velde. 2004. "The power of cross-border labour
market immobility." Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 95 (1):
100-107.
van Houtum, Henk and R. Pijpers. 2007. “The European Union as gated community:
The two-faced border and immigration regime of the EU.” Antipode 39 (2):291309.

238

Varsanyi, Monica. 2005. “Documenting Undocumented Migrants: The Matrículas
Consulares and Neoliberal Local Membership.” Geopolitics 12(2): 299-319.
Varsanyi, Monica. 2008. “Rescaling the ‘Alien,’ Rescaling Personhood: Neoliberalism,
Immigration, and the State.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers
98(4): 877-896.
VERA Institute of Justice. 1998. The Appearance Assistance Program: Attaining
Compliance with Immigration Laws through Community Supervision. New York:
New York.
Viña, Stephen. 2003. Authority to Enforce the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in
the Wake of the Homeland Security Act: Legal Issues. RL31997. Congressional
Research Service: Washington, D.C.
Waever, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and desecuritization " in On Security, edited by
Ronnie. Lipschutz, 46-86. New York: Columbia University Press.
Waever, Ole and Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrip and Pierre Lemaitre. 1993. Identity,
Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe. New York: St. Martin's
Press.
Waitt, Gordon. 2005. "Doing Discourse Analysis," in Qualitative Research Methods in
Human Geography, edited by Ian Hay, 163-191. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications.
Walby, Sylvia. 1996. "Woman and Nation," in Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal
Balakrishnan, 235-254. London: Verso.
Walters, William. 2006. "Border/Control." European Journal of Social Theory 9(2):
187-203.
Walton-Roberts, M. and G. Pratt. 2005. "Mobile modernities: A South Asian family
negotiates immigration, gender and class in Canada." Gender, Place, and Culture
12 (2): 173-195.
Watts, Michael. 2003. “Development and Governmentality.” Singapore Journal of
Tropical Geography 24 (1): 6-34.
Welch, Michael. 2002. Detained: Immigration Laws and the Expanding INS Jail
Complex. Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
Welch, Michael. and Liza. Schuster. 2005a. "Detention of Asylum Seekers in the UK
and USA: Deciphering Noisy and Quiet Constructions." Punishment and Society
7 (4): 397-417.

239

Welch, Michael. and Liza. Schuster. 2005b. "Detention of asylum seekers in the US,
UK, France, Germany, and Italy: A Critical View of the Globalizing Culture of
Control." Criminology & Criminal Justice 5 (4): 331-355.
White, Allen. 2002. "Geographies of asylum, legal knowledge and legal practices."
Political Geography 21 (8): 1055-1073.
Willen, Sarah. 2007. “ ‘Toward a Critical Phenomenology of “Illegality’: State Power,
Criminalization, and Abjectivity among Undocumented Migrant Workers in Tel
Aviv, Israel.” International Migration 45(3): 8-38.
Winchester, Hilary. 1990. "Women and Children Last: The Poverty and Marginalization
of One-Parent Families." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 15
(1): 70-86.
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children. 2002. Prison Guard or
Parent: INS Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee Children. Available at:
www.womenscommission.org. Accessed March 31, 2007.
Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children. 2007. Locking up family
values: The detention of immigrant families. Available at:
www.womenscommission.org. Accessed March 31, 2007.
Yeoh, Brenda S. A. 2006. "Bifurcated labour: The unequal incorporation of
transmigrants in Singapore." Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie
97 (1): 26-37.
Yuval-Davis, Nira and Floya Anthias. 1989. Woman-nation-state. New York: St.
Martin's Press.

COURT CASES
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.581, 9 S. Ct. 623 (1889).

Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Flores v. Meese Settlement. 1997. Case No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px). Available at:
"http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/flores_v_meese_agreement.pdf"http://ww
w.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/flores_v_meese_agreement.pdf.
Fong Yue Ting v. United States. 149 US 698 (1893). On file with the author.

240

In re Hutto Family Detention Center. 2007. Case No. A-07-CA-164-SS. Available at:
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/31504lgl20070826.html. Accessed
August 30, 2009. On file with the author.
Bunikyte et al., v. Chertoff et al., Case No. A-07-CA-164. Available at:
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/31504lgl20070826.html.
---“Anonymous Memorandum.” On file with the author.
--- “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.” On file with the author.
---“Declaration of Delourdes Verdeiu.” On file with the author.
---“Declaration of Deka Warsame.” On file with the author.
---“Declaration Raouitee Puran.” On file with the author.
---“Deposition of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director Marc
Moore.” On file with the author.
---“Final Compliance Report.” On file with the author.
---“Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to Prevent Separation from her Mother.” On
file with the author.
--- “Order” April 9, 2007. On file with the author.
--- “Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of her Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Ordering her
Immediate Release from Hutto With Her Mother.” On file with the author.
--- “Transcript of the Status Conference Before the Honorable Sam Sparks May 29,
2007.” On file with the author.
---“Transcript of the Injunction for Equitable Relief Before Honorable Judge Sam
Sparks.” March 20, 2007. On file with the author.
Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 202 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
Reno v. American-Arab Defamation Committee 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
Reno v. Flores 91-905, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).

241

VITA
LAUREN LEIGH MARTIN
DATE OF BIRTH: September 27, 1979
PLACE OF BIRTH: Houston, Texas

EDUCATION
BA, Philosophy, Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA. (2001).

AWARDS AND HONORS
Association of American Geographers Graduate Student Affinity Group Student
Paper Competition, Second Place. (2010)
Dissertation Year Fellowship. The Graduate School, University of Kentucky,
(2009-2010)
National Science Foundation, Geography and Regional Science. $9,504. Project:
“Doctoral Dissertation Research: Immigrant Family Detention: The Family, Law,
Security, and Space in U.S. Immigration Policy and Practice.” BCS 0825843.
Funded from August 1, 2008 to January 31, 2010. (Competitive.)
Dissertation Enhancement Award, University of Kentucky. (2008).
Presidential Fellowship, The Graduate School, University of Kentucky. (2007-8).
Daniel Reedy Achievement Award, The Graduate School, University of
Kentucky. (2004-2006).
PUBLICATIONS
Lauren Martin. 2010. “Bombs, Bodies, and Biopolitics: Securitizing the Subject at
the Airport Security Checkpoint.” Social & Cultural Geography, 11(1): 17-34.
Lauren Martin. 2010. “Critical Geographies: A Collection of Readings by Harald
Bauder and Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro and Radical Theory/Critical Practice:
Making a Difference Beyond the Academy? by Duncan Fuller and Rob Kitchin.
Reviewed by: Lauren Martin.” .” Human Geography 3(1).
Lauren Martin. 2009. “Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times.
Jasbir K. Puar. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. xxviii and 335pp., $24.95
paperback (ISBN 978-0-8223-4114-7).” Accepted by Annals of the Association of
American Geographers.
Lauren Martin and Matthew Mitchelson. 2009. “Geographies of Detention and
242

Confinement: Interrogating Spatial Practices of Confinement, Discipline, Law,
and State Power.” Geography Compass, 3(2): 459-477. (Invited article.)
Lauren Martin and Stephanie Simon. 2008. “A Formula for Disaster: The
Department of Homeland Security's Virtual Ontology.” Space and Polity. 12(3):
281-296.
Oliver Belcher, Lauren Martin, Anna Secor, Stephanie Simon, Tommy Wilson.
2008. “Everywhere and Nowhere: The Exception and the Topological Challenge
to Geography.” Antipode, 40 (5): 499-503.
Laura Gomez Tovar, Lauren Martin, Manuel Angel Gomez Cruz, Tad
Mutersbaugh. 2005. “Certified Organic Agriculture in Mexico: Market
Connections & Certification Practices in Large and Small Producers,” Journal of
Rural Studies, 29(4): 461-474.
Lauren Martin. 2007. “Interrogating ‘Experience’: Phenomenology, Architecture,
and Erudition. disClosure interviews Mark Jarzombek.” disClosure: A Journal of
Social Theory, 16: 91-99.
Lauren Martin. 2007. “Book Review: Butler, Judith. 2004. Precarious Life: the
Powers of Mourning and Violence. Verso, New York, NY.” disClosure: A
Journal of Social Theory, 16: 143-145.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Teaching Positions
Instructor, Department of Geography, University of Kentucky.
Cities of the World, Spring 2011.
Instructor, Latin American Studies Program, University of Kentucky.
Introduction to Latin American Studies. Fall 2006, Spring 2007.
Teaching Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Kentucky.
Lands and Peoples of the non-Western World. Fall 2005, Fall 2010.
Research Assistant, with Dr. Tad Mutersbaugh on an NSF-funded project on
Mexican fair trade coffee certification. Department of Geography, University of
Kentucky. Fall 2004-Summer 2005.
Other Experience
Scholar-in Residence, Grassroots Leadership, Inc. 2008-2010.
Consulting Geographer/Dramaturg, “We Give Up,” Directed by Maureen Towey,
Baryshnikov Arts Center, New York City, New York. 2008-2009.
243

Conference Organization
Session Organizer, “Finding the Family in Geographical Research I, II.” April 1418, 2010, at the Annual Association of American Geographers Conference,
Washington, D.C.
Session Organizer, “Geographies of Closed Doors I, II: Interrogating Security
Research and Methodology.” March 27, 2009. Annual Association of American
Geographers Conference, Las Vegas, NV.
Session Organizer, “Geographies of Detention and Confinement I, II, III.” April
16, 2008. Annual Association of American Geographers Conference, Boston,
MA.
Session Organizer, “Geographies of Detention and Confinement: Challenges of
Fieldwork.” April 16, 2008. Annual Association of American Geographers
Conference, Boston, MA.
Session Organizer, “Reassessing Sovereignty I, II.” April 19, 2007, Annual
Association of American Geographers Conference, San Francisco, CA.

Lauren Martin
March 9, 2011

244

